Jammu & Kashmir, history: 1989-, Iqbal, Dr Muhammad

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[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir|J ]]
 
 
= Governor's/ President’s rule=
 
==1977- 2018==
 
[http://www.dailypioneer.com/nation/if-jandk-comes-under-guv-rule-it-will-be-for-the-8th-time-in-4-decades.html  If J&K comes under Guv rule, it will be for the 8th time in 4 decades, 21 June 2018, PTI: ''The Pioneer'']
 
 
 
Governor's rule was imposed for the first time on March 26, 1977 during the tenure of Governor L K Jha after state Congress -- then headed by Sayeed -- withdrew support to the minority Government of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah of National Conference. Sheikh had come to the power following an accord with then prime minister Indira Gandhi in 1975.
 
 
The Governor's rule lasted for 105 days and ended as the National Conference founder returned to power in the Assembly polls.
 
 
Governor's rule was imposed for the second time in March 1986 after state Congress -- again headed by Sayeed -- withdrew support to the minority Government of Ghulam Mohammad Shah.
 
 
Shah became the Chief Minister after he led a rebellion with National Conference against his brother-in-law and then incumbent Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah in 1984.
 
 
This 246-day spell ended after Farooq Abdullah entered into an accord of his own with the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi
 
 
The third time Governor's rule was imposed in January 1990 when Farooq Abdullah resigned as the chief minister over the appointment of Jagmohan as the Governor following eruption of militancy in the state.
 
 
Sayeed was the Union Home Minister at that time and had brushed aside Farooq Abdullah's opposition to Jagmohan's appointment.  This was the longest spell of Governor's Rule -- six years and 264 days -- which ended in October 1996 after National Conference returned to power in Assembly elections held after a gap of nine-and-a-half years.
 
 
Six years later,  Governor's rule had to be imposed in the state for the fourth time in October 2002 after caretaker Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah refused to continue in the office in the wake of his party's defeat in the assembly elections that year. The 2002 Assembly polls threw up a hung assembly with no party in a position to form a Government on its own.
 
 
Sayeed, whose regional PDP had won 16 seats, negotiated an alliance with the Congress and dozen-odd independents to form the Government, ending the 15-day direct Central rule on March 1, when Sayeed was sworn in as the Chief Minister.
 
 
It was the shortest spell of Governor's rule -- 15 days -- as the PDP and Congress with support of 12 independents formed a government on November 2.
 
Mufti Sayeed's death was the cause for the next promulgation of the Governor's rule on January 8, 2016 after allies-- PDP and BJP-- deferred the Government formation process till the end of the four-day mourning period.
 
 
Invoking Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Vohra promulgated Governor's rule after approval by President Pranab Mukherjee.
 
 
It was the seventh time Governor's rule was promulgated in the State since Independence, the first being in March 1977. The central rule came to an end after Mehbooba Mufti was sworn in as the Chief Minister on April 4, 2016.
 
 
 
June 20, 2018: It was for the fourth time that the state will be placed under central rule during N N Vohra's tenure as Governor. Vohra, a former civil servant, became the Governor on June 25, 2008.
 
 
The BJP pulled out of its alliance with the PDP, saying it has become impossible to continue in the Government in view of the growing radicalism and terrorism in the state.
 
 
Ironically, late PDP chief Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, the father of incumbent Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti and her predecessor, was an important player in the political developments of the State that led to the imposition of central rule on the previous seven occasions.
 
 
=Late 1989- early 1990: A militant movement begins=
 
==The ideology behind the uprising==
 
[http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/hizb-leader-zakir-warns-hurriyat/249174.html  Hizb leader Zakir warns Hurriyat | IANS| May 13 2017| Greater Kashmir]
 
 
[[File: India Today , September 1,2016 a.jpg| India Today , September 1,2016 |frame|500px]]
 
 
[In May 2017, Hizbul Mujahideen leader Zakir Musa] asserted that his outfit was clear in its motives of "fighting to impose a Shariat in Kashmir and not resolving the Kashmir issue by calling it a political struggle".
 
 
Zakir [added]: "I am warning all those hypocrite Hurriyat leaders. They must not interfere in our Islamic struggle. If they do, we will cut their heads and hang them in Lal Chowk".
 
 
"Those leaders should know that the struggle is for Islam, for Shariat," he was heard saying in [an] over five-minute audio clip. IANS [could] not confirm the authenticity of the audio clip.
 
 
 
Urging the people of Kashmir to unite against the Hurriyat's "hycocrisy", Zakir says: "We all should love our religion and we should realise that we are fighting for Islam. If the Hurriyat leaders think it is not so, then why have we been hearing the slogan 'Azaadi ka matlab kya? - La ilaha il Allah' [‘Pakistan say rishta kya? La ilaha il Allah']’ , why have they (Hurriyat groups) been using mosques in their politics?" [Additional input from Nadeem Nadu, Journalist, on whatsapp, 12 May 2017]
 
 
The Hizbul Mujahideen has been waging a silent battle to upstage the Hurriyat Conference since the 2016 uprising. [In May 2017], the militant outfit also released a statement asking women protesters to not come on the roads to protest.
 
 
 
[http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/burhan-wani-successor-zakir-bhat-targets-hurriyat-brass/articleshow/58651619.cms  M Saleem Pandit | Call it Islamic struggle or die: Hizbul Mujahideen to Hurriyat |TNN | May 13, 2017  | IndiaTimes/ ''The Times of India''] adds:
 
 
Hizbul Mujahideen [leader] Zakir Bhat succeeded Burhan Wani after his killing in an encounter [in 2016].
 
 
In a strongly worded audio message to separatists shared on social media, Zakir Bhat, aka Moosa, said: " Hum kufr ko chhod kar pehley aap ko latkayeingey. Lal Chowk mein inkey galey kateingey ! (Before we kill the disbelievers [kufr literally means ‘infidel’], we'll hang you... your heads will be chopped at Lal Chowk)."
 
 
Zakir insisted that the 27-year-old armed movement in Kashmir was an Islamic struggle, not a political fight, and also warned separatists not to meddle in the setting up a caliphate in J&K along the lines of the rule established by [Daesh/ the] Islamic State.
 
 
He warned them against using mosques and other Islamic symbols and slogans if they believed that Kashmir was a political struggle.
 
 
Hurriyat's Syed Ali Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Yasin Malik stress on resolution of the Kashmir issue+ by seeking the right to "self-determination".
 
 
The Mirwaiz, who is the custodian of the Jamia Masjid in Srinagar, demands the implementation of UN resolutions of 1947 regarding Kashmir every Friday.
 
 
Geelani, on the other hand, roots for Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Addressing them, Zakir said, "You are our big problem... if you have to run this dirty politics, run it in your homes... if we have to implement the shariat, we have to implement it on ourselves."
 
 
Zakir, a native of violence-infested Tral in Pulwama district, was studying to be an engineer in a Chandigarh college before picking up arms in July 2016.
 
 
"I am not an ulema (sic), but scholars here are corrupt... fearful of crossing limits that they may be imprisoned. That is why we have to come forward," Zakir said, quoting a verse from the Quran. "They are actually political leaders and they can't be our leaders," Zakir said. "Our fight is purely for the sake of Islam, and we shall implement the shariat in Kashmir, insha-Allah," he said.
 
 
==Influencing the mind: 1989-2017==
 
[[File: Influencing the mind.jpg| Schools of faith popular in the Valley of Kashmir, especially during 1989-2017 |frame|500px]]
 
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=How-mosques-and-mobiles-are-radicalising-Kashmir-09072017010016    Aarti Singh | How mosques and mobiles are radicalising Kashmir | Jul 09 2017 : The Times of India (Delhi)]
 
 
 
The Valley has been succumbing to a hardline Wahhabi Islam, which is displacing or co-opting the more syncretic schools
 
 
Last month, in a south Kashmir mosque, Mufti Shabir Ahmad Qasmi fiercely defended former Hizbul commander Zakir Musa's call for Islamic jihad. For the first time, a cleric, using his religious pedestal, was exhorting believers to support Kashmir's most wanted terrorist, who had recently aligned ideologically with al-Qaida. The mufti's speech was widely circulated on online messaging platforms in the Valley .
 
 
Kashmir's mosques have always been used for religio-political ends, and for separatism since 1989 when the militancy broke out. But the character of the mosque has changed dramatically in the last decade.
 
 
HanafiBarelvi Islam, the traditionally moderate school followed by the majority in Kashmir, is being replaced by the radical Ahl-e-Hadith, the local moniker for Saudi-imported Salafism or Wahhabism. Though many Hanafi clerics like Moulana Abdul Rashid Dawoodi are resisting their Wahhabi competitors, “the attendance in annual fairs of all major Sufi shrines has been decreasing,“ said Muzamil, a Sufi practitioner. Of the roughly six million Muslims in the Valley , the once-marginal Ahl-e-Hadith now has over a million followers, claimed its general secretary , Dr Abdul Latif.
 
 
Arab-funded Wahhabism finds convergence with already-established conservative strains of Islam, such as the Deobandi and Jamat-e-Islami movements in Kashmir. The mufti who made a plea for Musa is a Deobandi from a Jamati household. Such religious intersections are not limited to fundamentalists. Last year, Sarjan Barkati, a selfproclaimed Sufi, earned epithets like `Pied Piper of Kashmir' and `Freedom Chacha' for mobilising people and glorifying the Hizbul commander Burhan Wani who had wanted to establish an Islamic Caliphate. These mutations from moderate to radical have been happening insidiously and manifested themselves in the mob that lynched deputy SP Ayub Pandith on Shab-e-Qadr.
 
 
The coalescing of all the schools of Sunni Islamic thought in Kashmir is result of a “common broad-based platform, Ittehaad-e-Millat, created to resolve differences“ not only among the puritanical groups but also with syncretic Barelvi outfits, said Jamat-i-Islami Amir chief Ghulam Mohammad Bhat. IeM was actively involved in organising protest rallies in favour of Wani last year. Way before Wani was killed, the signs of Wahhabised radicalisation had already begun to emerge. Maulana Mushtaq Ahmad Veeri, for example, was already popular in south Kashmir by 2015 for sermons in which he praised the IS and Caliph Al Baghdadi. “It was only a matter of time before the youth started waving IS flags while pelting stones, or Wani or Musa declared jihad for the Caliphate.Ironically, many moderate Kashmiri Muslims claim that IS has been created by the US and Israel to malign Muslims,“said a student of religion from Bijbehara.
 
 
Official sources said that there are over 7,500 mosques and seminaries in Kashmir, of which over 6,000 are Hanafi and around 200 are syncretic Sufi shrines.Ahl-e-Hadith, Deoband and Jamat put together have just over 1,000 mosques and charity based seminaries, of which Ahle-Hadith has the largest number. “ Ahl-eHadith mosques are popular for their modern furnishing and facilities,“ said Shahnawaz, a Barelvi follower in Anantnag, adding that the organisation also funds several orphanages, clinics and medical diagnostic centres.
 
 
Sources said Ahl-e-Hadith mosques and seminaries have doubled in the last 27 years. FCRA annual reports show that top donors to India among the Salafist Islam practising states are the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Although it is not clear who the top donor and recipient in J&K is, the state has received between 10 and 100 crores as foreign funds each year in the last decade.
 
 
Ahl-e-Hadith played a role in the separatist movement as a part of the joint Hurriyat Conference until it was split in 2003. The organisation is known to share a relationship with Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen, which is closely associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba. The TuM is a part of the PoK-based United Jihad Council headed by Hizbul Mujahideen commander Syed Salahuddin, who in 2014, had declared support for al-Qaida's entry into Kashmir.
 
 
However, security officials believe that the influence of Wahhabi discourse through the Internet, social media and messaging platforms is far more dangerous than the mosques and literature.“Kashmir has around 2.8 million mobile internet users. Even if there is one Salafist preacher glorifying Burhan Wani or Zakir Musa and the clip is circulated over smartphones, it has a dangerous multiplying effect over a huge population,“ a senior police official said.
 
 
Mobile data usage, officials claim, is higher in Kashmir than other parts of the country because of lack of other sources of entertainment. Cinemas, bars and discotheques were shut in Kashmir in the early 1990s when militant groups issued diktats against all things “un-Islamic“.
 
 
=1990: The situation in April =
 
[http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/terrorism-takes-a-perilous-turn-in-kashmir/1/315063.html  Inderjit Badhwar, Kashmir: Perilous turn, April 30, 1990 | ''India Today'']
 
 
''' The militant-fundamentalist sway over the Kashmir valley is complete, and the country's administrative control has been almost totally nullified. The situation is critical, and the time for soft options over. '''
 
 
 
'' Islam ki buniyad pe yeh mulk bana hai, ayega is mulk mein Islam ka dastoor, is mulk mein toofan ayega '' (The hurricane of Islam will blow through this land). -Refrain from an underground cassette
 
 
Kashmir is at war with India. It is a declared war with open moral, financial, and logistical support from Pakistan.
 
 
Its first phase is over. And the brutal reality to which the country must awake is that the initial round has already been won by the militants. The enormity of the situation - with the latent challenges it poses for the continued existence of the rest of India as a secular state - does not seem to have dawned fully on New Delhi or even on the rest of the nation.
 
 
And notwithstanding the predictable knee-jerk cries of repression and "reign of terror'' against the state administration by liberal groups like the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL), the stark truth is that the Indian state is barely fighting back.
 
 
The reins of the reign of terror are squarely in the hands of the separatists. Through kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, religious blandishments and press censorship - aided not least of all by the virtual abdication of governance by the Farooq Abdullah government during the last two years - the secessionists have virtually achieved the administrative and psychological severance of the valley from India. And their tentacles are now spreading into Doda, Kistwar, Rajauri and Poonch.
 
 
In a cartographic and military sense, Kashmir remains with India. There's Ladakh in the north. Jammu in the south. And the Indian Army all along the actual line of control. But within this circumference now lies an island, a virulently non-Indian entity called Kashmir easily vulnerable to Pakistani manipulation.
 
 
In Kashmir nobody, either out of fear or out of the total alienation that pervades the region, now talks for India or even a settlement with the Centre. That part is over. Done with. The movement has now arrived at a different crossroads. The debate is now whether they choose independence or Pakistan.
 
 
The 'Indian dogs', as it were, have mostly gone home. From Srinagar, Baramula, Tral, Pulwama, Anantnag, Kupward, Handwara, Bandipore. Businessmen, bankers, retired servicemen, hoteliers, tour operators. And Kashmiri pundits. Those who remain are men in uniform, or the Indian officials sitting as soft targets for terrorist hit lists in Srinagar's Raj Bhawan, or the mini winter secretariat. Lonely outposts of the Indian Union.
 
 
In what is surely one of the greatest refugee migrations in recent Indian history, some 90,000 Kashmiri pundits and other members of the minority community of a total of about 1,40,000 (4 per cent of the population) living in the valley have fled their homes leaving property worth crores behind. Rows of large houses in Munshibagh and Rawalpura are deserted.
 
 
And now, the 30,000-odd Sikh shopkeepers and farmers of Tral, Sopore and Baramula have begun to cry for protection if they, too, are not to migrate. Some have already started moving out.
 
 
Securitymen keep vigil on the empty boulevard along Srinagar's Dal Lake, that was once the hub of the valley's throbbing tourist activity and traffic
 
 
The few local papers that circulate under terrorist benevolence regularly attribute the migration to exaggerated Indian propaganda. The educated elite - yesterday's moderates, today's separatists - tell the eager ideologues of the puce just what they want to hear: that their movement is secular and the fleeing Hindus are just puppets of BJP propaganda. But to a family taking flight from its roots, property, value system and the familiarity of everyday existence, this is just so much nonsense.
 
 
Ask Mrs Dar, a doctor whose family has lived in downtown Srinagar for generations. She fled under fundamentalist threats a month ago to Jammu with her family. She and her sisters returned last fortnight - the men were too scared to accompany them - disguised under burkhas and fell at the feet of a government official begging help to recover their belongings from the house they hurriedly padlocked before fleeing.
 
 
Or a retired subedar major whose tenant, K. Kaul, is mercilessly gunned down on April 5 in Karan Nagar. The subedar receives a death threat shortly afterwards while he is at work. He does not even go back to his house. His daughters rent a truck within a few hours and load it with their belongings. They pick him up at an appointed place and drive straight to a refugee camp in Jammu.
 
 
That same day Subedar Bhushan Lal bursts into the room of a commanding officer inside the cantonment in Srinagar, breaks down and cries like a baby. He was on leave to see his family in Big Behara, a 45-minute drive from Srinagar, but has been hounded out by gangs of roving militants.
 
 
[[File: Scenes from a widely-circulated propaganda Videocassette showing a policeman greeting demonstrators.jpg| Scenes from a widely-circulated propaganda Videocassette showing a policeman greeting demonstrators |frame|500px]]
 
 
He, too, begs for protection for his mother and two daughters whom he left behind in Bij Behara when he fled in the early hours of the morning. All he wants is that they be safely escorted out. They will never go back. It doesn't matter that he is leaving behind his life savings - a small orchard and a house he had managed to build.
 
 
They are not fleeing for nothing. Kashmir has seen upheavals in 1953 and in 1964. There was no mass migration. This was largely because the separatist forces had identifiable leaders who espoused secularism and there were few, if any, terrorist assassinations of innocents.
 
 
But today, the movement is dominated by the money provided by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and the muscle power of the pro-Pakistan, fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami and its Hizbul Mujaheddin and Allah Tiger terror groups. The Jamaat is supposed to be strong in Baramula and Sopore and the "secular" Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in Srinagar and Anantnag. But this is now merely semantics.
 
 
For what once used to be a mass movement for the preservation of ethnic identity, of Kashmiriyat, of which Article 370 was supposed to be the symbolic guardian, has been consumed by a fundamentalist fury that gives the movement sustenance and spiritual guidance. The liberal spirit of sufism that had so infused the valley has now been exorcised.
 
 
The movement is now largely conducted from the mosques from where thousands of loudspeakers preach jehad in a terrifying cacophony. And the fundamentalist cultural aggression has spread into everyday life. People must sport beards and wear the traditional Kashmiri garb. Wristwatches, as in Pakistan, must be worn on the right hand and the time set back a half-hour to correspond with that of Pakistan.
 
 
Cinema halls, beauty and video parlours, symbols of Indian "decadence" have remained closed for six months. Friday, not Sunday, is now observed as the day of rest. Indian newspapers are not circulated any more. In Kupwara, street dogs were affixed with discs around their necks with the inscription, "Indian dogs," and in Khak, nearby, effigies of Indian soldiers are hung from trees. In nearby Sopore, militants impose their own road tax on civilian vehicles.
 
 
Almost everywhere in the valley, Indian institutions have been rendered redundant. In Srinagar, the Bank of Baroda has closed down, many of its officers have fled. The Canara Bank has virtually no staff to handle payments. And the militants have even knocked down the signboard of the State Bank of India near Srinagar's Batwara Chowk.
 
 
The banking system is virtually shut down. At the post offices tens of thousands of letters are piled up with no one to deliver them. Lawyers have boycotted the courts.
 
 
And Muslim government servants now in the winter capital of Jammu have threatened to strike unless moved back to Srinagar. Conversely, minority community officials are balking at having to go to Srinagar when the capital shifts there in summer.
 
 
Agriculture continues, with paddy cultivation in full swing, but trade and commerce are at a standstill. The transport, sheet metal, machine tool and lumber industries have ceased to function.
 
[[File: We are fighting a holy war.jpg| This was the sentiment since the earliest m onths of the movement: '' We are fighting a holy war '' |frame|500px]]
 
 
The hotels lie empty. The once proud Oberoi Palace has lost half its executive staff. And Mercury Travels Manager, Raj Awasthi, for the first time closed shop and left Srinagar, bags, baggage and all signalling the end of the tourist season even before it started. The house boats and shikaras bob aimlessly on the waters of the Dal and Nagin lakes like so much driftwood.
 
 
Life is one curfew after another with periods of relaxation. When it is relaxed people mill furtively in the streets for a little bit of shopping. Cigarettes are scarce, meat rarely available, fresh vegetables a treat if one can find them. Even though the people have begun to feel the pinch, there's still enough to eat. Every September, the Kashmiri begins stocking up on rice and dried tomatoes and other provisions.
 
 
These will last until May when there are fresh earnings through tourism, carpet weaving and casual labour. But even though this prospect looks bleak the people take heart from regularly beamed Pakistani propaganda that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was recently shown supporting a thousand-year struggle to "liberate" Kashmir, will raise crores of rupees in relief money.
 
 
During curfew relaxation, life appears superficially normal. But life is not normal even in the sanctuary of the army cantonment. Army schools have been closed down and parents given transfer certificates for their children: And the corps commander has declared downtown areas oat of bounds for army personnel and their families.
 
 
It is during curfew relaxation that the gunmen strike. The strategy is simple. Fire, or hurl bombs at security personnel, assassinate a soft target and duck. Force the security forces to return the fire in which innocent civilians are often killed, fuelling further anti-Indian sentiments.
 
 
[[File: Number and Nature of Casualties.jpg| Number and Nature of Casualties till mid-April 1990|frame|500px]]
 
 
According to government estimates, anywhere between 2,000 and 5,000 automatic weapons, mostly Chinese-made AK-47s, have been smuggled into the valley. The number of trained insurgents is about 600.
 
 
But with a network of sympathisers now spreading into virtually every village in the valley with sophisticated information cells', they spell a formidable problem for the roughly 20,000 men of the paramilitary and police forces deployed mostly in large towns.
 
 
Among of, biggest challenges for the security forces is that the activists, both armed and unarmed, include PWD workers, irrigation engineers, schoolteachers, storeowners, doctors, lawyers, former MLAs and, most important, members of the Jammu & Kashmir Police who have been active in recruiting terrorists, arranging border crossings, and even driving their vehicles.
 
 
Separatist targets are not just anybody found sympathetic to India but, increasingly, Indian Army installations. The subversive arsenal now includes antitank mines, rocket launchers and remote detonation devices. In several places army communication channels have been sabotaged. Civilian personnel working at army installations in Kupwara have received death threats.
 
 
How did the situation take such a precipitous turn for the worse? The answer is, it was not sudden. As the official record has shown, Governor Jagmohan was near prophetic in his warnings to Rajiv Gandhi during 1988-89 that the Farooq Abdullah government had collapsed even while it was in power and that separatist militancy, no matter what its immediate roots, was exploding. The warnings were ignored.
 
 
It is possible to pinpoint some events that helped fuel the insurgency. First, at a time when militancy was peaking, Farooq's government released 70 of the most experienced, Pakistani-trained terrorists whose detention had been confirmed by the Advisory Board headed by the chief justice of the state high court (see box). Even though they were on parole, they are now untraceable.
 
 
The separatists saw this as an important victory. Their morale got a major boost when the V.P. Singh Government agreed to free 5 hardcore detenus in exchange for the release of Dr Rubaiya Sayeed. The files show that the decision to release the terrorists was taken by the Farooq government not after negotiations with the terrorists but on the very day of her kidnapping.
 
 
''' Districts of south Kashmir have been the main centres of secessionist activity '''
 
[[File: Districts of south Kashmir have been the main centres of secessionist activity.jpg| Districts of south Kashmir have been the main centres of secessionist activity |frame|500px]]
 
 
Softliners in the Government had hoped that this would bring some of the extremists to the bargaining table. But the action achieved just the opposite. It swung the power pendulum away from the Government and squarely into the separatist camp. So far as the separatists were concerned they had won the first phase of their battle against India. There was nothing to negotiate. And they escalated their terror.
 
 
The crisis flared out of hand with the appointment of Jagmohan, not because the governor was unwilling to act. but because New Delhi seemed to have no clear direction in its Kashmir policy and tied the new administration's hands following the January 21 clashes in which securitymen killed violent pro-Pakistani demonstrators. The Government has appeared to falter, and that has given heart to the terrorists.
 
 
From the secessionists' viewpoint, the insurgency has the Indian Government exactly where it wants it - divided in dealing with the problem.
 
 
There are now three centres of power dealing with Kashmir: Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, a man with very little credibility in his home state, who veers between a hardline law-and-order approach and reviving the Assembly as a stopgap measure; Kashmir Affairs Minister George Fernandes - a novice as far as the intricacies of Kashmir politics are concerned - who believes that the Centre should deal with the militants as well as with some National Conference leaders; and Governor Jagmohan who is asking for a free hand to restore the state's administrative apparatus. The Mufti and Fernandes do not get along, and Fernandes goes about openly snubbing Jagmohan.
 
 
''' For the first time, 'wanted' lists are being circulated '''
 
[[File: For the first time, 'wanted' lists are being circulated.jpg| For the first time, 'wanted' lists are being circulated |frame|500px]]
 
 
When he visits the valley, ostensibly to contact the underground, Raj Bhawan is informed neither of his movements nor of whom he talks to. And some of his actions have effectively served to reverse the tough decisions taken by the Jagmohan administration.
 
 
For example, on April 2, after the state administration opposed a mass rally for the burial of Ashfaq Majid, a slain terrorist, Fernandes negotiated with a team of self-proclaimed representatives of the extremists and allowed a procession that swelled into a crowd of three lakh at which several of the most wanted militants were given a pulpit. Fernandes also met controversial government officials - like the jail superintendent sacked by the governor.
 
 
The Centre sees this as a carrot-and-stick policy of keeping all channels open. But it is creating an impossible situation for the state administrators who believe that when lobbyists can bypass the system and seek audiences with Fernandes or appeal to the Mufti who has his own political interests in the state, it will be hard to crack down on corrupt officials and collaborators.
 
 
Even finding a quick political fix in today's situation is a pipe dream. The National Conference, whose members have defected in droves is a spent force. Its MPs dare not enter the valley without massive security escort. And the grave of its founding father, Sheikh Abdullah, is guarded round the clock by two security companies because the militants have threatened to defile it. Even Maulvi Farooq lives in a fortress which he insists should be guarded by not state police but Central security forces.
 
[[File: Some of the prominent Pandits killed between Dec 89 and the first week of April 1990.jpg| Some of the prominent Pandits killed between Dec 89 and the first week of April 1990 |frame|500px]]
 
 
Militants openly issue calls to boycott Fernandes when he comes to the valley. And those with whom he has attempted contact - lawyer Mian Qayyoom, Imam Gul Baxi of Batamaloo, G. N. Hagroo, a civil rights activist, and journalist Sanaullah Butt - are hardly pro-Indian. Qayyoom says Kashmir cannot be held captive to the Simla agreement; his demand is nothing short of independence. And it is unclear whom these people represent.
 
 
The bottom line of the militants is secession. And the bottom line of the Indian Government cannot go outside the Constitution. The two positions are irreconcilable. The time for theorising, post-mortems and historical regurgitations is over. New Delhi's writ in the valley runs from Raj Bhawan through Gupkar Road to the nearby winter secretariat. Two hundred yards on each side is terrorist territory. Consider, for example, just one fact. When the administration wanted to relax curfew from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. the militants imposed their own curfew. Not a soul came out into the streets.
 
 
The bulk of the people follow whatever institution wields the big stick. Today, that stick is in the hands of the militants. The primary task before the Government is to re-establish its writ and show that it has the political will to do so. To demonstrate that the country will not compromise an inch of its territory. It was the absence of this message during the Farooq regime, and a lack of clarity of purpose under V.P. Singh's Government that has hobbled the state administration and given a certain strategic advantage to the secessionists.
 
 
Confusion and delay in regaining India's lost administrative turf in Kashmir will simply give Pakistan and the militants the most precious resource they can ask for - time. Their strategy is to wear New Delhi down to such an extent that the cost of maintaining Kashmir will become an impossible burden; or to keep a ready-made Pakistan inside India to be used by Pakistan to create constant problems.
 
 
The view from New Delhi is that in the long run, time is on its own side because in the peaks and valleys that characterise terrorism all over the world, the fundamentalists, when they realise that they can't really break loose of India's grip, when they begin suffering economically, will wear down and seek a solution with the Centre. But this is precisely the kind of thinking that led to escalating violence in Punjab.
 
 
In Kashmir the wait-and-wear-down attitude, considering how perilous the situation already is because of years of fence-sitting, is bound to make the problem even more intractable. The longer, for example, that security forces wait for orders to hit known training centres inside the valley's villages - so far more or less out of bounds - the more powerful will terrorist cadres become.
 
 
''' Of the nearly 90,000 refugees who have fled the Kashmir valley, many have come to Delhi '''
 
[[File: A makeshift camp of the migrant Pandits.jpg|  In Jammu, and to a lesser extent in Delhi, school classrooms and other government buildings were converted into makeshift camps for the migrant Pandits.  Every large room would accommodate several migrant Pandit families, who would spread thin mattresses and blankets on cold January floors.  |frame|500px]]
 
 
They will have more time to .import more deadly weapons (they now have Stinger missiles as well), increase their finances, recruit cadres, mobilise international opinion, and increase their base and morale.
 
 
The longer the wait, the greater the forces and firepower of the secessionists, the more deadly and bloody any future confrontation. This would not only cause unpredictable international repercussions but also dangerously affect the mood of India's 98 million Muslims - as Operation Bluestar did in the case of Sikhs in India - who so far have remained unsympathetic to the fundamentalist cause in Kashmir.
 
 
Right now, much can be achieved through low-level, sustained pressure. Last week, the governor began by sacking 75 government servants involved in subversive activities, mounting weapons searches, raids on training camps, indefinite curfews, and arresting over 200 people trying to cross the border. He also refused to compromise with the kidnappers of the vice-chancellor of Kashmir University. For the time being, it seems, New Delhi is backing stern measures to stop the drift.
 
 
But the task ahead is Herculean. Lost ground will have to be recovered inch by inch even in the face of hostile international opinion, and pressure from internal political lobbies. Government offices, banks, transport, hotels, post offices will have to be opened, forcibly if necessary even if it means handing them to security forces or government officials from outside as in Assam in 1983.
 
 
''' Subedar Bhushan Lal abandons his home in Kashmir '''
 
[[File: Subedar Bhushan Lal abandons his home in Kashmir.jpg| Subedar Bhushan Lal abandons his home in Kashmir |frame|500px]]
 
 
And New Delhi must also realise that indirectly its coffers are funding the separatist movement, through the subsidised petrol and the telephone networks with which the subversives communicate. The question to be asked is whether the state should continue to provide those who have declared war against it the wherewithal for mobility and communications.
 
 
Should it continue to keep on its payroll government servants who refuse allegiance to the Constitution? Should it continue to supply electricity to mosques that use loudspeakers to preach jehad against the state? These are the hard decisions to be made if India's writ is to run again in the valley.
 
 
In Kashmir - where the Centre has invested some Rs 70,000 crore in subsidies, what to say of the blood of Indian soldiers in two wars - the nation faces what is perhaps the gravest challenge to the ideas on which its integrity is moored. There are no soft options left. And temporary reverses must not be allowed to reverse the process of a sustained reclamation. The country can no longer afford to behave like a tenant put on notice to vacate somebody else's property.
 
 
===TERRORISTS RELEASED BY FAROOQ ABDULLAH GOVERNMENT ===
 
 
Between July and December 1989, 70 hardcore terrorists were released by the Farooq Abdullah government. Below is a partial list. All detentions had been confirmed by the Advisory Body headed by the chief justice of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court.
 
 
Mohammed Afzal Sheikh of Trehgam
 
 
Crossed over to Pakistani territory. Stayed in the home of his brother-in-law, Mohammed Wani, in POK at Athmuqam. Went to Peshawar for training. Met Javed Maqbool Butt and Showkat Maqbool Butt, sons of the hanged JKLF leader Maqbool Butt, with the help of JKLF Chairman Amanullah Khan, in Muzaffarabad. Took oath of allegiance to POK, with a thumb impression using his blood. Was responsible for bomb blast damaging two buses.
 
 
Rafiq Ahmed Ahangar
 
 
Went to Pakistan on August 22,1988 via Leepa. Trained in handling explosives. Involved in several bombings.
 
 
Mohammad Ayub Najar
 
 
Arrested following crossfiring incident near Jamia Masjid on August 25,1989. Was detained under Public Safety Act. On December 8, 1989, the day of the kidnapping of Dr Rubaiya Sayeed, it was decided in the office chamber of agriculture minister, Mohammed Shafi, that he would be released with 45 others.
 
 
Farooq Ahmed Ganai
 
 
Went to Pakistan under the code name of Khalid. Took courses in creating internal disturbances. Mission was to target army, police, the CRPF and BSF, and assassinate dignitaries. Met Amanullah Khan in the house of Raja Muzaffar Khan at Muzaffarabad. Involved in bombings, arson and looting.
 
 
Ghulam Mohammed Gujri
 
 
Entered Pakistan in August 1988 via Bungna Bala, Kupwara district, for sophisticated arms training. Crossed with help of two POK guides, stayed for the night in the house of one Ghulam Mohammed Wani, originally a resident of Kupwara but settled in Pakistan at Athmuqam (POK). This house was being used as a transit camp for the trainees. He was issued one Kalashnikov gun, two magazines, 200 rounds of ammunition, and detonators. Arrested following involvement in a bombing.
 
 
Farooq Ahmed Malik
 
 
Entered Pakistan with the help of Abdul Ahad Waza via Rashanpur for arms and explosives training. Met Amanullah Khan. Arrested after bomb blast in Telegraph Office, Srinagar.
 
 
Nazir Ahmed Sheikh
 
 
Entered Pakistan for arms training. Was taken to the house of Raja Muzaffar Khan. Met Amanullah Khan. On return, was arrested for role in Anantnag bombing.
 
 
Ghulam Mohi-Ud-Din Teli
 
 
Hardcore Jamaat-e-lslami. Key co-conspirator in an espionage ring. Under his guidance, two Handwara residents went to Pakistan to be trained to spy on Indian Army. Information passed to Pakistani intelligence.
 
 
Riyaz Ahmed Lone
 
 
Trained in Pakistan. Involved in several bombings.
 
 
Farooq Ahmed Thakur
 
 
Arrested following a Shootout with security forces near Jamia Masjid on August 25, 1989. Considerable amount of arms and ammunition recovered from him.
 
 
=1990: Rajiv, Benazir were ready to resolve Kashmir dispute=
 
[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/rajiv-gandhi-benazir-bhutto-were-ready-to-resolve-kashmir-dispute-zardari/articleshow/62805272.cms  February 6, 2018: ''The Times of India'']
 
 
 
'''HIGHLIGHTS'''
 
 
Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated while campaigning for the Congress party candidate in Sriperumbudur on May 21, 1991
 
 
The Pakistan People's Party co-chairman further said that no other government except PPP took up this issue with India
 
 
Zardari said Musharraf's (India friendly) plan on the Kashmir issue was rejected by other generals
 
 
 
Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto were ready to resolve the Kashmir issue amicably but the Indian leader was assassinated during the election campaign, Pakistan's former president Asif Ali Zardari has claimed.
 
 
Zardari also revealed that former dictator Gen (retd.) Pervez Musharraf had come up with a plan on Kashmir issue but other generals could not agree to it.
 
 
"BB (Benazir Bhutto) sahiba had spoken to Rajiv Gandhi in 1990 who agreed to resolve the Kashmir issue amicably. Rajiv told Benazir that during the last 10 years no one including Gen Zia from Pakistan spoke with us on this issue," Zardari said at a Kashmir rally here last evening.
 
 
"He (Rajiv) admitted that Kashmir was an important issue and should be resolved. Rajiv said he would take up this issue with Pakistan after coming to power but he was assassinated (in 1991)," the former president added.
 
 
Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated while campaigning for the Congress party candidate in Sriperumbudur on May 21, 1991.
 
 
The Pakistan People's Party co-chairman further said that no other government except PPP took up this issue with India.
 
 
After Benazir, it was PPP's previous government (2008-13) that had taken up the Kashmir issue with the then Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh.
 
 
Zardari said Musharraf's (India friendly) plan on the Kashmir issue was rejected by other generals.
 
 
"I have a copy of that secret plan of Musharraf on Kashmir. When Musharraf presented that plan before other generals they left the room," he said.
 
 
He said ousted prime minister Nawaz Sharif cannot talk on the Kashmir issue even in his Muzafarabad (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) rally as he is a friend of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
 
 
"A friend of Modi cannot talk on Kashmir. Sharif was rightly ousted from the prime minister house for betraying Kashmiris," he said.
 
 
=1990: Role of government servants in the separatist movement=
 
''' When Naeem Akhtar and 4 others were dismissed for being ‘threat to India’s security, sovereignty and integrity’ '''
 
 
Ahmed Ali Fayyaz, _Published in  STATE TIMES, Oct 21, 2016
 
 
 
With the volcanic eruption of armed insurgency, coupled with a separatist political movement, the administrative machinery was falling brick by brick January through March in 1990. Hundreds of thousands—and once a full million—of the Kashmiris used to march to the United Nations Military Observers Group for India and Pakistan at Sonwar, demanding separation from India and implementation of the UN resolutions on Plebiscite.
 
 
Suddenly the separatist movement received a shot in the arm when [six] senior IAS officers, including the stalwarts Hindal Haider Tayyabji, Ashok Jaitly, M.L, Kaul and Mohammad Shafi Pandit, signed and issued an appeal to the UN [Indpaedia believes that it was addressed to the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir and was also signed by Sheikh Ghulam Rasool and Sushma Chaudhary] to intervene and stop human rights abuse by security forces in the Valley. Historic political developments took place when Vishwanath Pratap Singh was Prime Minister, Mufti Mohammad Union Home Minister and Jammu and Kashmir was under Governor’s, followed by President’s rule, in 1990. Many of Kashmir’s bureaucrats besides civil and Police officers became part and parcel of the secessionist movement.
 
 
Deputy Commissioner Excise Naeem Akhtar’s official residence at Government Quarter No: J-22 became the postal address of the movement as almost all the separatist politicians had been detained and lodged in different jails outside the Valley. Trade unions merged into a coordination committee which chose former Chief Engineer of Power Development Department Abdul Hamid Matoo as its President and Muzaffar Ahmad Khan as General Secretary.
 
 
Senior KAS officers like Muzaffar Ahmad Khan, then RTO Kashmir and General Manager with J&K Bank, Abdul Rashid Mubarki, additional Secretary Khizar Mohammad Wani and other prominent faces of the Kashmir Administrative Service came to be seen as the “real representatives of the Kashmir cause and sentiment”.
 
 
In months of the IAS officers’ memorandum, around 250 J&K officers, many of them between the ranks of Deputy Secretary to Commissioner-Secretary, issued another passionate appeal to the ‘Citizens of the World’. Believed to have been drafted by Akhtar in his Queen’s English, it called for Plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir under the UN resolution — euphemism for Kashmir’s secession from India and accession to Pakistan. The Kashmiris named it ‘Azadi’. It created ripples in India and abroad.
 
 
Governor Girish Chander Saxena declared five senior and influential officers — Abdul Hamid Matoo, Naeem Akhar, A.R. Mubarki, Abdul Salam Bhat and Muzaffar Ahmad Khan — as threat to the State’s security, sovereignty and integrity and ordered their dismissal from service. Within an hour, the dismissed officers and their colleagues, holding key positions in the Government, held a meeting at Akhtar’s official residence in Jawahar Nagar. The coordination committee called for an indefinite strike, making a host of demands. Not one was conceded by Saxena’s government.
 
 
The 72-day-long employees’ strike, that started on September 15, 1990, crippled the services in Kashmir. On behalf of Governor Saxena, Advisor (Home) Mehmood Ahmad Zaki (who later retired as GOC of Srinagar-based 15 Corps of Army) and Additional Chief Secretary Home Mehmood-ur-Rehman called on senior IAS officer Sheikh Ghulam Rasool (then Financial Commissioner Revenue, who was emerging as potential contender for the coveted position of Chief Secretary) and asked him to use his good offices to resolve the crisis.
 
 
There was no breakthrough till VP Singh’s regime ended and Chander Shekhar took over as Prime Minister on November 10. Governor Saxena and Chief Secretary R.K. Takkar did strongly refuse to revoke the five officers’ dismissal and their reinstatement.
 
 
President of the coordination committee Matoo had earlier played a key role in persuading the legendary Policeman and retired Director General of Police Ghulam Hassan Shah against accepting Jagmohan’s offer of appointment as Advisor to Governor. Shah did not join Jagmohan’s government even as the order of his appointment was reportedly issued after seeking his consent. Matoo’s daughter was married to Shah’s son.
 
 
One day in October, days before the annual Durbar Move, Sheikh Ghulam Rasool called over 50 officers to his Sonwar residence and urged them to bring home to Matoo, Naeem and others that shutting down entire services and systems could lead to miseries of the common people and poor employees, making it hard for them to sustain the agitation. Even the pharmacies and ration depots had not been exempted from the strike.
 
 
It was decided in the meeting that three officers — Ghulam Abbas (DC Srinagar), Aijaz Ahmad Malik (PCCF) and Ghulam Ahmad Lone (Law Secretary) — would meet the employees coordination committee members at Matoo’s residence near Al-Farooq Masjid in Jawahar Nagar.
 
 
On their return from Matoo’s house, the three senior officers narrated to Sheikh Ghulam Rasool that the coordination committee members were “extremely discourteous and rude”. “Sir, they treated us as traitors of the Kashmir cause and agents of the Government of India. They alleged that we are hobnobbing with Governor to fail the freedom struggle. Naeem said what nonsense of ration are you talking about. Kashmiris want freedom”, one of the them told Rasool.
 
 
“Sir we made it clear to them that Abbas Sahab is here in his personal capacity, not as DC Srinagar, so are two of us. We conveyed to them Zaki Sahab’s and Rehman Sahab’s assurance that they would be reinstated immediately after they call off the strike. But they didn’t relent. They addressed us as if they were the Governors and Chief Ministers and we were the class 4th employees”, another officer told Rasool.
 
 
Commissioner Secretary ARI & Training Nazir Ahmad Kamili told Rasool that he and some other officers had also received threats on phone. “They posed as militants but we are sure they were our own colleagues trying to intimidate us”, Kamili said.
 
 
The matter didn’t end there. Matoo and his team in their speeches at Srinagar Municipality and other places alleged that some officers were out on the mission of failing the employees’ strike and the freedom struggle. Then only functional newspaper, late Mohammad Yousuf Qadri’s Afaaq, carried a story on such whispers. It was decided in Rasool’s meeting with the officers that three officers would go to editor of Afaaq and publish a statement about their failure to convince the coordination committee members on suspending the strike. “If all of them want to carry on, we will say that we too are with it”, said Sheikh and others.
 
 
A group of three officers was deputed to Qadri Sahab. They boarded the red-cross marked vehicle of Director Health Services and handed over their “clarification” to the editor’s son, Jeelani Qadiri, at his office near Abi Guzar. Jeelani agreed to publish but told the officers that he would need his father’s approval as it was a “sensitive matter”. Soon the trio arrived at the editor’s home in Balgarden.
 
 
Director Health Services Dr Muzaffar-uz-Zamaan Drabu, who lived in Karan Nagar neighbourhood, went in to meet Qadiri Sahab who obliged the officer. While he was still with Qadiri Sahab, some residents gathered around the vehicle and asked its driver about the officers meeting the editor. As he narrated everything with naiveté and honesty, the small group of residents began saying loudly that someone should make an announcement on the mosque’s PAS that the “traitors” were meeting Qadri Sahab. Someone was heard saying that they should set the vehicle on fire and beat up the “traitors”. Law Secretary Lone, who was inside the vehicle, turned pale.
 
 
However, as the motley gathering of the residents witnessed Dr Drabu emerging out of the editor’s home, they saluted him. He made it clear to them that none of the officers was working against the interests of the Kashmiris or the employees’ strike.
 
 
Immediately after VP Singh’s and Mufti Sayeed’s government at the Centre ended and Chander Shekhar took over as Prime Minister, senior National Conference leaders Dr Farooq Abdullah and Prof Saifuddin Soz persuaded him to withdraw the dismissal of the five Kashmiri officers as a “goodwill gesture”. They assured the new PM that it could initiate a process of resolving the crisis by understanding and dialogue. On November 26 the employees’ strike was called off as Saxena, on PM’s instruction, revoked the dismissal orders.
 
 
Among the reinstated officers and bureaucrats, Abdul Salam Bhat later functioned as DC in Udhampur and Srinagar, Muzaffar Khan headed several departments including Handicrafts and Estates before his retirement. Naeem Akhtar functioned as Secretary Tourism before holding a tenure as Secretary to Chief Minister Mufti Sayeed. For some time, when R.K. Jerath was on leave, Akhatr also held charge of the key portfolio of General Administration Department. Ultimately, in 2013 he became PDP’s Member in Legislative Council and in 2015 Chief Minister Mufti Sayeed inducted him as Minister of Education. He retained his berth and portfolio in Mehbooba Mufti’s Cabinet in 2016.
 
 
= All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)/ 1993- =
 
==Hurriyat: Its History, Role and Relevance ==
 
[http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/hurriyat-its-history-role-and-relevance/    Muzamil Jaleel | August 31, 2015, Indian Express]
 
 
 
New Delhi has now twice made high-level dialogue with Islamabad conditional upon Pakistan not talking to the separatists. Who are the Hurriyat? What is their politics? Do they speak for the people of the Valley?
 
 
 
While the reason for the cancellation of talks between the National Security Advisers (NSAs) of India and Pakistan was New Delhi’s insistence on keeping Kashmir off the table and discussing only terrorism, the decision to disallow a customary meeting between Kashmiri separatist leaders and Pakistani officials in New Delhi ahead of the bilateral became a key chapter in the fiasco.
 
 
The Pak High Commission had invited both factions of the Hurriyat, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) chief Yasin Malik, and Shabir Shah for a meeting with Pak NSA Sartaj Aziz. New Delhi’s new red line, excluding the Kashmir issue and terming the separatist leadership as the “third party”, and Islamabad’s refusal to accept these conditions, has refocussed attention on the Hurriyat, the political platform of the separatist movement for more than two decades now.
 
 
This is the second time that talks have been called off over the issue of Pak officials meeting Kashmiri separatist leaders. New Delhi had called off a Foreign Secretary-level engagement for this reason last year.
 
 
''' Birth of the Hurriyat '''
 
 
The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was formed on July 31, 1993, as a political platform of the separatist movement. It was an extension of the conglomerate of parties that had come together to contest Assembly polls against a National Conference-Congress alliance in 1987 — an election that was widely alleged to have been rigged. The conglomerate of disparate ideologies was held together by their common position that Jammu & Kashmir was “under occupation of India”, and the collective demand that “the wishes and aspirations of the people of the state should be ascertained for a final resolution of the dispute”.
 
 
At a time when militancy was at its peak, this conglomerate represented the political face of the militant movement, and claimed to “represent the wishes and aspirations of the people”. It had brought together two separate, but strong ideologies: those who sought J&K’s independence from both India and Pakistan, and those who wanted J&K to become part of Pakistan. Most of the groups that were part of the Hurriyat had their militant wings, or were linked to a militant outfit.
 
 
Before the formation of the APHC, there was another political platform — the Tehreek-i-Hurriyat Kashmir (THK). It was headed by the advocate Mian Abdul Qayoom, and consisted of 10 groups: the Jamat-e-Islami, JKLF, Muslim Conference, Islamic Students’ League, Mahaz-e-Azadi, Muslim Khawateen Markaz, Kashmir Bar Association, Ittehadul Muslimeen, Dukhtaran-e-Millat and Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadees. But this first separatist political platform did not have much influence.
 
 
On December 27, 1992, the 19-year-old Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who had taken over as chairman of J&K Awami Action Committee (J&KAAC) and become the head priest of Kashmir after the assassination of his father Mirwaiz Farooq, called a meeting of religious, social and political organisations at Mirwaiz Manzil. The aim of this meeting was to lay the foundation of a broad alliance of parties that were opposed to “Indian rule” in J&K. Seven months later, the APHC was born, with Mirwaiz Umar Farooq as its first chairman.
 
 
The APHC executive council had seven members from seven executive parties: Syed Ali Shah Geelani of Jamat-e-Islami, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq of Awami Action Committee, Sheikh Abdul Aziz of People’s League, Moulvi Abbas Ansari of Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, Prof Abdul Gani Bhat of Muslim Conference, Yasin Malik of JKLF, and Abdul Gani Lone of People’s Conference.
 
 
Of these leaders, Sheikh Aziz was killed in police firing near Sheri in Baramulla in August 2008. Abdul Gani Lone was killed by militants in May 2002.
 
 
The Hurriyat also had a 21-member working committee. This included the seven members of the executive council, plus two members from each of the seven parties.
 
 
There was also a general council, with more than 23 members, including traders’ bodies, employee unions, and social organisations. The membership of the executive council couldn’t be increased as per the APHC constitution, but the general council could accommodate more members. The Hurriyat had observer status at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
 
 
''' The Battle Within '''
 
 
Because the Hurriyat was such a mixed bag of ideologies and personalities, infighting was a near permanent feature. Disagreements often came out in the open.
 
 
In September 2003, the Hurriyat split on the questions of its future strategies, the role of militancy in the separatist movement, and dialogue. The Syed Ali Shah Geelani-led group was firm that talks with New Delhi could take place only after the central government accepted that J&K was in dispute, while the group led by Mirwaiz wanted talks.
 
 
Geelani hasn’t departed from his stance that “the struggle will continue till complete freedom” or a “referendum in accordance with UN resolutions”. The Mirwaiz group backed former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s four-point formula that envisaged suzerainty and a joint mechanism between the two parts of J&K, without changing any existing boundaries. The Mirwaiz group also entered into a dialogue directly with New Delhi during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s tenure, and held talks with the then Deputy PM, L K Advani, in 2004.
 
 
The leaders of the Mirwaiz faction, along with Yasin Malik (who was no longer a part of Hurriyat by then), visited Pakistan through the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road in June 2005 to hold talks with various Muzaffarabad-based Kashmiri separatist leaders and the Pakistan establishment. This visit was facilitated by the Vajpayee government, which had come up with Srinagar-Delhi, Delhi-Islamabad and Srinagar-Islamabad tracks as part of its Kashmir peace process.
 
 
Though there were stark ideological differences within the two factions of the Hurriyat, the trigger for the split came on the question of fielding proxy candidates by a Hurriyat constituent, People’s Conference, in the 2002 Assembly polls. Geelani vehemently criticised the decision, and sought the eviction of the party led by Abdul Gani Lone’s sons, Bilal Lone and Sajjad Lone.
 
 
On September 7, 2003, the Geelani faction removed the then Hurriyat chairman, Abbas Ansari, and replaced him with Masarat Alam as interim chief. They also suspended the seven-member executive council, and set up a five-member committee to review the Hurriyat constitution.
 
 
Geelani also left the Jamaat-e-Islami, and formed his own party, the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir, in August 2004.
 
 
The Mirwaiz faction split in 2014, when four of its leaders — Democratic Freedom Party president Shabir Ahmad Shah, National Front chairman Nayeem Ahmad Khan, Mahaz-e-Azadi chief Mohammad Azam Inqlabi and Islamic Political Party chief Mohammad Yousuf Naqash — left.
 
 
''' The Hurriyat Constitution '''
 
 
The APHC constitution, describes it as a union of political, social and religious parties of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, set up to:
 
 
* Wage a peaceful struggle to secure for the people of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the UN charter and the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, the exercise of the right to self-determination, which shall include the right to independence.
 
 
* Make endeavours for an alternative negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute amongst all the three parties to the dispute — India, Pakistan and people of the Jammu and Kashmir — under the auspices of the UN or any other friendly country, provided that such settlement reflects the will of the people.
 
 
* Project the ongoing struggle in the state before nations and governments of the world in its proper perspective, as being a “struggle directed against the forcible and fraudulent occupation of the state by India”.
 
 
''' Relevance of Separatists '''
 
 
The separatist leadership across the ideological divide represents a major political constituency in J&K, which will likely remain relevant for as long as the issue is not resolved. This political reality on the ground can be understood by looking at the public political agendas of the two major pro-India political groups — the ruling People’s Democratic Party and the opposition National Conference. These two parties share the support of the largest chunk of the electorate that takes part in Assembly and Lok Sabha elections. While the NC seeks autonomy and a return to the 1953 position where New Delhi had authority only over Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs, the PDP’s declared political agenda has been self-rule, wherein they seek autonomy, plus a joint mechanism between two parts of J&K to turn the region into a fusion of India and Pakistan.
 
 
These political agendas, which are widely publicised during election campaigns, border on separatist politics. There is, in fact, very little difference between the larger political framework for the resolution of the Kashmir issue that is publicly envisaged by the Mirwaiz faction and the PDP. The difference is that the Mirwaiz group has not agreed to join the electoral battle prior to a solution.
 
 
It is obvious that if the two major pro-India political groups seek votes for an agenda that seeks different degrees of separation from the Indian Union, the separatist political discourse remains relevant. Besides, there is an inherent flaw in an assessment that seeks to judge the relevance of separatist leaders by the same yardstick that is applied to leaders participating in electoral politics.
 
 
The separatists are relevant because of a sentiment, which is not voted on in any election. The other reason why they remain relevant is their utility to the state at times of crises. When Kashmir was up in arms during the public agitations from 2008-10, New Delhi sent high-level delegations to speak to the separatists in a bid to calm tempers.
 
 
The fact that Pakistan considers the separatists as representatives of the people is also an important reason to think of them as relevant on the ground.
 
 
===PAK CONNECTION===
 
 
New Delhi drew the red line on Islamabad talking to the Hurriyat in August 2014, and reiterated its position this month. However, Pakistani officials have been talking to the separatists around the time of India-Pak dialogues for 20 years now MAY 1995: Pakistan’s President Farooq Ahmad Leghari met separatist leaders in New Delhi when he came to attend the SAARC meeting. It was Leghari who began the tradition of meeting the separatists.
 
 
JULY 2001: General Pervez Musharraf met separatist leaders in New Delhi before the Agra summit with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
 
 
APRIL 2005: President Pervez Musharraf again met separatist leaders from Kashmir in New Delhi
 
 
APRIL 2007: Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz met separatist leaders at Pakistan House on his visit to New Delhi. Aziz visited India as head of SAARC, and also had a separate meeting with Prime minister Manmohan Singh.
 
 
JULY 2011: Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar met delegations led by Hurriyat leaders Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq at the Pakistan High Commission. Khar was on a visit to New Delhi to meet her Indian counterpart S M Krishna
 
 
NOVEMBER 2013: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Advisor on Security and Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz met with Kashmiri separatist leaders at the Pakistan High Commission
 
 
===The Hurriyat Top Three ===
 
 
'''  Syed Ali Shah Geelani ''' 
 
 
Veteran hardliner faces challenge from a harder line
 
 
The octogenarian Geelani is the most prominent public face of the separatist struggle in Kashmir. Geelani was a primary school teacher employed by the J&K education department when he became a member of Jamat-e-Islami in 1959. Thirteen years later, he contested the 1972 Assembly elections from his home constituency Sopore, and won. He was re-elected to the Assembly in 1977 as a Jamat-e-Islami candidate.
 
 
In 1987, Geelani was instrumental in bringing together the Jamat-e-Islami and several other social and religious outfits in the Muslim United Front, which fought the elections. It is widely believed that the elections were massively rigged and triggered armed militancy in Kashmir, Geelani managed to win for the third time.
 
 
After the armed resistance began in 1989, Geelani resigned from the Assembly and took a lead role in separatist politics. When the Hurriyat was formed, he became its member, and later its chairman.
 
 
In 2002, when Mufti Mohammad Sayeed became Chief Minister, Geelani was in jail. On his release, he accused People’s Conference leader Sajjad Lone of fielding proxy candidates in the Assembly elections, and called for his expulsion from the Hurriyat. When the Hurriyat didn’t accept his demand, Geelani broke away and formed his own faction. A few months later, he divorced the Jamaat-e-Islami, his organisation for 45 years, to form the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat.
 
 
Though an ardent supporter of Pakistan, Geelani vehemently opposed President Musharraf’s four-point formula for resolution of the Kashmir issue, calling it “surrender”. At that time, the Mirwaiz faction was favoured by both India and Pakistan, who gave it the central role in Kashmir. By 2008, however, the Hurriyat moderates were marginalised, as they failed to deliver on the ground.
 
 
A heart patient who lives on a pacemaker and a malignant kidney, Geelani started to re-emerge as an important leader in 2008, when he launched an agitation opposing the transfer of government land to the Amarnath shrine board. The agitation was repeated in 2010.
 
 
Geelani’s strength is seen in his successful mix of a “consistent and uncompromising political stance on Kashmir” and organised street resistance. With his Jamaat background, religion is an important part of Geelani’s worldview and politics. He also enjoys substantial influence over the militant movement.
 
 
For the first time in decades, it now seems Geelani’s authority has come into question from the new breed of militants with more hardline views. Geelani has been publicly critical of the ISIS and its methods, and has questioned the wisdom behind a group of Kashmiri youths raising Daesh flags during protests in Srinagar. Geelani had earlier opposed the entry of al-Qaeda into Kashmir.
 
 
'''  Mirwaiz Umar Farooq ''' 
 
 
Chief cleric of Kashmir prefers negotiations
 
 
Kashmir’s head priest carries a great deal of weight on his young shoulders. The head preacher of Jamia Masjid, Srinagar, Umar was anointed the head of the Awami Action Committee (AAC), a constituent of the Hurriyat, at just 17, after the assassination of his father, Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq, in May 1991. Considered a moderate, Umar favours resolution of the Kashmir issue through peaceful negotiations. Though he has never denounced the armed struggle, he maintains a safe distance from militant groups. Though the AAC was once considered pro-Pakistan, Umar has preferred to remain non-committal on whether he supports accession to Pakistan or independence.
 
 
'''  Yasin Malik '''
 
 
Militant commander turned non-violent activist
 
 
From a top commander and pioneer of the militant movement in Kashmir, Yasin Malik has come a long way. He gave up arms and decided to follow the path of non-violence as the only means of struggle.
 
 
Yasin Malik was one among the several Kashmiri youth who crossed to Pakistan in the late 80s for arms training. In fact, he was one among four area commanders, the others being Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Ajid and Javid Mir. The ‘HAJY’ group, as it was known, was allegedly tortured in police custody for its support to Muslim United Front (MUF) candidate Mohammad Yousuf Shah in the 1987 elections. Mohammad Yousuf Shah, of course, is now better known as Syed Salahuddin, chief of the Hizbul Mujahideen. Malik’s stint as a militant was short-lived — in 1991, he was arrested and jailed for three-and-a-half years.
 
 
After his release on May 17, 1994, Malik changed his ways and became an ardent advocate of non-violence. He is now in favour of a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue, but not until Kashmiris get a place on the Indo-Pak bilateral table.
 
 
=1994-2017=
 
Syed Ata Hasnain | After the attack on the Amarnath Yatra: Why Meghnad Desai is both right and wrong on Kashmir | Jul 20 2017 | The Times of India (Delhi)
 
[[File: From 2010-2016 , India Today , July 25,2016 .jpg| From 2010-2016 , India Today , [https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/nation/story/20160725-burhan-wani-killed-jammu-and-kashmir-protests-829235-2016-07-13 Asit Jolly and Naseer Ganai , A rebellion goes viral “India Today” 25/7/2016] |frame|500px]] 
 
The writer commanded the 15 Corps in Jammu & Kashmir
 
 
 
1994 and 1996 were political high water marks with the Joint Resolution of Parliament and the first elections after 1989, respectively. 1997 was the humanitarian landmark with the adoption of Operation Sadbhavana and the Supreme Court's issue of guidelines to the army on operations under AFSPA.
 
 
2002 saw the adoption of the healing touch policy of the late Mufti Mohammad Sayeed in conjunction with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's philosophical and humanitarian approach. 2611 saw the re-adoption of a hard line by Pakistan, leading to the paralysis in the streets till 2010. 2011-13 saw the conscious calibration of the balance of hard and soft power through the Hearts Doctrine which created hope and attempted restoration of dignity to the conflict stricken people, incidentally by the army itself; a situation not politically exploited.
 
 
There was nothing militaristic about 2014-16 either; it was a situation of political uncertainty.No doubt violence increased, but not so dangerously until July 8, 2016, when Burhan Wani was killed and the current impasse came to be.
 
 
The [2017] attack on the Amarnath Yatra after 15 years of peace may actually prove to be another landmark in the history of J&K since 1989
 
 
=Tunnels, strategic=
 
==2010-2020==
 
[[File: Strategic Tunnels in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh-HP, 2010-2020..jpg| Strategic Tunnels in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh-HP, 2010-2020. <br/> From: [https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2020%2F10%2F04&entity=Ar00508&sk=42059AF1&mode=text  Akhilesh Singh, Anand Bodh & Suresh Sharma, October 4, 2020: ''The Times of India'']|frame|500px]]
 
 
 
'''See graphic''':
 
 
'' Strategic Tunnels in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh-HP, 2010-2020. ''
 
 
[[Category:History|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
 
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
 
[[Category:India|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
 
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
 
[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
 
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
 
[[Category:Politics|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
 
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
 
 
=2014-July 2016: Lions in hibernation wake up, Burhan becomes icon=
 
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=Mehbooba-Muftis-inheritance-of-loss-How-Burhan-Wani-30072016022035 By Ahmed Ali Fayyaz, ''The Times of India''], Jul 30 2016
 
[[File: People killed post 8th July 2016, India Today , September 1,2016 .jpg| People killed post 8th July 2016, India Today , September 1,2016 |frame|500px]] 
 
'' Mehbooba Mufti's inheritance of loss: How Burhan Wani grew to iconic status in the Valley ''
 
 
Burhan Wani, the 23-year-old Hizbul Mujahideen militant cutting his teeth with India's glamorous social media, achieved what only the charismatic Sheikh Abdullah had to his credit in Kashmir's history ­ a sizeable swarm of people at his funeral prayers, anything between the army's drone figure of 15,000 and some journalists' 2,00,000. Over a million had joined the Sheikh's in 1982 ­ by far the largest. Many of the 48 youths killed in the clashes triggered by the July 8 encounter died on the day of the funeral.
 
 
Funerals of even the iconic militants and separatists have been invariably ignored as their charm faded out the same day .Some pulled a thousand, someone even five or ten thousand. In 20 years, Kashmir has witnessed two massive funerals: around 20,000 attended Mustafa Khan's during Farooq Abdullah's regime in Tangmarg and around 30,000 Badshah Khan's in Kulgam when Mufti Sayeed was chief minister.
 
 
It didn't take Kashmiris long to forget even top separatist leaders Abdul Gani Lone and Sheikh Abdul Aziz ­ one shot dead by gunmen in Srinagar in 2002 and another killed in security forces' firing in Baramulla in 2008. Masarat Alam, unparalleled protagonist of the 2010 street turbulence faded into oblivion within days of his arrest. More significantly, nobody died for high profile separatist Afzal Guru whose execution in 2013 was “murder of an innocent“ for the average Kashmiri.
 
 
So what made Burhan a legend whose death triggered a chain of clashes and left around 50 people dead, hundreds injured and a bustling tourist season that has already suffered losses of hundreds of crores of rupees punctured?
 
 
'''Mufti M. Saeed'''  After the Sheikh's dismissal in 1953 and his successor Farooq Abdullah's in 1984, no J&K politician has embarrassed New Delhi beyond a point. Mufti alone, who cultivated Congress and floated his own PDP to neutralise Sheikh's National Conference (NC), took liberties. His detractors insist he had Delhi's “licence“ that eventually made him the only Muslim home minister.
 
 
His brief tenure as Union home minister witnessed a fringe insurgency explode with the release of JKLF militants in exchange for his kidnapped daughter Rubaiya in 1989, followed by Kashmiri Pandits' mass migration in 1990. His outcry over the Ghulam Nabi Azad government's allotment of land to a Hindu shrine board divided people irretrievably on regional and communal lines in ''' 2008, ''' when secessionism had ebbed and the Valley was blooming with tranquillity .
 
 
With a mission to demolish Abdullah's NC, Mufti and daughter Mehbooba left no stone unturned to discredit and demonise `India' ­ its body politic, democracy , systems and institutions. With both UPA's and NDA's unfettered permission, he laid the `road to Rawalpindi'. It won him a chunk of votes and helped him become chief minister twice, but at a price Delhi will have to pay for ages.
 
 
For over a decade Mufti and his party only whetted the sense of victimhood and betrayal in the Valley which, in the process, grew rabidly anti-Indian ­ some of them ferociously Islamist.Omar Abdullah's deficits of domicile, language and culture forced him to toe Mufti's line and both, in competition, began discrediting “Indians“.
 
 
At the end of the day , nobody in Kashmir respects or loves India. Anybody perceived to be soft on India runs huge risks, such as those meted out to the residents of Kokernag after the July 8 encounter. Their houses were torched and orchards destroyed. The government remained a mute spectator.
 
 
The irony is that Kashmir was pushed back to the abyss when complaints of rape, custodial killings and fake encounters against the security forces had dipped to the lowest level of 25 years and India's best held assembly elections had happened in J&K in 2014.Nobody knew Burhan who was then three years into militancy.
 
 
But Mufti didn't wait much to ride the tiger. He freed Masarat and permitted him to hold a massive pro-Pakistan demonstration in front of J&K police headquarters. It woke up all the lions in hibernation. Within days a young school dropout emerged as an icon of jihad for Kashmir's Generation Next.
 
 
Meanwhile, Mufti's ally continued to stoke fires. A frenzied group of cow vigilantes killed a Kashmiri Muslim trucker in Udhampur. BJP leaders and friends filed petitions to terminate the state's flag and special position. The tinderbox needed just a matchstick that came in handy with Burhan's death.
 
 
''The writer is a senior journalist ''
 
 
[[Category:India |J ]]
 
[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir |J ]]
 
 
== Aftermath ==
 
[http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/yadav-family-fued-virat-kohli-baba-ramdev-mamata-banerjee/1/845227.html Shougat Dasgupta Asit Jolly MG Arun Damayanti Datta , Behind the headlines “India Today” 29/12/2016]
 
[[File: Insha Malik blinded by pellet gun , India Today , December 29.2016 .jpg| Insha Malik blinded by pellet gun , India Today , December 29.2016 |frame|500px]]
 
 
My Dear Insha,
 
 
I was there when they carried you in with a bloodied face. Surgeons who cleaned your terrible wounds at Srinagar's Shri Maharaja Hari Singh (SMHS) Hospital said, "her face was like a sieve that had been used to filter blood". Earlier that July morning, you had sat terrified, huddled with other relatives in a first-floor room in your father's modest, two-storied home in Shopian's Sewdow village. Your parents believed you'd be safe from the fury on the street down below where police and paramilitary soldiers battled a mob of angry youngsters-some among them as young as 11, some of them your own classmates-protesting the killing of the Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani on July 8. But clearly, there was no place safe from the violence outside, the gunshots, the exploding canisters of teargas and fiery slogans. Suddenly, a window close to where you sat shattered. "I heard Insha wail and saw blood flowing from her face?her eyes. She fell down on the floor," Afroza Malik, your mother, said recalling her worst nightmare-become-real. Your eyes, face and torso were riddled with pellets from a pump-action shotgun fired, inexplicably, at the first-floor window. The good doctors, first at the SMHS Hospital in Srinagar and later at the nation's best, Delhi's All India Institute of Medical Sciences, kept you alive, helping you battle a series of complications including a brief brain infection from the lead pellets embedded inside your skull. The physical pain you still suffer will ebb with time. But the doctors have said they can do nothing that would help return your eyesight: "Nothing short of a miracle from God himself can give Insha Malik her beautiful eyes back," they said, evidently burdened by the pain of the terrible truth-that you will never again be able to see the beautiful Valley that is your home.
 
 
"It's a fate worse than death. Worse than an AK-47 bullet through the skull," said a surgeon responsible for admitting young and older victims of this latest cycle of strife, one that completely changed life as we had known it until July 8 in the Kashmir Valley. Seventy-five people, many of them teenagers like you, have been killed (local media reports claim 97 dead). Thousands more have sustained injuries, including scores, who like you, have been wholly or partially blinded by pellet guns. The doctors at the SMHS Hospital talk of Omar Nazir, a diminutive 12-year-old school-going son of a daily wage worker of Pulwama called Nazir Ahmad. Unmoving on his hospital bed, he too had lost both his eyes. Tamanna Ashiq, just eight years old, was perhaps more fortunate. Struck similarly in the face by a deadly volley of shotgun pellets when she peered out the window of her village home to watch a protest demonstration on July 9, a day after Burhan's killing. A pellet lodged deep inside her right eye destroyed the retina but the schoolgirl still has one good eye.
 
 
 
 
Nudged equally by the curfew ordered by the Mehbooba Mufti government and an unremitting calendar of hartals called by Syed Ali Shah Geelani as well as the Hurriyat hardliners, trouble persisted right until the Durbar (state government) packed its bags and shifted shop to Jammu for the winter in early November. In October, 12-year-old Junaid Akhoon of Saidpora in downtown Srinagar died. He fell to a hail of pellets fired by security personnel intent on dispersing a small crowd of protesters. Young Junaid's killing; the four-year-old girl with her legs and abdomen riddled by what she believes were "firecrackers"; the loss of Omar Nazir and Tamanna Ashiq's young eyes; and your own completely undeserved fate, Insha, are a distressing reminder of how children have fallen victim to the cycle of violent strife that simply won't leave the Kashmir Valley.
 
 
Strife that is driven by a dangerously swelling sense of alienation and resentment that rankles every Kashmiri today-a feeling engendered by the mainstream Kashmiri political leadership and Delhi's collective failure to resolve the Kashmir issue. An anger that is preyed upon and fanned by obdurate Hurriyat hardliners like Geelani, who give little thought to the people they profess to speak for; who think little of paralysing the lives and livelihoods of an entire population; men who, for close to six long months, condemned Kashmir to a life of unending darkness; men who think nothing of shutting down schools and denying children the simple pleasure of stepping out of their homes to play.
 
 
Children like you, Insha, and in fact close to 40 per cent of all Kashmiris-born after 1989-have no notion of what it is to live in peace. You have no experience of life without the discomforting presence of khaki uniforms, camouflaged fatigues, jackboots and Kalashnikovs.
 
 
You cannot see it, but this is the greatest wound.
 
 
Yours in empathy,
 
 
Asit Jolly
 
 
(To all the children of Kashmir who lost their innocence, blinded and bruised in the summer of 2016)
 
 
=2014-July 2016: Lions in hibernation wake up, Burhan becomes icon=
 
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=Mehbooba-Muftis-inheritance-of-loss-How-Burhan-Wani-30072016022035 By Ahmed Ali Fayyaz, ''The Times of India''], Jul 30 2016
 
[[File: People killed post 8th July 2016, India Today , September 1,2016 .jpg| People killed post 8th July 2016, India Today , September 1,2016 |frame|500px]] 
 
'' Mehbooba Mufti's inheritance of loss: How Burhan Wani grew to iconic status in the Valley ''
 
 
Burhan Wani, the 23-year-old Hizbul Mujahideen militant cutting his teeth with India's glamorous social media, achieved what only the charismatic Sheikh Abdullah had to his credit in Kashmir's history ­ a sizeable swarm of people at his funeral prayers, anything between the army's drone figure of 15,000 and some journalists' 2,00,000. Over a million had joined the Sheikh's in 1982 ­ by far the largest. Many of the 48 youths killed in the clashes triggered by the July 8 encounter died on the day of the funeral.
 
 
Funerals of even the iconic militants and separatists have been invariably ignored as their charm faded out the same day .Some pulled a thousand, someone even five or ten thousand. In 20 years, Kashmir has witnessed two massive funerals: around 20,000 attended Mustafa Khan's during Farooq Abdullah's regime in Tangmarg and around 30,000 Badshah Khan's in Kulgam when Mufti Sayeed was chief minister.
 
 
It didn't take Kashmiris long to forget even top separatist leaders Abdul Gani Lone and Sheikh Abdul Aziz ­ one shot dead by gunmen in Srinagar in 2002 and another killed in security forces' firing in Baramulla in 2008. Masarat Alam, unparalleled protagonist of the 2010 street turbulence faded into oblivion within days of his arrest. More significantly, nobody died for high profile separatist Afzal Guru whose execution in 2013 was “murder of an innocent“ for the average Kashmiri.
 
 
So what made Burhan a legend whose death triggered a chain of clashes and left around 50 people dead, hundreds injured and a bustling tourist season that has already suffered losses of hundreds of crores of rupees punctured?
 
 
'''Mufti M. Saeed'''  After the Sheikh's dismissal in 1953 and his successor Farooq Abdullah's in 1984, no J&K politician has embarrassed New Delhi beyond a point. Mufti alone, who cultivated Congress and floated his own PDP to neutralise Sheikh's National Conference (NC), took liberties. His detractors insist he had Delhi's “licence“ that eventually made him the only Muslim home minister.
 
 
His brief tenure as Union home minister witnessed a fringe insurgency explode with the release of JKLF militants in exchange for his kidnapped daughter Rubaiya in 1989, followed by Kashmiri Pandits' mass migration in 1990. His outcry over the Ghulam Nabi Azad government's allotment of land to a Hindu shrine board divided people irretrievably on regional and communal lines in ''' 2008, ''' when secessionism had ebbed and the Valley was blooming with tranquillity .
 
 
With a mission to demolish Abdullah's NC, Mufti and daughter Mehbooba left no stone unturned to discredit and demonise `India' ­ its body politic, democracy , systems and institutions. With both UPA's and NDA's unfettered permission, he laid the `road to Rawalpindi'. It won him a chunk of votes and helped him become chief minister twice, but at a price Delhi will have to pay for ages.
 
 
For over a decade Mufti and his party only whetted the sense of victimhood and betrayal in the Valley which, in the process, grew rabidly anti-Indian ­ some of them ferociously Islamist.Omar Abdullah's deficits of domicile, language and culture forced him to toe Mufti's line and both, in competition, began discrediting “Indians“.
 
 
At the end of the day , nobody in Kashmir respects or loves India. Anybody perceived to be soft on India runs huge risks, such as those meted out to the residents of Kokernag after the July 8 encounter. Their houses were torched and orchards destroyed. The government remained a mute spectator.
 
 
The irony is that Kashmir was pushed back to the abyss when complaints of rape, custodial killings and fake encounters against the security forces had dipped to the lowest level of 25 years and India's best held assembly elections had happened in J&K in 2014.Nobody knew Burhan who was then three years into militancy.
 
 
But Mufti didn't wait much to ride the tiger. He freed Masarat and permitted him to hold a massive pro-Pakistan demonstration in front of J&K police headquarters. It woke up all the lions in hibernation. Within days a young school dropout emerged as an icon of jihad for Kashmir's Generation Next.
 
 
Meanwhile, Mufti's ally continued to stoke fires. A frenzied group of cow vigilantes killed a Kashmiri Muslim trucker in Udhampur. BJP leaders and friends filed petitions to terminate the state's flag and special position. The tinderbox needed just a matchstick that came in handy with Burhan's death.
 
 
''The writer is a senior journalist ''
 
 
[[Category:India |J ]]
 
[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir |J ]]
 
 
== Aftermath ==
 
[http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/yadav-family-fued-virat-kohli-baba-ramdev-mamata-banerjee/1/845227.html Shougat Dasgupta Asit Jolly MG Arun Damayanti Datta , Behind the headlines “India Today” 29/12/2016]
 
[[File: Insha Malik blinded by pellet gun , India Today , December 29.2016 .jpg| Insha Malik blinded by pellet gun , India Today , December 29.2016 |frame|500px]]
 
 
My Dear Insha,
 
 
I was there when they carried you in with a bloodied face. Surgeons who cleaned your terrible wounds at Srinagar's Shri Maharaja Hari Singh (SMHS) Hospital said, "her face was like a sieve that had been used to filter blood". Earlier that July morning, you had sat terrified, huddled with other relatives in a first-floor room in your father's modest, two-storied home in Shopian's Sewdow village. Your parents believed you'd be safe from the fury on the street down below where police and paramilitary soldiers battled a mob of angry youngsters-some among them as young as 11, some of them your own classmates-protesting the killing of the Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani on July 8. But clearly, there was no place safe from the violence outside, the gunshots, the exploding canisters of teargas and fiery slogans. Suddenly, a window close to where you sat shattered. "I heard Insha wail and saw blood flowing from her face?her eyes. She fell down on the floor," Afroza Malik, your mother, said recalling her worst nightmare-become-real. Your eyes, face and torso were riddled with pellets from a pump-action shotgun fired, inexplicably, at the first-floor window. The good doctors, first at the SMHS Hospital in Srinagar and later at the nation's best, Delhi's All India Institute of Medical Sciences, kept you alive, helping you battle a series of complications including a brief brain infection from the lead pellets embedded inside your skull. The physical pain you still suffer will ebb with time. But the doctors have said they can do nothing that would help return your eyesight: "Nothing short of a miracle from God himself can give Insha Malik her beautiful eyes back," they said, evidently burdened by the pain of the terrible truth-that you will never again be able to see the beautiful Valley that is your home.
 
 
"It's a fate worse than death. Worse than an AK-47 bullet through the skull," said a surgeon responsible for admitting young and older victims of this latest cycle of strife, one that completely changed life as we had known it until July 8 in the Kashmir Valley. Seventy-five people, many of them teenagers like you, have been killed (local media reports claim 97 dead). Thousands more have sustained injuries, including scores, who like you, have been wholly or partially blinded by pellet guns. The doctors at the SMHS Hospital talk of Omar Nazir, a diminutive 12-year-old school-going son of a daily wage worker of Pulwama called Nazir Ahmad. Unmoving on his hospital bed, he too had lost both his eyes. Tamanna Ashiq, just eight years old, was perhaps more fortunate. Struck similarly in the face by a deadly volley of shotgun pellets when she peered out the window of her village home to watch a protest demonstration on July 9, a day after Burhan's killing. A pellet lodged deep inside her right eye destroyed the retina but the schoolgirl still has one good eye.
 
 
 
 
Nudged equally by the curfew ordered by the Mehbooba Mufti government and an unremitting calendar of hartals called by Syed Ali Shah Geelani as well as the Hurriyat hardliners, trouble persisted right until the Durbar (state government) packed its bags and shifted shop to Jammu for the winter in early November. In October, 12-year-old Junaid Akhoon of Saidpora in downtown Srinagar died. He fell to a hail of pellets fired by security personnel intent on dispersing a small crowd of protesters. Young Junaid's killing; the four-year-old girl with her legs and abdomen riddled by what she believes were "firecrackers"; the loss of Omar Nazir and Tamanna Ashiq's young eyes; and your own completely undeserved fate, Insha, are a distressing reminder of how children have fallen victim to the cycle of violent strife that simply won't leave the Kashmir Valley.
 
 
Strife that is driven by a dangerously swelling sense of alienation and resentment that rankles every Kashmiri today-a feeling engendered by the mainstream Kashmiri political leadership and Delhi's collective failure to resolve the Kashmir issue. An anger that is preyed upon and fanned by obdurate Hurriyat hardliners like Geelani, who give little thought to the people they profess to speak for; who think little of paralysing the lives and livelihoods of an entire population; men who, for close to six long months, condemned Kashmir to a life of unending darkness; men who think nothing of shutting down schools and denying children the simple pleasure of stepping out of their homes to play.
 
 
Children like you, Insha, and in fact close to 40 per cent of all Kashmiris-born after 1989-have no notion of what it is to live in peace. You have no experience of life without the discomforting presence of khaki uniforms, camouflaged fatigues, jackboots and Kalashnikovs.
 
 
You cannot see it, but this is the greatest wound.
 
 
Yours in empathy,
 
 
Asit Jolly
 
 
(To all the children of Kashmir who lost their innocence, blinded and bruised in the summer of 2016)
 
 
=2015-2018: BJP- PDP’s coalition government=
 
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F20&entity=Ar01900&sk=584A2A4B&mode=text  Akhilesh Singh, J&K: One State, Two States Of Mind, June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']
 
 
[[File: 2015-2018- BJP- PDP’s coalition government.jpg|2015-2018: BJP- PDP’s coalition government <br/> From: [https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F20&entity=Ar01900&sk=584A2A4B&mode=text  Akhilesh Singh, J&K: One State, Two States Of Mind, June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']|frame|500px]]
 
 
''BJP Hopes To Repair Image, Get Free Hand In Terror Fight''
 
 
Wary of rising unease in its support base in Jammu and other parts of the country, BJP sought to refurbish its ‘Hindutva’ credentials by snapping ties with ally PDP to counter the perception that it had compromised its ideological commitment to unifying J&K with the mainland.
 
 
The alliance with PDP, seen to pursue a ‘soft separatism’ political line, was always at odds with the BJP’s ‘nationalist’ stance and its advocacy of scrapping Article 370 and amending laws like Article 35A that accord special privileges to state residents.
 
 
More immediately, BJP pointed to support to separatist sentiments as PDP sought to push a soft approach to stone-pelters and began to act against security forces by looking to file FIRs against officers, as was alleged in the Shopian firing case. The move to file FIRs, which left the scope to name officers, and brinkmanship over the Kathua gang-rape case, where it was suggested PDP could quit the alliance if BJP ministers present at a rally in support of the accused were not acted upon deepened the divisions.
 
 
Differences over how to approach security ops took a toll on the alliance as the Centre’s ‘strike hard’ policy was seen by PDP as adversely impacting its south Kashmir base. Even in the Shujaat Bukhari case, it was felt police was being held back from conducting searches and NIA cases against separatists did not go down well with PDP either.
 
 
There is an expectation that governor’s rule will allow the Centre to take tough measures against terrorism with the state police completely in sync. A senior party leader argued the perception was gaining ground that BJP was being held to ransom by its ally. Some also felt the death of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed robbed the state of a leader who could have reduced the Kashmir-Jammu divide.
 
 
Mehbooba Mufti’s attempt to balance her political constituency with the challenge of terrorism and radicalism and the costs this was imposing on BJP found mention even in the recent dinner hosted by PM Narendra Modi for senior R-S-S functionaries and party general secretaries in charge of organisation.
 
 
After the Centre’s decision not to extend the Ramzan truce, political circles were abuzz about Mehbooba quitting the alliance but BJP acted fast, looking to get back to the policy of ‘zero tolerance’ against terrorism. The alliance, BJP leaders said, was a bid to carry out a risky experiment, which did not work out.
 
 
“It wasn’t possible to continue in view of the general polls approaching. Breaking the alliance will send a positive message about the party that it didn’t compromise with national security,” said a senior party leader.
 
 
==2018, June: BJP- PDP alliance falls apart==
 
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F20&entity=Ar00501&sk=33FF4CC9&mode=text  June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']
 
 
[[File: Coalition between BJP and PDP, March 1, 2015- June 19, 2018.jpg|Coalition between BJP and PDP, March 1, 2015- June 19, 2018; <br/> June 2018: how the BJP- PDP alliance fell apart—and why <br/> From: [https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F20&entity=Ar00501&sk=33FF4CC9&mode=text  June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']|frame|500px]]
 
 
PDP And BJP Were An Odd Couple To Begin With, And The Alliance In J&K Collapsed Under The Weight Of Their Inherent Differences, Made Worse By The Failure Of The Ramzan Ceasefire And The Killing Of An Editor Amid Escalating Violence
 
 
In Pre-Emptive Strike, BJP Brings Down Mehbooba, Goes For Governor’s Rule
 
 
Jammu and Kashmir is set for governor’s rule as the PDPBJP coalition, divided over tackling violence in the Kashmir Valley and catering to sharply conflicting political constituencies, came crashing on Tuesday with BJP yanking the rug from under its coalition partner.
 
 
Despite a steady deterioration in relations, BJP’s decision to quit the alliance came as a surprise and was seen in some quarters as intended to pre-empt a precipitate move by chief minister Mehbooba Mufti, possibly by September-October.
 
 
The dramatic decision has cleared the way for BJP to sharpen its ‘tough-on-security’ plank ahead of three state polls scheduled later this year and next year’s Lok Sabha contest. “Two issues were the basis of the coalition. One was to do all we could to restore peace and secondly to ensure equitable development of all three regions in the state. This has not happened, and in fact, the violence in the Valley has increased and this makes it difficult to continue,” BJP general secretary Ram Madhav told reporters, adding that Mehbooba discriminated against (Hindu-majority) Jammu and (Buddhist-dominated) Ladakh regions.
 
 
He specifically mentioned the recent killing of Shujaat Bukhari, a prominent editor who had attracted the anger of Pakistan-backed terrorists and hardliners by supporting the Ramzan ceasefire, saying his murder in the heart of Srinagar in broad daylight signalled the Mehbooba government’s failure, impelling BJP to pull the plug on the first woman CM of J&K.
 
 
Madhav’s stress on PDP’s alleged failings on countering separatism and radicalism and lack of attention to Jammu and Ladkah is clearly intended to refurbish its ‘Hindutva’ credentials, particularly at the national level where the party’s constituency was ill at ease with the arrangement.
 
 
===Why BJP pulled out of alliance with PDP in J&K===
 
[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/6-reasons-why-bjp-pulled-the-plug-in-jammu-and-kashmir/articleshow/64658791.cms  June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']
 
 
 
'''HIGHLIGHTS'''
 
 
BJP pulled out of the coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir, leading to the governor’s rule in the troubled state. Here are six reasons why BJP pulled the plug in the state.
 
 
1. Both PDP and BJP were looking for an exit to shore up credentials among respective constituencies. BJP moved pre-emptively to seize political high ground.
 
 
2. Gulf between the partners had widened. Disagreements rose over security strategy after Burhan Wani’s killing. PDP wanted a softer approach towards stone-pelters + and militants, mindful of massive resentment in Valley.
 
 
3. Mehbooba Mufti’s moves mollifying her supporters in the Valley by raising the ante on Kathua gang rape and Army/security forces’ operations further annoyed BJP’s constituency.
 
 
4. BJP went along with PDP’s demand for a ceasefire during Ramzan + . This was not reciprocated by Pakistan-backed terror groups or separatists, and dented BJP’s image nationally.
 
 
5. The ‘pre-emptive’ strike against Mehbooba Mufti is aimed at repairing the damage. BJP was keen to pull out earlier but waited until Tuesday so that state elections don’t have to be held before 2019 Lok Sabha polls.
 
 
6. The killing of journalist Shujaat Bukhari + provided the impetus for Centre to take control. BJP will revive its hardline nationalist theme, starting with S P Mookerjee’s death anniversary on June 23.
 
 
===The Ramzan truce helped, but not enough===
 
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F20&entity=Ar01902&sk=A15D5190&mode=text  Bharti Jain, How Ramzan truce brought some calm but failed at peace, June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']
 
 
[[File: Violence during the PDP- BJP alliance government- Civilian- militant, Army casualties under PDP-BJP government, 2015- June 2018; Casualties in ceasefire violations- cross-border firing, 2015- June 2018.jpg|Violence during the PDP- BJP alliance government: <br/> i) Civilian- militant, Army casualties under PDP-BJP government, 2015- June 2018; <br/> ii) Casualties in ceasefire violations- cross-border firing, 2015- June 2018 <br/> The Ramzan cease fire of May- June 2018: <br/> a) Violence during the 2018 Ramzan, and during the preceding month; <br/> b) A timeline of the Ramzan cease fire.  <br/> From: [https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F20&entity=Ar01902&sk=A15D5190&mode=text  Bharti Jain, How Ramzan truce brought some calm but failed at peace, June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']|frame|500px]]
 
 
The 31-day Ramzan truce in J&K saw a 265% spike in terror-related incidents and 80% rise in killings of security forces compared with the preceding 31-day period but did provide respite by bringing down stone-pelting incidents by 40% and the killings of civilians in terror and law and order-related incidents.
 
 
According to official figures, terror incidents in J&K shot up from 20 between April 15 and May 16 to 73 during May 17-June 16. However, there was no let-up in the crackdown on terrorism with 22 terrorists killed during the ceasefire compared with 14 in the 31 days preceding the truce. Most of the terrorists killed were foreign fighters.
 
 
Security personnel killed in terror incidents went up from five in the pre-ceasefire period to nine during the truce. During the truce, 14 security personnel were injured in law and order incidents and 52 in terror attacks.
 
 
Five civilians were killed during the ceasefire compared to the preceding 31 days, when 12 died. As for stone pelting, there were 107 cases during the truce, and 258 from April 15 to May 16.
 
 
“The suspension of operations… did provide relief to civilians as stone-pelting incidents declined and so did casualties among security forces and civilians in law and order incidents. However, there was a sharp rise in terror-related incidents as Pakistan-backed terrorists tried their best to sabotage the truce, even launching spectacular attacks like the killing of journalist Shujaat Bukhari and soldier Aurangzeb in the final days,” said a home ministry official.
 
 
“The failure of the Hurriyat to seize the opportunity and reciprocate our Ramzan initiative only emboldened the terrorists. By killing Bukhari, a clear message was sent by Pakistan’s ISI and separatist hardliners based in J&K that anybody supporting peace would meet with the same fate,” the official added.
 
 
===Fallout of alliance with BJP on PDP===
 
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F20&entity=Ar01905&sk=87F80114&mode=text  Aarti Tikoo Singh & M Saleem Pandit, PDP loses partner, and its support base, June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']
 
 
[[File: Fallout of alliance with BJP on PDP.jpg|Fallout of alliance with BJP on PDP <br/> From: [https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F20&entity=Ar01905&sk=87F80114&mode=text  Aarti Tikoo Singh & M Saleem Pandit, PDP loses partner, and its support base, June 20, 2018: ''The Times of India'']|frame|500px]]
 
 
 
Nineteen years after Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and his daughter Mehbooba Mufti floated the Peoples Democratic Party in 1999, the regional party is staring at one of its worst crises.
 
 
In 2015, when PDP joined hands with BJP — a very unlikely alliance — to form the government, for many there was reason for optimism. Especially in PDP, comprising mostly the Jamat-e-Islami, the pro-Pakistan socio-political group whose armed wing is Hizbul Mujahideen.
 
 
“Our hope was BJP, like in its previous avatar under PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, would initiate dialogue with separatists and Pakistan to resolve the longstanding conflict,” a PDP member told TOI.
 
 
When Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani was killed in an encounter in 2016, “the PDP lost lot of ground in its bastion, south Kashmir, the hotbed of the new militancy that was born through the violent years of 2008 to 2010,” Shahnawaz, a PDP activist in Anantnag, said. The entire valley erupted in protests, with over 80 people killed in clashes and some even blinded by pellets, which further added to the growing anger against PDP.
 
 
“The lynching of several Muslims over the suspicions of beef made BJP extremely unpopular in Kashmir too. By continuing its alliance with BJP, PDP lost my vote,” Ishrat, a student in Kulgam, said.
 
 
PDP’s base eroded further when BJP refused to hold talks with separatists and instead sent NIA after them to crack down on terror funding.
 
 
=Polarised views, polarised thinking and rumours=
 
==1994/ Innocent tailor; 2016/ The girl who was not molested==
 
[Ahmed Ali Fayyaz, In Kashmir’s polarised polity, it’s all down to who you believe in the battle of narratives, April 21, 2016, The Times of India]
 
 
When, in 1994, a sizeable crowd dragged a youthful tailor out of his home in the congested Nawab Bazar neighbourhood in downtown Srinagar and stoned him to death for the ‘rape’ of a three-and-a-half-year-old girl, an investigation by Kashmir Times established that the accused had not even touched the tiny tot. It was probably the first Taliban-type execution in Kashmir. The tailor’s body was thrown into the Jhelum.
 
 
This does not suggest that every rumour or outcry in the Valley is unfounded. It does, however, underscore the need of a credible investigation into the street allegation of a 16-year-old girl student’s molestation by a soldier in Handwara. Unfortunately, neither the media today nor any magistrate – police itself has become a party after releasing the girl’s video – retains credibility.
 
 
If an enquiry finds the soldier guilty, it will vindicate the pro-separatist civil society. Army will dismiss it as ‘a conspiracy to deprecate the security forces’. Contrarily, if an enquiry gives a clean chit to the anonymous soldier civil society, including mainstream politicians thriving on pseudo-separatist tirades, would call it ‘a fudged one to protect the forces and denigrate the Kashmiris’. The accusation, though debunked by the girl in disputed conditions, has already claimed five civilian lives in Kupwara district.
 
 
The world witnessed how an outcry of ‘rape and murder’ of two young women in Shopian set the Valley on fire in 2009. Even CBI – whose investigations in the infamous Pathribal fake encounter and Srinagar sex scam had been widely appreciated – failed to find takers for its conclusion in this case. It established that neither rape nor murder had happened. Exhumation of the unmarried girl’s body, followed by a thorough examination by a team of doctors and forensic experts from AIIMS and FSL, found her hymen and septum intact. But by then, Shopian had taken its toll.
 
 
Police have not been able to investigate even 2% of the over 60,000 militancy-related FIRs filed in the last 25 years. Allegations of sexual abuse and rape against non-state actors have often gone unnoticed, unreported and unquestioned. When the father of 2009 IAS topper Shah Faesal counselled a non-Kashmiri guerrilla against shaking his hand forcibly with a neighbour’s daughter, it proved to be the last day of the poor teacher’s life.
 
 
Security forces too enjoyed considerable impunity as few of them were punished over a delinquency or crime. From Kunan-Poshpora (1991) to Handwara (2016), the army has faced allegations of rape and molestation scores of times. Enjoying immunity under AFSPA, it has not been held accountable. Even the first – and till date the last – investigation by the Press Council of India (in the Kunan-Poshpora case) was not acceptable to civil society in the Valley as it exonerated the army and was conducted by a journalist known for his linkage to the then army chief’s father.
 
 
As the army provided institutional support to the accused even in cases like Pathribal, the Valley’s intelligentsia and civil society which was already tilted towards the separatists and militants, found it convenient to compromise neutrality and professionalism. When over 20 non-Kashmiri students were injured in the police lathi charge at NIT Srinagar, neither the agencies nor newspapers in Srinagar carried a line of reporting till it exploded in New Delhi.
 
 
People have little hesitation to admit that many of the journalists, human rights activists, judges and lawyers, even police officers, are obsessively inclined to one side and selectively pick up on matters that have potential to malign the Indian state, its systems, institutions and icons.
 
 
Now the battle lines are drawn. Rumour and perception have taken precedence over news. In the battle of narratives, which gets intensified by New Delhi’s licence to competitive separatism and an unbridled social media, the Valley would support the Handwara ‘victim’ only if she complains against the soldier. And the rest of India will be on her side only if she omits the soldier and proceeds against the two Kashmiri youths who created the scene.
 
 
Unscrupulous players have turned the teenager into a political football to strengthen their narrative. Nobody seems to care for her safety, dignity and future.
 
 
== Aug- Oct 2016: 20 educational institutes destroyed==
 
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=Taliban-type-offensive-against-schools-in-JK-27102016017031  Saleem Pandit, Taliban-type offensive against schools in J&K, Oct 27 2016 : The Times of India]
 
 
 
20 Institutes Wrecked In Last 3 Mths [Aug- Oct 2016]
 
 
Almost like Taliban's offensive against education in Pakistan and Afghanistan, terror groups in Kashmir are destroying schools and ensuring their continued shutdown. According to official figures, seventeen government schools and three private schools have been wrecked in the last three months of unrest.
 
 
The schools in Valley have remained shut since the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani on July 8. Officials said that around two million students have been prevented from going to schools across the Kashmir Valley . The students of border areas like Gurez, Tangdhar and Uri in Kashmir, and Jammu and Ladakh regions have been attending schools without disruption though. Separatist influence is limited to the Valley.
 
 
Pakistan-sponsored stone-pelting brigades set two more government schools on fire on Tuesday , one at Noorbagh area of Srinagar city and a higher secondary at Aishmuqam in Anantnag district.The closure of schools and colleges has also been enforced by the diktats issued by the separatist conglomerate Hurriyat and militant outfits.
 
 
Lashkar-e-Taiba issued a warning to J&K education minister Naeem Akhtar on September 27 for trying to resume schools and colleges in the Valley. Lashkar spokesman Abdullah Ghaznavi quoted LeT operation chief Mehmood Shah and said, “...Kashmiris are educated enough to decide what is good or bad for them. If Naeem Akhtar does not budge, we will initiate action against him.“ Later, in an open letter, Akhtar asked pro-Pakistan separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani to allow educational institutions to run. But his plea had no effect on separatists or terror groups.
 
 
Hundreds of parents have sent their wards to Jammu and Delhi for studies after they lost three months of schooling.
 
 
=2018=
 
==Report of High Commissioner for Human Rights==
 
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F06%2F16&entity=Ar01213&sk=74B6FC8C&mode=text  Dilip Sinha, June 16, 2018: ''The Times of India'']
 
 
 
''(The writer is a former ambassador to the UN in Geneva and vice-president of Human Rights Council).''
 
 
The report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Kashmir deserves attention, coming as it does from the office that claims the “unique mandate from the international community to promote and protect all human rights”. This is an exaggerated interpretation of the mandate of the office as given by the UN General Assembly in 1993, when it was established. Protecting human rights is the duty of the country concerned, though some western countries claim greater say in the affairs of others. The tendentious report, which has a major factual error, only serves to highlight the inherent weaknesses of the office and the people running it.
 
 
Human rights are a tool in international relations used by countries to point fingers at others and avoid scrutiny of their own record. The extreme politicisation of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva led to the body being abolished in 2006 and replaced by the Human Rights Council. But the changes were cosmetic. The Council does not even have its own secretariat. The high commissioner’s office, which services it, treats itself as an autonomous body. And with good reason. The high commissioner is not elected by the Council but is appointed by the UN secretary-general.
 
 
First, the factual error in the report. It says that India is a state party to the international conventions against torture and enforced disappearance. A check on its own website would have confirmed to the office that India has not ratified either. Pakistan has ratified the convention against torture, but that is another story.
 
 
Now to the glaring biases in the report. It refers to LeT, JeM and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen as “armed groups” even though they are listed as terrorist organisations by the Security Council. This will be music to Pakistan’s ears. Little wonder it has welcomed the report.
 
 
Human rights bodies undermine their own credibility when they ignore the violence of terrorists and focus exclusively on the responsibilities of government security forces.
 
 
The high commissioner’s office does not state why it selected Kashmir’s human rights situation for the report. It does not cite any resolution of the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council or the Security Council as the mandate for it, only its founding resolution. Why does the high commissioner, Zeid Raad Al Hussein of Jordan, then pick on it for a special report? Does he have the same obsession with Kashmir as the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, where Pakistan has been insisting on it year after year?
 
 
The report claims that it also covers the situation in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and states that “human rights violations in this area are of a different calibre and magnitude and of a more structural nature”. It even concedes that people in the Pakistan-occupied part do not have the rights available to citizens of Pakistan and their independence is illusory. But twothirds of the report deals with the Indian part.
 
 
The report repeats allegations and statistics from various motivated sources on the number of people killed by Indian security forces and those missing. It dwells at length on the provisions of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act but ignores the fact that most countries protect their armed forces with similar laws.
 
 
The high commissioner’s obsession with Kashmir is also evident from the coverage given to the Kashmir dispute in the report.
 
 
But how independent is the office? A look at its budget reveals that it has little financial independence. Only 40% of its funding comes from the UN. The remaining money is given by member states, mainly western, who decide where it is to be spent. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Russia are the only non-western countries among the top 20 donors. Half the office staff is drawn from western countries. The report does not state which countries have funded it.
 
 
The report may be used by some political parties and NGOs in India to embarrass the government. They would do well to remember that Pakistan had joined hands with the OIC during Narasimha Rao’s time to do the same in the Commission on Human Rights. But we should not let our political differences give an opportunity to selfappointed international custodians of human rights to interfere in our inter nal affairs.
 
 
==Nov: Assembly is dissolved when PDP, NC, Cong combine stakes claim==
 
[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jammu-and-kashmir-assembly-dissolution-victory-for-pdp-nc/articleshow/66738066.cms  Samiya Latief, Jammu and Kashmir assembly dissolution: Victory for PDP, NC?, November 22, 2018: ''The Times of India'']
 
 
[[File: Assembly is dissolved when PDP, NC, Cong combine stakes claim- November 2018.jpg|Assembly is dissolved when PDP, NC, Cong combine stakes claim- November 2018 <br/> From: [https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F11%2F22&entity=Ar00507&sk=9FE73D68&mode=text  Saleem Pandit, November 22, 2018:  ''The Times of India'']|frame|500px]]
 
 
 
The announcement of grand alliance of the PDP, NC and Congress literally forced Governor Satya Pal Malik to dissolve the assembly, paving way for early elections in the state.
 
 
In fast-paced developments, PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti on Wednesday evening wrote a letter to the Governor to stake claim to form the government in alliance with the NC and Congress in the state.
 
 
To counter Mehbooba Mufti, People's Conference's Sajad Lone just moments later also staked claim to form the government in the state.
 
 
But within an hour, the Governor issued a notification dissolving the state assembly.
 
 
Both the PDP and NC were demanding dissolution of the assembly for the last five months, however, the Governor had refused to act till now.
 
  
Taking a dig at Governor, NC chief Omar Abdullah took to Twitter and said: "JKNC has been pressing for assembly dissolution for 5 months now. It can’t be a coincidence that within minutes of Mehbooba Mufti Sahiba letter staking claim the order to dissolve the assembly suddenly appears."
 
  
However, the dissolution of the assembly is still being considered to be a victory of the two main regional parties - PDP and NC - in the state as both are willing to hold fresh polls.
 
  
PDP chief also took to Twitter and said she had never thought that the idea of a grand coalition would give such "jitters" and would help in achieving the "seemingly impossible".
 
  
Both the PDP and NC don't have much to lose as it will stop the alleged "horse-trading" of their party members by the BJP-backed People's Conference.
 
  
Talking to TOI, a PDP leader on condition of anonymity said, "This was part of the plan that worked. We wanted to pressurise the Governor to dissolve the assembly. The BJP and PC were trying to break our party and now everything is over. MLAs can't do anything."
+
=Iqbal=
 +
iqbal lives on with new research
  
But, for the BJP and PC, assembly dissolution has come as a major setback as they have been trying hard to come up with a third front in the state.
+
By Rauf Parekh
  
After the BJP broke the alliance with PDP in June, at least 3 of its members rebelled against the leadership and sided with Sajad Lone, and more members were likely to desert the party. Even the NC had accused the BJP of horse-trading to form the government.  
+
[http://www.dawn.com/ Dawn]
  
After the June 19 pull-out, Lone is understood to have been approaching disgruntled PDP leaders for forming an alliance with the BJP, the sources said. The PC has only two MLAs.  
+
[[File:  Iqbal.PNG | Iqbal |frame|500px]]
  
The PC chief was also successful in breaking away NC's chief spokesman Junaid Mattu, who contested the urban local body elections and became the mayor of Srinagar.
 
  
However, even with the support of the BJP, Lone could not gather the numbers till now to stake the claim to form the government in Jammu and Kashmir.  
+
As I have mentioned elsewhere, Ghalib and Iqbal are two poets of Urdu fascination about whom has refused to wane and in spite of the fact that almost every aspect of their lives and art has been done to death, scholars keep on piling up books and articles on them. Hardly a year goes by when a book on Iqbal and Ghalib is not published.
  
The PDP had 28 MLAs, followed by NC's 15 and and the Congress' 12. The BJP was the second largest party in the state with 25 members.
+
Though most of such articles, especially the ones written as a ritual on the death or birth anniversaries of these poets, are more or less repetition of past writings and hardly anything new, if at all, is found in them, sometimes quite good articles can be spotted in the heap.
  
=2020=
+
Similarly, among a number of books published on the two poets every year, only a few are worth the time and money spent on them. But some books present such refreshing thoughts and the approach is so different that one is convinced that such a book was needed and its publication is not yet another spiritless, ritualistic affair. In the last few months a few such books have been published on Iqbal that deserve special mention.
== Geelani leaves Hurriyat Conference==
+
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2020%2F06%2F30&entity=Ar00308&sk=9969BB97&mode=text  Saleem Pandit, June 30, 2020: ''The Times of India'']
+
  
In a move that left Kashmir’s separatist conglomerate in disarray, pro-Pakistan hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani quit his faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference and named Abdullah Geelani as his successor amid speculation he was doing ISI’s bidding. The Rawalpindi-based Abdullah Geelani is the younger brother of the late SAR Geelani, former DU professor who was acquitted in the Parliament attack case.
+
One of them is on Iqbal’s last book ‘Armaghaan-i-Hijaz’. But before I introduce the book and say something about the author, allow me a few words on the trends and quality of Urdu research. What pleasantly surprises me and keeps me excited is the emergence of one after another talented, young research scholar of Urdu from Punjab. I have mentioned in these columns some commendable research works of Punjab’s young researchers of Urdu, such as Abrar Abdus Salam (Aab-i-Hayat) and Suhail Abbas Khan (Bagh-o-Bahar), both of whom belong to Multan. Now I have before me another good work done by a young researcher from Lahore.
  
Officially, the 91-year-old cited disenchantment with the way fellow constituents of the group responded to the nullification of Article 370 as the primary reason for his decision. He also alleged lack of accountability within Hurriyat and a rebellion brewing in the ranks.
+
These rising stars of Urdu research make me wish that Karachi may find its own stars to sing of, which we badly need. This new trend shows a lack of genuine interest in Urdu research in Karachi. It reflects the city’s mundane spirit and its commercial culture that favours studying management and economic sciences or technology rather than humanities. It also reflects the quality of research that is carried out by the new generation of scholars of Urdu from Karachi: of late, hardly any worth-mentioning dissertation of a young Karachiite has been published.
  
 +
The new rising star in the firmament of Urdu research is Dr Baseera Ambreen. She not only possesses some prerequisites for Urdu research, such as knowing Persian and prosody, she has already published another research work which was just as unique and fresh. Titled ‘Tazmeenat-i-Iqbal’, the previous work traced the insertion of quotations or other poets’ verses by Iqbal in his poetry. This insertion, intended to corroborate or complement the meanings a poet wants to convey and which is duly notified, is technically known as ‘tazmeen’. Tracing the ‘tazmeen’ is called ‘takhreej’, or the act of finding the original and correct text and the creator of the couplets or quotations inserted. This meticulous work calls for a perfect researcher who could sift through numerous books and reference works and whose brain is a store-house of miscellaneous information. Tracing such verses in Iqbal’s poetry requires another precondition to be met: a keen eye for classical Persian texts. Baseera Ambreen has done the job quite well in her book ‘Tazmeenat-i-Iqbal’.
  
''' ‘Successor to Geelani said to be close to ISI’ '''
+
Though I have never met her, judging by the work presented by her in the new book of hers ‘Maqaesa-i-Armaghaan-i-Hijaz Farsi’, published by Bazm-i-Iqbal, and by the introductory notes written by such literary stalwarts as Dr Waheed Qureshi and Dr Aslam Ansari, I can well imagine the enormity of her talent. Dr Ansari writes that the variation in the texts of old manuscripts was but natural as all the texts were hand-written. Even in today’s era of modern printing and publishing, textual errors and variance in different editions of a work are not uncommon. That is the reason why researchers and scholars lay much emphasis on collation and comparison of varied texts of a work. Except for ‘Armaghaan-i-Hijaz’ and ‘Baqiyaat-i-Iqbal’, all the works of Iqbal were published during his lifetime and he was very particular about their calligraphy and printing. Dr Ansari says that since ‘Armaghaan’ was published a few months after his death and its various editions contain varied text at many places, it was a must to ascertain the authentic version before looking for the reasons for this variance. This was a hard nut to crack but University Oriental College’s young faculty member and scholar Baseera Ambreen has made this work look so easy, opines Dr Ansari in his introduction. As she has consulted the original text hand-written by Iqbal himself, she has, in the process of collating, edited and compiled the Persian quartets that were missing from the printed versions of ‘Armaghaan’. She has brought back to life the ‘rubaiyyat’ and ‘dobaitis’ of Iqbal that were hitherto unknown to the scholars of Iqbal and some of which are so elegant that they must have been incorporated in the original text.
  
A Hurriyat spokesman said Shah Geelani had written to all eight constituents of the group, outlining the reasons for his quitting, including allegations of lack of accountability within Hurriyat colleagues based in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. “Activities of these representatives are limited to seeking access to ministries in POK. Some members were expelled while others started holding their own meetings. These activities were endorsed by you (constituents) by holding a meeting here to ratify their decisions,” he wrote.
+
Dr Waheed Qureshi is of the view that the scholars who have worked on Ghalib and Iqbal without knowing a little Persian could not grasp the real thoughts of these poets. Baseera has chosen Iqbal as a topic of special study and not only has she done justice to ‘tazmeenat’ of Iqbal but, equipped with the knowledge of Persian, she has also collected such verses of Iqbal, after collation and comparison, which had skipped the early compilers. There are large numbers of general surveys of Iqbal’s poetry, but any real and worthwhile research works on Iqbal can be counted on the fingers of one hand, says Dr Qureshi. The way in which Dr Baseera Ambreen has shed light on some new aspects of Iqbal and his linguistic peculiarities in this book of hers has in fact enriched the treasures of Iqbal studies.
Sources said Abdullah Geelani being chosen to run the Hurriyat from Rawalpindi effectively means sidelining the separatist cabal in the Valley. Abdullah Geelani is the brother of SAR Geelani, the former DU professor who was acquitted in the 2001 Parliament attack case. “Abdullah is known to be close to ISI,” an insider said.
+
  
===Details===
+
Baseera Ambreen’s yet another marvellous work, which I have been waiting for, is to appear soon. It is her PhD dissertation titled ‘Iqbal ke sanae badae’, or rhetorical ornaments of Iqbal. Those who have gone through this thesis, such as Prof Dr Moinuddin Aqeel, believe that it is yet another stunning work from a young scholar.
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2020%2F07%2F01&entity=Ar02004&sk=B8317A7B&mode=text  Bharti Jain, July 1, 2020: ''The Times of India'']
+
  
The exit of the ailing, 90-year-old separatist hawk Syed Ali Shah Geelani from the Hurriyat Conference completes his sidelining by those very Pakistanbased masters who used him for the past several years to stoke the fires of militancy and violence in Jammu & Kashmir.
+
drraufparekh@yahoo.com
  
Sources in the security establishment said Geelani’s dissociation with the Hurriyat reeked of Pakistan’s and particularly ISI’s “use and throw” policy, given that the politician who could mobilise endless hartals and violent protests in his heyday was now left to fend for himself after he riled them with his attempts to assert his supremacy through his chosen representative for the Hurriyat’s PoK chapter, Abdullah Gilani, and prop up his sons as heirs to his legacy.
+
=Nationhood=
The rumblings within the Hurriyat Conference led by Shah Geelani have been going on for the past 4-6 months. Geelani, a source said, realised that time was not on his side and was keen to push his sons in the succession battle. In fact, he ensured that Abdullah Gilani, his trusted aide and a good friend of his son Nayeem Geelani, was appointed as convenor of the Hurriyat chapter in PoK.
+
== A Muslim India, within India==
 +
[https://www.dawn.com/news/1219465  Mustafa Zafar, November 18, 2015: ''Dawn'']
  
An IPS officer said this was with an eye on creating acceptance for his son, purportedly Nayeem, as the heir to his legacy. However, Pakistan-based agencies were not happy with the plan and are believed to have tied up with other Hurriyat functionaries in Kashmir as well as PoK to first sideline and then oust Abdullah Gilani recently by replacing him with their “own man” Hussain Mohammad Khateeb.
+
''' For too long now there has been a parochial understanding of what Pakistani history as an academic discipline entails, as there is a firm assumption that it has to be accountable to the public eye. '''
  
===''Hurriyat's mission has failed''===
+
Many are of the idea that history is perhaps, already present in the past. And that the historian’s role is only one of assorting facts and events along a chronological and byte-sized narrative; as if it were a jigsaw puzzle in which the pieces were facts that fit in a fixed tapestry of national belonging.
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2020%2F07%2F01&entity=Ar02018&sk=4029496D&mode=text  Saleem Pandit, ‘Hurriyat failed in its mission, wrote Geelani’, July 1, 2020: ''The Times of India'']
+
These traditionalist frameworks become very real when narratives associated with Dr Muhammad Iqbal’s statements regarding the official demand for separation led to the public de facto assuming that Iqbal also called for a partitioned Muslim state.
  
 +
The infamous Pakistan studies textbook presents Iqbal as a pious orthodox Muslim thinker with the message being that Pakistan, the homeland, can be accredited to his vision.
  
J&K DGP Dilbagh Singh said former Hurriyat Conference chairman Syed Ali Shah Geelani had admitted in a letter sent by him to all constituents of the separatist outfit that the “path chosen by him was wrong and people were using it for personal gains, while the mission they were pursuing has failed.
+
It is not surprising then that Iqbal has become the father of Pakistan as he was the first to call for “the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind and Balochistan amalgamated into a single state” in his presidential address to the 21st session of the All-India Muslim League that was held in Allahabad on the 29th of December, 1930.
 +
What is surprising, however, is that if one were to read Iqbal’s seminal presidential address in the historical context, it becomes clear that his vision never actually called for the partitioned Muslim state of Pakistan.
  
Singh said, “Geelani’s letter is an eye-opener. He admitted that they (Hurriyat Conference and its factions) have miserably failed in their mission and the Kashmir issue is being used by people for their personal gain. He also confessed that his path was wrong, and they were propagating negative thinking.
+
From the very onset of Iqbal’s address, it is clear that he was posing the ideological dichotomy between Islam and Western nationalism as a conflict as it had the potential to disrupt Islam as an edifice of life.
 +
In setting the parameters of this conflict between Islam and modern nationalism within the South Asian context, the genius of Iqbal neither chose an isolationist approach, such as the one adopted by the Deobandi school of thought, nor did he want to appease the colonial powers and their separation of church and state.
  
The DGP said, the aged politician, in his letter, had “cried hoarse” over how people sitting across the LoC were luring Kashmiri youths towards narcotics. Geelani had also stated that “Kashmir’s freedom struggle was reduced to mere drug abuse and serving Pakistan’s interests.
+
Instead, Iqbal expounded the idea that Islam was not just an “ethical ideal” but also an overarching legal political “social structure” which, throughout the “life-history of the Muslims of India” had unified “scattered individuals and groups”.
  
== Major changes in domicile rules==
+
For Iqbal, Western nationalism was centred on a “narrower system of ethics” which took agency of religion away from the public to the private sphere.
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2020%2F05%2F19&entity=Ar01100&sk=7406B86B&mode=text  Sanjay Khajuria, J&K notifies major changes in domicile rules, May 19, 2020: ''The Times of India'']
+
  
 +
Iqbal countered the idea of territory arguing that Islam was a “force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations” and that religion was a power of the utmost importance in the life of individual, as well as of states.
  
The J&K government issued a notification specifying the conditions for obtaining domicile certificates necessary for applying for government jobs and other privileges in the Union Territory, with some amendments in the Jammu & Kashmir Civil Services (Decentralisation and Recruitment) Act, 2010. As a result of the new rules, West Pakistan refugees, children of women married outside J&K and ‘safai karamcharis’ will now be eligible for domicile certificate.
+
He maintained that if democracy were to be applied there had to be recognition of the “units of Indian society” not from a territorial standpoint but rather through accounting for the diverse nature of India’s “communal groups”.
  
Addressing a press conference on Sunday, government spokesperson Rohit Kansal said, according to the new rules all those holding permanent resident certificates of the erstwhile J&K state will be eligible to get domicile certificates from the designated authority. “Permanent residents of the erstwhile state of J&K in whose favour permanent resident certificates have been issued by the competent authority before 31.10.2019 shall be eligible for receiving their domicile certificates on the basis of PRCs alone and no other document shall be required for such residents,” Kansal said.
+
Within them, Indian Muslims were the most homogenous and united in India and were the only people who could be “fitly described as a nation in the modern sense of the word”, he argued.
  
He added, “There may be bonafide migrants and bonafide displaced persons who have migrated but have not registered with the relief department. In order to facilitate such persons, the relief department shall be making a special limited provision to apply before the Relief & Rehabilitation Commissioner (Migrant) for registration for the purpose of issuance of a domicile certificate only, with any one of the many documents such as 1951/1988 electoral roll, proof of employment, ownership of property, proof of registration in other states/UTs as a migrant or a displaced person or any other documentation which would have made him/her eligible for grant of PRC before 06-08-2019.”
+
But does that mean Iqbal was talking about a partitioned Muslim state?
  
[[Category:History|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
For many the demand for Pakistan after Iqbal’s address which called for the North-West to become a single state and the added oppression under the “Hindu” Congress is enough to solidify the notion that Iqbal envisioned Pakistan.
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:India|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:Politics|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
  
==Pakistani MBBS seats scandal==
+
School histories cite remote statements from Iqbal’s 1930 address contending that he can be viewed as a separatist; various communal groups could simply not “sink their respective individualities in a larger whole” are those gold lines which tickle the patriotic heart.
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2020%2F07%2F07&entity=Ar00719&sk=75A61C3E&mode=text  Saleem Pandit, Hurriyat members in dock over sale of Pak med seats in J&K, July 7, 2020: ''The Times of India'']
+
Yet nationalist narratives conveniently forget Iqbal stating that were communal groups entitled to the autonomous development of their cultures in their own “Indian home-lands” then they would be ready to safeguard the “freedom of India”.
  
 +
The omission of Iqbal’s arbitration between Western ideals of state and the role of Islam as mentioned in his address from our school histories is unfortunate – his answer for this disruption is what makes Iqbal an unequivocal visionary for Muslim nationalism in a land as diverse as India.
  
Seats Sold For ₹10-20L To Kids Of Cops, Netas
+
“Muslim India within India”
  
Srinagar:
+
There is also a need to contextualise the December 1930 presidential address and Iqbal’s historical situation before painting with a brush the Pakistani green of national zeal as the poet-politician's tract on autonomous states within a federation goes amiss in our mainstream narratives.
  
Over two decades, Hurriyat members and other separatists earned a fortune by facilitating medical and engineering seats to wards of influential families of J&K, including kids of cops and politicians, as well as accommodating their own kin in colleges in Pakistan and PoK.
+
The intended audience for the address was not just Indian Muslims, but the speech was a direct rebuttal to the Nehru report of 1929 which “rejected the crucial Muslim demands for a separate electorate and weightage for minorities”.
The train of students going to Pakistan interestingly enough failed to attract any action from successive Indian governments since the quotas were first set up in 2000. The seats were ostensibly meant for Kashmiri children whose parents or bread–earner were killed in the conflict in J&K. What came to pass was separatists selling seats designated for orphans between Rs 10 lakh to 20 lakh each.
+
The separatists preferred students from Sopore and Baramulla areas besides other parts of north Kashmir, a Hurriyat insider said. Though fees are charged, students are provided 100% scholarship, free accommodation and a per diem.
+
  
Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s differences with Ghulam Mohammad Safi over alleged corruption brought the can of worms out in the public. While four of the siblings of Safi are either doctors or engineers, one daughter is a journalist in Islamabad. Geelani refused to hand over leadership of the PoK chapter of his Hurriyat faction to Safi.
+
The concept of a federation for Iqbal warranted an abolition of the Central Legislative Assembly and instead called for an assembly which would represent the federal states and thus eliminate the “communal problem”.
Interestingly, police officers, bureaucrats and mainstream politicos also managed MBBS seats for their wards through Hurriyat leaders. The daughter of a police officer who was in former CM Mehbooba Mufti’s security is understood to a beneficiary.
+
  
The girl is currently at the Peoples University of Medical and Health Sciences for Women in Sindh in Pakistan. Likewise, a daughter of another retired DSP and a former deputy commissioner’s daughter were given MBBS seats in lieu of money, the Hurriyat source said.
+
How can one argue for a partitioned Muslim state if Iqbal himself affirmed that “proper redistribution will make the question of joint and separate electorates automatically disappear from the constitutional controversy of India”.
  
Hurriyat patron Syed Geelani Ali Geelani’s aides like Ghulam Mohammad Sofi alias Safi in Islamabad in Pakistan would operate through Geelani’s jailed private secretary Ayaz Akbar. Mirwaiz Umar’s representative Fayaz Naqshbandi besides Prof Abdul Gani Bhat are also understood to have been involved.
+
A solution could not be reached until all parties understood that the argument of the Muslims in India was “international and not national” as communal groups were nations in themselves.
  
Jailed separatist Shabir Shah’s representative in Islamabad was one Mehmood Sagar, originally a Kashmiri dry fruit shopkeeper of Saribala in Srinagar, as also one Bashir Ahmad Wani. The representatives or the conduits would arrange seats and money was received by the Hurriyat and separatist leaders here in Kashmir, the Hurriyat insider said.
+
When Iqbal called for a consolidated Muslim state, which would be centralised in a specific territory, namely the North-West of India, let us not forget that he argued for a “Muslim India within India”.
  
Importantly, while Geelani’s Hurriyat faction has 22 constituents, Mirwaiz- headed Hurriyat is a conglomerate of 27 smaller separatist groups. Both the groups are involved in monetary transfers, according to the insider.
+
Perhaps, what makes Iqbal’s rhetoric even more powerful was that his political proposal was adjoined and fitted neatly into his theory of the universal Muslim millat.
  
Syed Ali Geelani’s resignation from the Hurriyat faction on June 29 exposed the scandal when he cited sale of Pakistani medical seats by his constituent outfit leaders as one of the main reasons of his quitting the amalgam.
+
The consolidation of the Muslim state was a stepping stone towards the unification of the world Islamic community, as Islam was a “peoples building force” and again not just an “ideal”.
 +
A consolidated state for Islam was an “opportunity to rid itself from the stamp of Arab imperialism” and instead to revamp its “law, culture, education and to bring them in closer context with the spirit of modern times”.
  
[[Category:History|J
+
There is nothing orthodox about Iqbal and he never called for a Pakistan as a partitioned Muslim state in his December 1930 presidential address to the All-India Muslim League – an address that is recalled as the first stepping stone towards a separate homeland justified in our school histories through isolated statements of sovereign marked territory.
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:India|J
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir|J
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:Politics|J
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
  
[[Category:History|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
Instead, we need to read Iqbal’s statements closely on that day, and uphold him as a Muslim nationalist of the time, whose political proposals called for harmony between Western democracy and Islamic nationalism through an overarching concept of Islam as a cultural force within India.
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:India|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:Politics|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
  
=See also=
+
It is ironic that answering a question about who spelt out the idea of Pakistan in school histories has become something of a joke because the kind of separatism Iqbal had been spelling out actually never had its desired effect on Indian Muslims.
[[Jammu & Kashmir, history: 1846- 1946]]
+
  
[[Jammu & Kashmir, history: 1947-48]]
+
The question put up to the Pakistan studies student about the 1930 address should not be filtered through an already present Pakistan in mind. Rather, points of study during the 1930s should flesh out how Muslim proposals projected their visions for syncretic power between religiously marked categories of “majorities” and “minorities” in a British free India.
  
[[Jammu & Kashmir, history: 1989- ]]
+
“In the world of Islam today, we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed, but whose structure … stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam,” said Iqbal.
  
[[Jammu & Kashmir: Militant violence]]
+
''' References: '''
  
[[Category:History|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
Pirzada, Syed Shariffuddin, Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents (1906-1947) Volume 2, (National Publishing House, 1970).
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
R.J. Moore, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand,’ Modern Asian Studies, XVII, 4, (1983): pp. 529-546.
[[Category:India|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
Naim, C.M, Iqbal, Jinnah, and Pakistan: The Vision of Reality, (New York, 1979).
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
[[Category:Politics|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
  
[[Category:History|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
[[Category:Literature|I
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
IQBAL]]
[[Category:India|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
[[Category:Name|ALPHABET
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
IQBAL]]
[[Category:Jammu & Kashmir|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
[[Category:Pakistan|I
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+
IQBAL]]
[[Category:Politics|J JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-
+
JAMMU & KASHMIR, HISTORY: 1989-]]
+

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Iqbal

iqbal lives on with new research

By Rauf Parekh

Dawn

Iqbal


As I have mentioned elsewhere, Ghalib and Iqbal are two poets of Urdu fascination about whom has refused to wane and in spite of the fact that almost every aspect of their lives and art has been done to death, scholars keep on piling up books and articles on them. Hardly a year goes by when a book on Iqbal and Ghalib is not published.

Though most of such articles, especially the ones written as a ritual on the death or birth anniversaries of these poets, are more or less repetition of past writings and hardly anything new, if at all, is found in them, sometimes quite good articles can be spotted in the heap.

Similarly, among a number of books published on the two poets every year, only a few are worth the time and money spent on them. But some books present such refreshing thoughts and the approach is so different that one is convinced that such a book was needed and its publication is not yet another spiritless, ritualistic affair. In the last few months a few such books have been published on Iqbal that deserve special mention.

One of them is on Iqbal’s last book ‘Armaghaan-i-Hijaz’. But before I introduce the book and say something about the author, allow me a few words on the trends and quality of Urdu research. What pleasantly surprises me and keeps me excited is the emergence of one after another talented, young research scholar of Urdu from Punjab. I have mentioned in these columns some commendable research works of Punjab’s young researchers of Urdu, such as Abrar Abdus Salam (Aab-i-Hayat) and Suhail Abbas Khan (Bagh-o-Bahar), both of whom belong to Multan. Now I have before me another good work done by a young researcher from Lahore.

These rising stars of Urdu research make me wish that Karachi may find its own stars to sing of, which we badly need. This new trend shows a lack of genuine interest in Urdu research in Karachi. It reflects the city’s mundane spirit and its commercial culture that favours studying management and economic sciences or technology rather than humanities. It also reflects the quality of research that is carried out by the new generation of scholars of Urdu from Karachi: of late, hardly any worth-mentioning dissertation of a young Karachiite has been published.

The new rising star in the firmament of Urdu research is Dr Baseera Ambreen. She not only possesses some prerequisites for Urdu research, such as knowing Persian and prosody, she has already published another research work which was just as unique and fresh. Titled ‘Tazmeenat-i-Iqbal’, the previous work traced the insertion of quotations or other poets’ verses by Iqbal in his poetry. This insertion, intended to corroborate or complement the meanings a poet wants to convey and which is duly notified, is technically known as ‘tazmeen’. Tracing the ‘tazmeen’ is called ‘takhreej’, or the act of finding the original and correct text and the creator of the couplets or quotations inserted. This meticulous work calls for a perfect researcher who could sift through numerous books and reference works and whose brain is a store-house of miscellaneous information. Tracing such verses in Iqbal’s poetry requires another precondition to be met: a keen eye for classical Persian texts. Baseera Ambreen has done the job quite well in her book ‘Tazmeenat-i-Iqbal’.

Though I have never met her, judging by the work presented by her in the new book of hers ‘Maqaesa-i-Armaghaan-i-Hijaz Farsi’, published by Bazm-i-Iqbal, and by the introductory notes written by such literary stalwarts as Dr Waheed Qureshi and Dr Aslam Ansari, I can well imagine the enormity of her talent. Dr Ansari writes that the variation in the texts of old manuscripts was but natural as all the texts were hand-written. Even in today’s era of modern printing and publishing, textual errors and variance in different editions of a work are not uncommon. That is the reason why researchers and scholars lay much emphasis on collation and comparison of varied texts of a work. Except for ‘Armaghaan-i-Hijaz’ and ‘Baqiyaat-i-Iqbal’, all the works of Iqbal were published during his lifetime and he was very particular about their calligraphy and printing. Dr Ansari says that since ‘Armaghaan’ was published a few months after his death and its various editions contain varied text at many places, it was a must to ascertain the authentic version before looking for the reasons for this variance. This was a hard nut to crack but University Oriental College’s young faculty member and scholar Baseera Ambreen has made this work look so easy, opines Dr Ansari in his introduction. As she has consulted the original text hand-written by Iqbal himself, she has, in the process of collating, edited and compiled the Persian quartets that were missing from the printed versions of ‘Armaghaan’. She has brought back to life the ‘rubaiyyat’ and ‘dobaitis’ of Iqbal that were hitherto unknown to the scholars of Iqbal and some of which are so elegant that they must have been incorporated in the original text.

Dr Waheed Qureshi is of the view that the scholars who have worked on Ghalib and Iqbal without knowing a little Persian could not grasp the real thoughts of these poets. Baseera has chosen Iqbal as a topic of special study and not only has she done justice to ‘tazmeenat’ of Iqbal but, equipped with the knowledge of Persian, she has also collected such verses of Iqbal, after collation and comparison, which had skipped the early compilers. There are large numbers of general surveys of Iqbal’s poetry, but any real and worthwhile research works on Iqbal can be counted on the fingers of one hand, says Dr Qureshi. The way in which Dr Baseera Ambreen has shed light on some new aspects of Iqbal and his linguistic peculiarities in this book of hers has in fact enriched the treasures of Iqbal studies.

Baseera Ambreen’s yet another marvellous work, which I have been waiting for, is to appear soon. It is her PhD dissertation titled ‘Iqbal ke sanae badae’, or rhetorical ornaments of Iqbal. Those who have gone through this thesis, such as Prof Dr Moinuddin Aqeel, believe that it is yet another stunning work from a young scholar.

drraufparekh@yahoo.com

Nationhood

A Muslim India, within India

Mustafa Zafar, November 18, 2015: Dawn

For too long now there has been a parochial understanding of what Pakistani history as an academic discipline entails, as there is a firm assumption that it has to be accountable to the public eye.

Many are of the idea that history is perhaps, already present in the past. And that the historian’s role is only one of assorting facts and events along a chronological and byte-sized narrative; as if it were a jigsaw puzzle in which the pieces were facts that fit in a fixed tapestry of national belonging. These traditionalist frameworks become very real when narratives associated with Dr Muhammad Iqbal’s statements regarding the official demand for separation led to the public de facto assuming that Iqbal also called for a partitioned Muslim state.

The infamous Pakistan studies textbook presents Iqbal as a pious orthodox Muslim thinker with the message being that Pakistan, the homeland, can be accredited to his vision.

It is not surprising then that Iqbal has become the father of Pakistan as he was the first to call for “the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind and Balochistan amalgamated into a single state” in his presidential address to the 21st session of the All-India Muslim League that was held in Allahabad on the 29th of December, 1930. What is surprising, however, is that if one were to read Iqbal’s seminal presidential address in the historical context, it becomes clear that his vision never actually called for the partitioned Muslim state of Pakistan.

From the very onset of Iqbal’s address, it is clear that he was posing the ideological dichotomy between Islam and Western nationalism as a conflict as it had the potential to disrupt Islam as an edifice of life. In setting the parameters of this conflict between Islam and modern nationalism within the South Asian context, the genius of Iqbal neither chose an isolationist approach, such as the one adopted by the Deobandi school of thought, nor did he want to appease the colonial powers and their separation of church and state.

Instead, Iqbal expounded the idea that Islam was not just an “ethical ideal” but also an overarching legal political “social structure” which, throughout the “life-history of the Muslims of India” had unified “scattered individuals and groups”.

For Iqbal, Western nationalism was centred on a “narrower system of ethics” which took agency of religion away from the public to the private sphere.

Iqbal countered the idea of territory arguing that Islam was a “force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations” and that religion was a power of the utmost importance in the life of individual, as well as of states.

He maintained that if democracy were to be applied there had to be recognition of the “units of Indian society” not from a territorial standpoint but rather through accounting for the diverse nature of India’s “communal groups”.

Within them, Indian Muslims were the most homogenous and united in India and were the only people who could be “fitly described as a nation in the modern sense of the word”, he argued.

But does that mean Iqbal was talking about a partitioned Muslim state?

For many the demand for Pakistan after Iqbal’s address which called for the North-West to become a single state and the added oppression under the “Hindu” Congress is enough to solidify the notion that Iqbal envisioned Pakistan.

School histories cite remote statements from Iqbal’s 1930 address contending that he can be viewed as a separatist; various communal groups could simply not “sink their respective individualities in a larger whole” are those gold lines which tickle the patriotic heart. Yet nationalist narratives conveniently forget Iqbal stating that were communal groups entitled to the autonomous development of their cultures in their own “Indian home-lands” then they would be ready to safeguard the “freedom of India”.

The omission of Iqbal’s arbitration between Western ideals of state and the role of Islam as mentioned in his address from our school histories is unfortunate – his answer for this disruption is what makes Iqbal an unequivocal visionary for Muslim nationalism in a land as diverse as India.

“Muslim India within India”

There is also a need to contextualise the December 1930 presidential address and Iqbal’s historical situation before painting with a brush the Pakistani green of national zeal as the poet-politician's tract on autonomous states within a federation goes amiss in our mainstream narratives.

The intended audience for the address was not just Indian Muslims, but the speech was a direct rebuttal to the Nehru report of 1929 which “rejected the crucial Muslim demands for a separate electorate and weightage for minorities”.

The concept of a federation for Iqbal warranted an abolition of the Central Legislative Assembly and instead called for an assembly which would represent the federal states and thus eliminate the “communal problem”.

How can one argue for a partitioned Muslim state if Iqbal himself affirmed that “proper redistribution will make the question of joint and separate electorates automatically disappear from the constitutional controversy of India”.

A solution could not be reached until all parties understood that the argument of the Muslims in India was “international and not national” as communal groups were nations in themselves.

When Iqbal called for a consolidated Muslim state, which would be centralised in a specific territory, namely the North-West of India, let us not forget that he argued for a “Muslim India within India”.

Perhaps, what makes Iqbal’s rhetoric even more powerful was that his political proposal was adjoined and fitted neatly into his theory of the universal Muslim millat.

The consolidation of the Muslim state was a stepping stone towards the unification of the world Islamic community, as Islam was a “peoples building force” and again not just an “ideal”. A consolidated state for Islam was an “opportunity to rid itself from the stamp of Arab imperialism” and instead to revamp its “law, culture, education and to bring them in closer context with the spirit of modern times”.

There is nothing orthodox about Iqbal and he never called for a Pakistan as a partitioned Muslim state in his December 1930 presidential address to the All-India Muslim League – an address that is recalled as the first stepping stone towards a separate homeland justified in our school histories through isolated statements of sovereign marked territory.

Instead, we need to read Iqbal’s statements closely on that day, and uphold him as a Muslim nationalist of the time, whose political proposals called for harmony between Western democracy and Islamic nationalism through an overarching concept of Islam as a cultural force within India.

It is ironic that answering a question about who spelt out the idea of Pakistan in school histories has become something of a joke because the kind of separatism Iqbal had been spelling out actually never had its desired effect on Indian Muslims.

The question put up to the Pakistan studies student about the 1930 address should not be filtered through an already present Pakistan in mind. Rather, points of study during the 1930s should flesh out how Muslim proposals projected their visions for syncretic power between religiously marked categories of “majorities” and “minorities” in a British free India.

“In the world of Islam today, we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed, but whose structure … stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam,” said Iqbal.

References:

Pirzada, Syed Shariffuddin, Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents (1906-1947) Volume 2, (National Publishing House, 1970). R.J. Moore, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand,’ Modern Asian Studies, XVII, 4, (1983): pp. 529-546. Naim, C.M, Iqbal, Jinnah, and Pakistan: The Vision of Reality, (New York, 1979).

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