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=Delayed projects=
==1974-2015==
See graphic, '5 crucial but delayed DRDO projects  '  
[[File: 5 crucial but delayed DRDO projects.jpg|5 crucial but delayed DRDO projects, 1974-2015; Graphic courtesy: [http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com//Gallery.aspx?id=27_06_2015_015_005_003&type=P&artUrl=NEWSICLE-5-CRUCIAL-BUT-DELAYED-DRDO-PROJECTS-27062015015005&eid=31808 ''The Times of India'' 27_06_2015]|frame|500px]]

==Deadlines missed (as in 2016)==
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=From-missiles-to-drones-DRDO-projects-keep-missing-08082016010026 ''The Times of India''], Aug 08 2016

Rajat Pandit

'''From missiles to drones, DRDO projects keep missing deadlines'''


The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) continues to miss deadlines in critical military projects with alarming regularity . Leave alone the much-talked-about Tejas light combat aircraft and Arjun main-battle tank, several projects ranging from spy drones and missiles to radars and artillery guns continue to languish with time and cost overruns.

Official documents, for instance, show that two important projects were to be completed by August 2016 but have got “revised dates of completion“ now. The first project, launched in January , 2012, was to build an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar, which is the norm in modern fighter jets, at a cost of Rs 445 crore.But the radar called `Uttam' is nowhere near being ready with its deadline now extended to May, 2019.

The second project was for developing a medium-altitude long-endurance UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) called Rustom-II, along with an aeronautical test range at Chitradurga, which was approved in February , 2011, at a cost of Rs 1,649 crore. But its completion date has been pushed to February , 2017.

Absence of an indigenous AESA radar has meant that the first 20 Tejas light combat aircraft  the first two jets were finally delivered to IAF last month under the LCA project approved in 1983 -will have an older mechanically-steered radar.

Moreover, a hunt is now underway to get a suitable AESA radar-EW (electronic warfare) package from global arms majors like Raytheon, Israeli Aerospace Industries, Thales, Saab and others for the next 100 upgraded Tejas Mark-1A fighters to be delivered from 2020 onwards.Similarly , in the absence of indigenous UAVs, the armed forces continue to induct highly-expensive Israeli drones.

DRDO, of course, has to contend with technology denial regimes, frequent midterm revision in qualitative requirements by the armed forces, problems in absorbing high-end technologies by the production agencies (defence PSUs) as well as continuing scarcity of scientific manpower and funds. “China spends around 20% of its defence outlay on R&D. But DRDO gets only 5-7% of the defence budget,“ said a scientist.

All this is certainly true, and there is no getting away from the fact that India has to become largely self-reliant in defence to avoid becoming strategically vulnerable in times of crisis. But as of now, revised timelines remain a recurring theme for DRDO projects across the board which, coupled with shoddy performance of the five de fence PSUs, four shipyards and 39 ordnance factories, means India continues to import over 60% of its military requirements.

The much-touted `Nirbhay' cruise missile, designed to carry nuclear warheads with a strike range of 1,000km, for instance, is already three years overdue and still far from induction.The Astra air-to-air missile is not ready 12 years after it was sanctioned at a cost of Rs 955 crore.

=Revival attempts=
==Reforms: were they cosmetic? (c.2010)==
 
[http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/welcome.asp?skin=pastissues2&QS=skin%3Dpastissues2%26enter%3DLowLevel The Times of India]

''' Is DRDO’s makeover just cosmetic? ''' 
 
Measures Slated To ‘Transform’ Body May Make It More Bureaucratic And Top-Heavy 

Rajat Pandit | TNN 

New Delhi: It needed drastic surgery but only first-aid has been rendered. Or, so it seems from the government’s halfhearted steps to revamp Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), whose projects continue to be plagued by huge time and cost overruns. 

Defence minister A K Antony approved a series of measures which — it was grandiosely proclaimed — will ‘‘transform and revitalize’’ DRDO in both ‘‘form and substance’’. The measures range from creation of a Defence Technology Commission (DTC) headed by Antony and de-centralization of DRDO’s management to hiving off some of its labs and setting up a commercial arm with seed capital of Rs 2 crore. 

The other steps include development of Mark-II versions of the long-delayed Arjun main-battle tanks and Akash surface-to-air missile systems as well as consultation by an ‘‘eminent human resource expert’’ to restructure DRDO and selection of industry partners by evolving ‘‘a suitable mechanism’’. 

But there is scepticism whether all this will actually transform DRDO into a lean and mean organisation capable of delivering cuttingedge weapon systems to the armed forces. 

For one, MoD will decentralise DRDO management through creation of seven ‘‘technology domain based centres’’ or clusters of labs — missile systems, aeronautics, armament & combat engineering, electronics & communication, material sciences, naval systems and life sciences. 

But there are fears all this will make DRDO even more bureaucratic and top-heavy, especially since each such cluster will be headed by a director-general and his associated paraphernalia. 

DRDO, with its 51 labs, currently has one director-general at the helm. After being redesignated as chairman, he will head the DRDO management council consisting of seven DGs, four chief controllers (R&D) and an additional financial advisor at the HQ. 

For another, MoD has decided to hive off only three of its 51 labs, two to CSIR and one to ICAR, instead of the dozen or so recommended by the Rama Rao Committee report.The Rama Rao report had stressed DRDO should concentrate only on 8 to 10 ‘critical technologies’ of ‘strategic importance’ instead of also venturing into making juices, mosquito repellents, titanium dental implants and the like. 

The creation of DTC is being done to allow DRDO to have a greater say in defence procurements from abroad. Armed forces, however, already feel DRDO often derails armament deals by pledging to develop the systems concerned but does not make good its promises. Defence scientists, on their part, contend the services are often against indigenisation, with foreign arms lobbies always ready to play ball in deriding DRDO.
 
There is, of course, no getting away from the fact that India needs to develop a robust industrial-military infrastructure, importing as it still does around 70% of its military hardware and software. Incidentally, India has inked defence deals worth a staggering $50 billion since the 1999 Kargil conflict, the overwhelming majority of them with foreign armament firms. DRDO REBOOT Status of the weapon systems developed by the agency 
===Some delayed projects===
''' Missile Programme ''' 

Sanctioned: 1983 Trishul and Akash SAM systems: Not inducted Nag anti-tank guided missile: 
Not inducted 

Prithvi (150-350km) and Agni-I (700km): Inducted Agni-II (2000km) and Agni-III (3,500km): Being operationalized Agni-V (5,000km): First Test in 2011 


''' Tejas LCV ''' 
 
Sanctioned: 1983 Original Cost: Rs 560 cr Revised cost: Over Rs 13,000 cr with FSED (full-scale engineering development) extended to 2018 Status: Final operational clearance for IAF LCA is Dec 2012 and naval LCA is Dec 2014 

''' Kaveri Engine (Tejas) ''' 
 
Sanctioned: 1989 Original Cost: Rs 383 crore Revised cost: Rs 2,893 crore Status: Not operational Arjun Tank 

Sanctioned: 1974 Original Cost: Rs 15.5 cr Revised Cost: Rs 306 cr Status: First regiment inducted only in 2009. Army keen on inducting 1,657 Russian-origin T-90S tanks and only 124 Arjuns for its main battle tank requirements for the immediate future

==Measures proposed==
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com//Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=Looking-to-breathe-life-into-DRDO-govt-splits-31052015022016 ''The Times of India''], May 31 2015 
[[File: DRDO, drastic overhaul needed.jpg|DRDO: drastic overhaul needed; Graphic courtesy: [http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com//Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=Looking-to-breathe-life-into-DRDO-govt-splits-31052015022016 ''The Times of India''], May 31 2015 |frame|500px]] 
Rajat Pandit 


With the Modi government keen to build a strong defence-industrial base in tune with the `Make in India' policy , the stage has now been set for revival of the country's moribund defence R&D establishment by the appointment of two relatively younger scientists at the helm of affairs.
The government is quite miffed with the lackadaisical functioning of the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), often in the dock for its failure to deliver cutting-edge weaponry without huge time and cost overruns, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi himself warning the organisation to fast shed its “chalta hai“ attitude.

But only time will tell whether S Christopher, 59, the new DRDO chief, and G Satheesh Reddy , 51, the new scientific adviser to the defence minister, can undertake the kind of drastic surgery that is needed to revive DRDO and its 52 labs spread across the country . India, after all, still continues to import 65% of its military hardware and software.

Officials say Reddy's appointment in the MoD, by splitting the scientific adviser-cum-DRDO chief post, will provide an “independent mechanism“ to review and scrutinise DRDO's functioning. Till now, the same scientist wore the two hats.

“More changes are on the anvil. They could include a new defence technology commission and a commercial arm for DRDO, as was recommended by the Rama Rao committee (RRC),“ said an official. “There is a big thrust on Make in India, which will include greater private sector participation as production agencies or lead integrators for technologies developed by DRDO,“ he added.

As earlier reported by TOI, the RRC in 2008 held that DRDO should focus only on eight to 10 “critical tech nologies“ of “strategic importance“. But many of its recommendations have been implemented half-heartedly, with DRDO still continuing to make everything from dental implants and mosquito repellents to nuclear missiles and fighter jets.

Modi's advice in August last year that at least five DRDO labs should be headed by scientists under the age of 35 to reinvigorate the organisation is yet to be acted up on. Though DRDO scientists are supposed to retire at 60, many were routinely getting two-year extensions till now.

“Four of the seven cluster heads or DGs in DRDO are currently on extension after retirement, as are most of the `distinguished scientists'. They believe in statusquo and are risk-averse. Consequently , many young scientists get frustrated, adding to the already severe braindrain,“ said a scientist.

DRDO, of course, also gets a measly 6% of the overall defence budget when it is 12% in the US and 20% in China. Apart from the braindrain and failure to attract bright young scientists from top-rung institutes, the DRDO has also suffered from a virtual freeze in the enhancement of scientific manpower for over a decade. It has asked for sanctions to recruit around 300 young scientists every year, instead of the 70-80 inducted at present.

Some projects:=
= Ballistic Missile Defence system=
==Delhi and Mumbai, chosen for DRDO’s Ballistic Missile Defence system==
From the archives of '' The Times of India ''

Delhi, Mumbai first to get missile shield DRDO System Can Be Put In Place At Short Notice New Delhi: Delhi and Mumbai, the two most vital metros of India, have been chosen for DRDO’s Ballistic Missile Defence system that can be put in place at short notice.      

The detailed proposal is being prepared for final clearance from the Cabinet committee on security (CCS).      The strategic planning has already begun to install the system in the two cities and the final proposal will be put before the government after detailed analysis of the entire project, sources said.      

The sites for installing radars to track enemy missiles and storing counter-attack projectiles will be determined during the planning stage, they said, adding that these locations must have adequate stealth feature and protection against enemy sabotage.      

To ensure maximum protection against air-borne threats, DRDO will put a mix of counter-attack missiles which will be able to shoot down enemy missiles both within Earth’s atmosphere (endo-atmospheric) and outside it (exo-atmospheric).      

The system will require minimum human intervention due to the complete automation of tracking devices and counter-measures. Human intervention will be required only to abort the mission, the sources said.      

After successful implementation in Delhi and Mumbai, the system will be used to cover other major cities in the country, they added.      

The shield has undergone a series of successful tests. It can destroy an incoming ballistic missile with the range of up to 2,000 km. During the test stage, DRDO used variants of Prithvi missiles as simulated targets and successfully intercepted them in mid-air.      

All the necessary elements such as long-range radars and tracking devices, real-time datalink and mission control system required for installing the missile system have also been successfully tested by the DRDO. The system is all set to be upgraded to the range of 5,000 km by 2016.  

It was first test-fired in November 2006, elevating India into the elite club of countries to have successfully developed an anti-ballistic missile system after the US, Russia and Israel

=Excalibur=
==Army finds it inadequate==
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=Army-hunts-for-lethal-assault-rifle-junks-DRDOs-03072016012023 The Times of India], Jul 03 2016

Rajat Pandit

'''Army hunts for lethal assault rifle, junks DRDO's Excalibur'''

Army has launched a fresh hunt for a new-generation assault rifle all over again. Rejecting the 5.56x45mm calibre Excalibur rifle offered by the DRDO-Ordnance Factory Board combine, the force has now decided to go in for a 7.62x51mm gun with “higher kill probability and stopping power“.
In the race to acquire high-end weapon systems from submarines and fighters to howitzers and helicopters, basic weaponry and protective gear for ordinary foot-soldiers often do not get the requisite attention and push by the brass.

But the Army says it means business this time, shrugging aside failed attempts to acquire new rifles over the last decade.

The RFI (request for information) for the new 7.62mm assault rifles is going to be issued soon to elicit responses from around the globe. “The GSQRs (general staff qualitative requirements) or technical parameters for the rifles will then be formulated before the actual tender is floated to invite bids,“ said a source.

It was in April that the Army commanders' conference first discussed whether the force required a 7.62mm rifle that “killed“ or a 5.56mm rifle that “incapacitated“ enemy soldiers, as was then reported by TOI.

“The decision has now been taken to go for 7.62x51mm rifles with a higher kill probability and accuracy at an enhanced ef fective range of 500-metre,“ said the source.

The military wisdom till now was that the 5.56mm rifle was better for conventional war because it generally injured an enemy soldier, tying down at least two of his colleagues to carry him in the battlefield. Conversely , the 7.62mm rifle was better for counter-insurgency since terrorists had to be killed at the first instance, eliminating the risk of “suicide bombing“.

Soldiers largely use the 7.62mm AK-47 rifles for counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and the northeast, even though the infantry is saddled with the indigenous glitch-prone 5.56mm INSAS (Indian small arms system) rifles.

The fully-automatic Ex calibur, which fires 5.56x45mm ammunition, is a much-improved version of INSAS rifle that entered service in 1994-1995. But the Army now wants 7.62mm rifles for greater lethality.

The Army's overambitious experiment to induct rifles with interchangeable barrels, with a 5.56x45mm primary barrel for conventional warfare and a 7.62x39mm secondary one for counter-terrorism, miserably flopped last year.
the proposed mega project was junked since the rifles on offer by armament firms like Colt (US), Beretta (Italy), Ceska (Czech) and Israel Weapon Industries were not found cost-effective or suitable after extensive trials.

Under the project, 65,000 rifles were to be directly acquired from the selected vendor to equip the 120 infantry battalions deployed on the western and eastern fronts.The OFB was to then subsequently manufacture over 1,13,000 such rifles after getting transfer of technology from the foreign company .
=Missile test-firing range, Wheeler Island=
India’s solitary missile test firing range faces sand erosion 
PTI 2013/05/12

[http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=TOINEW&BaseHref=CAP/2013/05/12&PageLabel=23&EntityId=Ar02302&ViewMode=HTML The Times of India]

Chennai: Changing sand patterns around India’s lone missile test-firing range at Wheeler Island off Odisha coast is causing serious concern for the Defence Research and Development Organisation that is seeking assistance from Chennai-based National Institute of Ocean Technology to control the erosion. 

“Due to erosion, some 300 metre of sand area has submerged and some sand is showing up in other part of the island,” DRDO chief controller (R&D) Avinash Chander said. 

Since Wheeler Island is technically a “sand bar” with a size of approximately 1sq km in the Bay of Bengal and not a rock formation, water currents result in the change in sand patterns, he said. PTI

=Nirbhay cruise missile=
==Failures in 2013, 14, 15==
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=BLOW-TO-INDIAS-DEFENCE-TECH-N-capable-Nirbhay-17102015015021 ''The Times of India''], Oct 17 2015

'''N-capable Nirbhay missile bites the dust for 2nd time'''

Another test of the Nirbhay cruise missile, designed to carry nuclear warheads within a strike range of 1,000 km, failed.
This was the subsonic missile's third test after the first one miserably flopped in March 2013, while the second one was just “a partial success“ in October 2014.

The long-range missile had to be destroyed in midair after it deviated from its flight path along the coast in Bay of Bengal soon after being launched from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur in Odisha. “The flight had to be aborted after its guidance system failed. The missile had travelled a distance of 128 km, but couldn't take the required turn at the waypoint and instead nose-dived. It was then put on the self-destruct mode,“ said a source. The defence ministry said, “Nirbhay reached the desired cruise altitude with all initial critical operations such as booster ignition, booster separation, wing deployment and engine start being successfully executed. But the mission had to be aborted after 700 seconds of flight.“

A stealth missile in the making for almost a decade, Nirbhay is meant to fulfill the armed forces' demand for nuclear-tipped land-attack cruise missiles, versatile enough to be fired from land, air and sea.


=Parachutes =
==Were they `life threatening?' (2016)==
[http://epaperbeta.timesofindia.com/Article.aspx?eid=31808&articlexml=Made-in-India-flop-DRDO-chute-sinks-09062016008054 The Times of India], June 9, 2016

Arvind Chauhan

'''Made-in-India flop: DRDO chute sinks'''


After 13 years of research and crores of rupees in expenses, parachutes designed by a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) lab here for special forces have not only failed field trials but also been classed as “seriously life threatening“ in an audit report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG). The auditor has also slammed the functioning of the lab as well as the domestic manufacturer, Ordnance Parachute Factory (OPF) in Kanpur.
The report emanates from an audit of Army ordnance factories and defence PSUs by CAG, which has pointed out serious lapses on the part of the Aerial Delivery Research and Development Establishment (ADRDE) in Agra and the OPF in Kanpur for “failing“ to produce combat free fall (CFF) parachutes despite an expenditure of Rs 10.75 crore.

CAG has raised questions about ADRDE, the sole institution in India for the development of military-grade parachutes, vis-a-vis its claim of successful trials of CFF chutes, pointing out that an overwhelming 75% had failed field trials.

CFF parachutes are used by elite paratroopers for highly specialised operations. In 1986, a batch was imported, which was de-commissioned in 2002, six years after their 10year shelf life expired.

In 2001, the Army placed an order for 1,031 CFF parachu tes, of which 410 were to be procured from abroad on a fasttrack basis for urgent needs.The remaining 621 were to be developed under a project for indigenous CFFs which started in March 2003. However, in 2006, the ministry of defence junked the idea of import, suggesting that all be procured from domestic sources.

Between March and No vember 2006, ADRDE conducted trials for the CFFs it had developed and claimed success. The defence ministry then placed an order with OPF Kanpur for 700 of the parachutes in October 2008, at a total cost of Rs 55.35 crore.OPF was to deliver a sample of 40 for further trials.

However, according to the CAG report, in 2010, trials revealed the parachutes were not up to the mark, with experts saying the implications of the flaws were “seriously life threatening“. De spite this, the ministry , in 2011, ordered two consignments of 25 parachutes each.

In October 2014, of the first 25 chutes, only seven passed trials. The failure rate of 75%, said the CAG report, raised serious questions about the claims by ADRDE as well as the OPF.

Meanwhile, in January 2008, India signed a deal with the US government to buy C130 Hercules aircraft for the IAF, and 600 CFF chutes. Of these, 400 were given to the Army in January 2013.

ADRDE director Debasish Chakraborti was not available for comment following the release of the CAG report. A senior IAF officer at Kheria base, where paratroopers are trained, said, “The quality of imported CFF parachutes is better than indigenous ones.At present we are using ADRDE parachutes and they have done a decent job so far.“