View source for Sri Lanka- India relations

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=Fishermen issue=
==November 2016: Joint Working Group==
[http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-sri-lanka-set-up-joint-working-group-to-address-fishermen-issue/article9310518.ece ''The Hindu''], November 6, 2016

'''India, Sri Lanka set up Joint Working Group to address fishermen issue'''

India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a Joint Working Group on Fisheries (JWG) and a hotline between their Coast Guards to address the long-standing issue of fishermen from Tamil Nadu being arrested, the External Affairs Ministry said.

The decision, taken during talks between External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera in New Delhi, came three days after fishermen of both countries failed to reach an agreement on ending fishing in Sri Lankan waters by Indian fishermen.

'''Regular meetings planned'''

“The [Foreign] Ministers exchanged views on possible mechanisms to help find a permanent solution to the fishermen issues,” a statement issued here said. It was also decided that the JWG would meet every three months while the Ministers of Fisheries on both sides would meet every six months beginning January 2017 along with Coast Guard and Naval representatives to discuss the protracted issue.

However, the issue of their seized boats is unresolved, and has been an emotive issue in Tamil Nadu, with the State government writing to the Centre on several occasions to negotiate for their release.. “The issue of the release of detained fishing vessels will be discussed at the first JWG meeting,” the statement said.

Minister of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare Radha Mohan Singh, Sri Lankan Minister for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development Mahinda Amaraweera, as well Minister of State for Road Transport, Highways & Shipping Pon Radhakrishnan and Sri Lankan MP M.A. Sumanthiran participated in the discussions.

= China- India- Sri Lanka relations=
==Sri Lanka dropped Chinese co., in favour of Indian co./ 2018==
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2018%2F10%2F19&entity=Ar01400&sk=6B84F7EC&mode=text  Sri Lanka dumps Chinese co ahead of its PM’s India trip, October 19, 2018: ''The Times of India'']


''₹3,580Cr Contract To Build Houses Will Now Go To Indian Firm''

Sri Lanka has reversed a decision to award a $300million (approximately Rs 2,211 crore) housing deal to China in favour of a joint venture with an Indian company, the government said, ahead of a visit by the prime minister to its South Asian neighbour.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe will meet his counterpart PM Narendra Modi on Saturday in New Delhi for talks. The two countries have long-standing ties, partly because of cultural and ethnic links with Tamils, many of whom live in the island’s north and east.

In April, state-run China Railway Beijing Engineering Group Co Ltd had won a tender worth over $300 million to build 40,000 houses in Jaffna, with China’s Exim bank to provide funding. But the project was halted after residents demanded brick houses, saying they preferred their traditional type of dwelling instead of the concrete structures the Chinese firm had planned.

On Wednesday, government spokesman Rajitha Senaratne said the cabinet had approved a new proposal for 28,000 houses worth Rs 3,580 crore ($210 million) to be built by Indian firm ND Enterprises and two Sri Lankan firms in the north and east. The planned homes are part of a total requirement of 65,000, he added.

“The rest of the houses will be given to firms which are ready to build them at lower prices,” Senaratne said, adding that China could also be considered in future for the remaining housing projects.

In Beijing on Thursday, foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang told a news briefing China’s cooperation with Sri Lanka was derived from consultations on an equal footing and he hoped that cooperation would be viewed objectively.

India has built 44,000 houses in the country in the first phase of reconstruction after a 26-year-war with Tamil Tiger rebels, and plans to rebuild Palaly airport and Kankesanthurai harbour, both damaged in the conflict.

Moreover, Sirisena’s election as Sri Lanka president had also been seen as a “gain” for India because of the overt tilt of his predecessor and rival, Mahinda Rajapaksa, towards China.


== Renewable energy systems in 3 islands near Jaffna/ 2021==
[https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-worked-for-a-year-to-get-china-off-lanka-projects/articleshow/88080863.cms  Indrani Bagchi, Dec 4, 2021: ''The Times of India'']

India offered to build more environment-friendly ‘hybrid renewable energy systems’ and that too at a fraction of the cost at three Lankan islands

NEW DELHI: It took India almost a year to get China out of three islands off Jaffna peninsula. 
In January 2021, India was surprised with an announcement that the Ceylon Electricity Board had decided to award a contract for building “hybrid renewable energy systems” in three islands off the coast of Jaffna to a Chinese company, Sino Soar Hybrid Technology.

The three northern islands, Delft, Nagadeepa and Analthivu, are strategically positioned and given India’s security sensitivities, red flags went off in New Delhi. The initial survey showed that such systems were bound to fail environmental scrutiny, since diesel was part of the mix. Second, the company itself was only nominally private. 

The Indian government weighed in with the Rajapaksa family in power in Sri Lanka. India offered to build the same systems, but more environment friendly and at a fraction of the cost. The Chinese project was going to be carried through with an ADB loan as part of the Supporting Electricity Supply Reliability Improvement Project. 

India offered a big chunk of the money as a grant, with a very small loan component on easy terms. Sri Lanka had an offer it could hardly refuse. 

The Sri Lankan government went into a huddle, then fell silent. The Chinese, who have tremendous influence upon the Sri Lankan government, emphasised it was an ADB project, with multilateral funding and all the necessary protections against accusations of a Chinese “debt trap”. The Sri Lankan government latched on to this explanation as a way to keep India at bay. Colombo said, trying to assuage Indian concerns, that Chinese teams would build and leave. India promised their teams would do the same. Colombo said they could not back out of an ADB project. India drew upon its goodwill cache with ADB to mitigate Lankan inconvenience. 

Four months passed. A new Chinese ambassador Qi Zhenhong, persuaded the government to move a Cabinet note saying that India had not responded with a counter proposal so the Chinese project should go ahead. 

India jumped in to show its formal offer made months prior and underlined that it was Sri Lanka that had been holding back. By now Colombo had a fair sense of New Delhi’s seriousness in the matter. 

Around the same time, the Ceylon Electricity Board agreed to sell a 40% stake in a power plant in Kerawelapitiya near Colombo to an American company, New Fortress Energy, which the Chinese objected to. 

To bolster their case, the Chinese roped in Pakistan, whose diplomats weighed in on behalf of Beijing with Colombo, including sending their press councillor on a “holiday” near the islands. 

But India wasn’t giving up. It was finally in November that India managed to convince the Rajapaksa government of the viability of the Indian proposal. By the time finance minister Basil Rajapaksa visited India last week, Sri Lanka had agreed to give the project to India, after cancelling out the Chinese. 

From their official handle, the Chinese Embassy in Colombo tweeted that the suspension was due to a ‘security concern’ from a third party. Beijing inked a contract with the Maldivian government on 29th November to establish solar power plants in 12 islands in the island country. 

The fact that China used their official Twitter handle made it clear that China was no longer maintaining the fig leaf of the company being a private one, yet another example of their “wolf-warrior” diplomacy.


==2022: In strategic victory over China, India inks SL projects==
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/article-share?article=30_03_2022_030_003_cap_TOI  March 30, 2022: ''The Times of India'']


Colombo: In a deal seen as a strategic victory in its competition with China for influence in the Indian Ocean, India on Tuesday signed an agreement to set up hybrid power projects on northern Sri Lankan islands.  

External affairs minister S Jaishankar, who was visiting Colombo, witnessed the signing along with Sri Lankan foreign minister Gamini Peiris, the Indian embassy said. 

 In December, China had announced that it was suspending its own plan to build power plants on three Sri Lankan islands due to security concerns. An Indian official said that he couldn’t confirm if the plants in the new agreement are to be built on the same islands earmarked for the Chinese project. The power source and other details about the projects weren’t available.  India considers Sri Lanka, just across the narrow Palk Strait off India’s southeastern coast, to be within its sphere of influence. The island nation is in the middle of a key sea route connecting East and West and is important to China’s ambitious ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. 

The cancelled Chinese power plant project would have been near India’s southern coast. 

Sri Lanka is facing daunting problems with debt and is enduring its worst eco- nomic crisis in recent memory with shortages of medicine, fuel, fertilizer and milk power. Daily power outages are lasting for hours. 

The debt crisis partly stems from infrastructure projects that were financed with Chinese loans but are not making money. Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves are dwindling while it needs to repay $7 billion in foreign debts this year. 

It has approached both India and China for help. India provided a $1 billion credit line to buy essentials and $500 billion to buy fuel. China is considering a request for $2. 5 billion in economic assistance but has been noncommittal about restructuring billions in debt. 

Sri Lanka's government previously scrapped a plan to allow China outright ownership to land on the Colombo Port City. It instead provided 62 hectares (153 acres) on a 99-year lease. 
AP

=Nagapattinam- Kankesanthurai ferry=
==As in 2023==
[https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2023/oct/09/nagai-sri-lanka-boat-service-trial-run-successful-to-start-on-october-10-2622177.html  Oct 9, 2023: ''The Indian Express'']

NAGAPATTINAM: HSC Cheriyapani, the high-speed vessel will ferry passengers between Nagapattinam and Kankesanthurai in the northern province of Sri Lanka from October 10.

The first and only trial run was held at around 9.30 am. The vessel, operated by a 15-member crew, covered 60 nautical miles in less than four hours at 36 knots and arrived at Kankesanthurai at around 1.15 pm. The vessel began its return journey at 1.45 pm and reached Nagapattinam Mini Port at around 6 pm. Officials deemed the trial run a success.

Tickets, costing `7,670 per person, are currently being issued. The vessel can carry around 150 passengers at a time. The Tamil Nadu Maritime Board (TNMB) and the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways are working on the service. The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) will handle the service as it deals with international travel.

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=United Nations/ UNHRC: India’s voting pattern=
==War crimes and human rights: 2012, 13, 14, 21==
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2021%2F03%2F24&entity=Ar00302&sk=27CDC73A&mode=text  Sachin Parashar, March 24, 2021: ''The Times of India'']

Caught between the expectations of the Tamil community in the middle of an election season and the prospect of ceding strategic ground in the neighbourhood, India abstained from voting on a contentious resolution at the UNHRC that sought to fix responsibility for war crimes and human rights violations by Sri Lankan authorities.

While the government was under pressure from political parties in Tamil Nadu to support the resolution, as it has done in the past on at least two occasions, voting in favour would certainly have sent ties with Lanka into a tailspin given that China, Russia, Pakistan and even Bangladesh rejected the resolution.

In 2012 and 2013, India had voted in favour of similar resolutions at the council.

''' 11 vote against Lanka resolution '''

In 2014, though, India abstained from voting on a resolution calling for a probe into alleged war crimes.

The resolution — promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka — at the 46th session of the Council was adopted on Tuesday with 22 out of 47 member states voting in favour. India and 13 other countries, including Nepal, abstained while the remaining 11 voted against.

As it abstained from voting, India continued to maintain that its support for Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and unity, as also an abiding commitment for aspirations of Lankan Tamils for equality, peace, justice and dignity, were not either-or choices.

“India’s approach to the question of human rights in Sri Lanka is guided by two fundamental considerations. One is our support to the Tamils of Sri Lanka for equality, justice, dignity and peace. The other is in ensuring the unity, stability and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. We have always believed that these two goals are mutually supportive and Sri Lanka’s progress is best assured by simultaneously addressing both objectives,’’ said Pawan Badhe, first secretary, permanent mission of India.

While it abstained from voting, India supported the call by the international community for Sri Lanka to fulfil its commitments on devolution of political authority, including through early holding of elections for provincial councils and to ensure that all provincial councils were able to operate effectively, in accordance with the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution.

At the same time, Badhe said India believed that the work of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should be in conformity with the mandate given by the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly.

=Katchatheevu and Wadge Bank=
==A backgrounder==
[https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-politics/katchatheevu-and-wadge-bank-the-story-of-two-india-sri-lanka-agreements-from-a-half-century-ago-9247710/ Arun Janardhanan, April 4, 2024: ''The Indian Express'']

Weeks before voting for the Lok Sabha election in Tamil Nadu, the BJP has reignited the decades-old Katchatheevu issue, accusing the Indira Gandhi government of “callously giving away”, as the Prime Minister said in a post on social media, the island to Sri Lanka.

Did India indeed “cede” Katchatheevu island to Sri Lanka in 1974? What happened two years later, in 1976, when India signed a second agreement with Sri Lanka? These questions ponder the import of decisions taken a half century ago, weighing the trading of territorial claims for maritime advantages and broad strategic interests off the coast of Kanyakumari.

''' But first, what is Katchatheevu island? '''

Katchatheevu is a 285-acre patch in the sea within the maritime boundary line of Sri Lanka, located 33 km off the Indian coast to the northeast of Rameswaram in Tamil Nadu, and southwest of Sri Lanka’s Delft Island. The tiny, barren island which, according to some official reports, was created following a 14th-century volcanic eruption, is 1.6 km in length and just 300 metres wide at its widest point.

The island was under the control of the kingdom of the Ramanad Raja, a zamindari from 1795 to 1803 in Ramanathapuram in the Madras Presidency during British rule. The 120-year-old St Anthony’s Church on the island attracts devotees from India and Sri Lanka for an annual festival.

''' What happened to the Island in 1974? '''

India and Sri Lanka had been claiming Katchatheevu since at least 1921, after a survey placed the island within Sri Lanka’s boundaries. This was contested by a British Indian delegation that cited the Ramanad kingdom’s ownership of the island. The dispute could not be settled, and continued in the years after Independence.

In 1974, when Indira was Prime Minister, the two governments signed — on June 26 in Colombo and June 28 in New Delhi — an agreement by which the island went to Sri Lanka, but Indian fishermen were given “access to Katchatheevu for rest, for drying of nets and for the annual St Anthony’s festival”.

“Indian fishermen and pilgrims will enjoy access to visit Katchatheevu as hitherto, and will not be required by Sri Lanka to obtain travel documents or visas for these purposes,” the agreement said. The agreement did not specify the fishing rights of Indian fishermen.

According to information obtained by Tamil Nadu BJP chief K Annamalai under The RTI Act, 2005, the DMK government in Tamil Nadu led by M Karunanidhi at the time silently acquiesced to the Centre’s decision to sign the agreement. The RTI reply quoted from the minutes of a meeting between then External Affairs Minister Kewal Singh and Karunanidhi at Fort St. George in Chennai a month before the transfer of the island. According to Annamalai, Karunanidhi was “party to this decision”, and had only asked if it was possible to “postpone the decision by two years”.

Tamil Nadu Assembly records, however, show that Chief Minister Karunanidhi had attempted to move a resolution in the House in 1974 against the Katchatheevu agreement, but the opposition AIADMK had refused to go along.

''' And what happened in 1976? '''

In June 1975, Indira Gandhi imposed the Emergency, and Karunanidhi’s government was dismissed in January 1976. Thereafter, several letters were exchanged between the foreign secretaries of India and Sri Lanka, and a set of executive orders were issued on the Katchatheevu issue.

The negotiations and the orders essentially settled the maritime boundary between India and Sri Lanka by giving sovereign rights over a maritime patch called ‘Wadge Bank’ near Kanyakumari to India. The Wadge Bank lies to the south of Kanyakumari, and has been identified by the Fishery Survey of India as a 4,000-sq-mile area bound by 76°.30’ E to 78°.00 E longitude and 7°.00 N to 8° 20’ N latitude. It is one of the world’s richest fishing grounds, and in a much more strategic part of the sea than the island of Katchatheevu. This area near Kanyakumari has been significant for fishermen from Tamil Nadu and Kerala for more than four decades.

An agreement reached between the two countries in March 1976 said “the Wadge Bank…lies within the exclusive economic zone of India, and India shall have sovereign rights over the area and its resources” and “the fishing vessels of Sri Lanka and persons on board these vessels shall not engage in fishing in the Wadge Bank”.

However, “at the request of the Government of Sri Lanka and as a gesture of goodwill”, India agreed that Sri Lankan boats licensed by India could fish in the Wadge Bank for three years “from the date of establishment by India of its exclusive economic zone”. But no more than six Sri Lankan fishing vessels were allowed, and their catch in the Wadge Bank could not exceed 2,000 tonnes in any year.
The agreement also said that if India “decided to explore the Wadge Bank for petroleum and other mineral resources” during the three-year period, the Sri Lankan boats “shall terminate fishing activity… in these zones with effect from the date of commencement of exploration”.

''' What happened after the 1974 and 1976 agreements? '''

The focus in the 1970s was on settling competing claims over territorial boundaries, which led to agreements that gave Katchatheevu to Sri Lanka and the resource-rich Wadge Bank to India.

In the 1990s, the Palk Strait to the east of the Wadge Bank saw a proliferation of efficient bottom-trawl fishing trawlers on the Indian side. The Sri Lankan military was battling the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) at the time, and its navy had no major presence in the sea region. Indian fishing boats would routinely enter Sri Lankan waters for fishing during this time.

In 1991, when J Jayalalithaa was in her first term as Chief Minister, the Tamil Nadu Assembly sought the retrieval of Katchatheevu and restoration of traditional fishing rights for Indian Tamil fishermen. But the demand could not be followed up with Sri Lanka due to the civil war in that country.

The situation changed after the war ended in 2009. Even as Indian fishermen continued to enter Sri Lankan waters due to the depletion of marine resources on the Indian side, the Sri Lankan navy began to carry out arrests, and destroyed hundreds of fishing boats for violating the maritime boundary. This provoked a renewed wave of demands from political parties in Tamil Nadu, including the DMK and AIADMK, to retrieve Katchatheevu.

''' How did Sri Lanka react to the demands from the Indian Tamil parties? '''

The two countries have signed an international agreement on Katchatheevu, and Sri Lanka has refused to link the status of the island with the Tamil fishermen’s issue.

A Sri Lankan Cabinet Minister told The Indian Express on Monday that linking the two issues would be “inappropriate and inaccurate because the issue with regards to Indian fishermen is all about the bottom-trawlers they use for fishing outside Indian waters, which is illegal as per international maritime laws”.

“When this huge exploitation and depletion of maritime resources happen in the entire ocean region, the victims of these trawlers owned by Indian Tamil fishermen are not Muslims or Sinhala fishermen but the Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen,” the Sri Lankan Minister said.

''' And how did the matter reach the Supreme Court? '''

In 2008, Jayalalithaa filed a petition in the Supreme Court claiming Katchatheevu belonged to India, and could not be ceded to another country without a Constitutional amendment. She argued that the 1974 agreement affected the traditional fishing rights and livelihood options of Indian fishermen.

After becoming Chief Minister in 2011, Jayalalithaa moved a resolution in the state Assembly raising the same demand. In 2012, amid increasing incidents of arrests of Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan waters, she again moved the Supreme Court to expedite her petition.



In August 2014, then Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi told the Supreme Court that the matter was closed, and it would require “war” to get the island back. “Katchatheevu went to Sri Lanka by an agreement in 1974. It was ceded and now acts as a boundary. How can it be taken back today? If you want Katchatheevu back, you will have to go to war to get it back,” he said.

The petition remains pending in the Supreme Court.

''' Now that the issue has been raked up again, what happens hereafter? '''

The BJP leadership, including Prime Minister Modi, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, and state BJP chief Annamalai, have launched attacks on the Congress and DMK for allegedly surrendering the island to Sri Lanka. The PM has said that “weakening India’s unity, integrity and interests has been Congress’ way of working for 75 years”, and “DMK has done NOTHING to safeguard Tamil Nadu’s interests”.

However, election campaign rhetoric aside, the Indian government does not seem to have made any concrete move to examine the possibility of retrieving the island for India. Asked what steps had been taken in this regard, Jaishankar said on Monday that “the matter is sub judice”.

Jeevan Thondaman, a Tamil-origin Minister in Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Cabinet, told The Indian Express that there has been no official communication from India on the Katchatheevu island issue.

“Narendra Modi’s foreign policy with Sri Lanka is organic and healthy. So far, there has not been an official communication from India to return the powers of Katchatheevu island. No such request from India so far. If there is such a communication, the foreign ministry will reply to that,” he said.



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=YEAR-WISE DEVELOPMENTS= 
=1987: India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA)=
From the archives of '' The Times of India ''

ASHOK MEHTA 

The India-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) was signed in 1987 by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President Junius Jayawardene to end the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka peacefully.

India willy-nilly became the guarantor for the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) disarming the LTTE in lieu of Sri Lanka devolving power to the minority Tamils. 

Invited by Sri Lanka,IPKF became the instrument for implementing ISLA.Two and a half years after the accord,with 1200 soldiers lost and nearly 2500 wounded,the IPKF was unceremoniously withdrawn with ISLA in tatters.Then Tamil Nadu CM M Karunanidhi renamed the IPKF as ITKF Indian Tamil Killing Force.That is the residual public perception of Indias first out-of-area military intervention and coercive diplomacy. Three years ago,with Indias passive and active help,Sri Lanka finally disarmed the LTTE through a comprehensive military defeat but the ethnic question,the rationale for ISLA and IPKF,remains unresolved.In a letter written to the author after the military victory,a serving Sri Lanka army commander wrote: The work started by you has been finished by us. Lt Gen Hamilton Wanasinghe,the Sri Lanka artillery (SLA) chief during the IPKF days,had earlier written in a letter that were India to leave us alone,Sri Lanka would sort out the LTTE.  Not without its inherent shortcomings,especially with one hand tied at the back,the IPKF was made the scapegoat for the failure of Indias coercive diplomacy.

New Delhi's decision to intervene in Sri Lanka was triggered by overarching strategic reasons: the presence of foreign military and intelligence agencies inimical to India;domestic politics in Tamil Nadu;the dangerous internal security situation likely to arise in south India from the Sri Lankan army operations against the LTTE;and generally not mentioned deflecting attention from the Bofors scam. The ISLA ceremony in Colombo was marked by the assault on Gandhi by a Sri Lankan sailor of the Honour Guard.Dissent within the United National Party government over ISLA was suppressed.Both Jayewardene and LTTE supremo Prabhakaran were inveigled into accepting the accord,though some claim it was the other way round.

India was drawn into a trap to do Colombos dirty work. The ISLA was signed in great haste with India becoming not only the signatory but also its guarantor.President Jayewardene was strangely nominated CinC of IPKF which was dispatched with equal haste,lack of preparedness and abysmal intelligence.The flawed assessment claimed that the LTTE would surrender their arms whereas it waged a wellplanned insurgency which completely surprised the IPKF. Lacking forethought,a clear mandate,proper contingency planning,a decisive chain of command and an exit policy,the IPKF arrived with much fanfare in Jaffna.

Absence of a political consensus and popular support at home were to compound its problems.For example,no one had factored in that friend LTTE would turn foe and that elections in both countries in 1989 would result in change of governments.Conscientous objector,Ranasinghe Premadasa became president and soon did a deal with Prabhakaran to evict the IPKF.As CinC,he ordered it to withdraw or face the SLA. Despite these enormous hurdles,IPKF did a commendable job: prevented Eelam and the breakup of Sri Lanka,with India underwriting its sovereignty and territorial integrity;restored the democratic process and institutions in the Tamil north and east,illustrated by holding of three elections;maintained the merger of the north and east through ISLA enabled the 13th amendment and formation of the northeast provincial council which gave Tamils the first taste of self governance.And,most of all,while IPKF weakened the LTTE,it allowed the SLA to defeat the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna urban insurgency in the south. 

The month-long conventional battle of Jaffna and the 20-month short counter-insurgency campaign produced tactical lessons for the Indian Army,especially from LTTEs brilliant use of IEDs which were responsible for 70% of IPKF casualties.The Indian government blundered over its political calculations on time and resources required to alter the behaviour of the LTTE.Lack of a cohesive policy at the apex level and inadequate coordination at the operational level robbed the IPKF of greater success in its mission.Unfortunately,the lessons of the expeditionary campaign,like previous military encounters,lie buried in government closets. 

Protesting Buddhist monks outside the Indian high commission in Colombo have demonstrated Lankas prescient India policy: after the deal with Prabhakaran in 1989,their placards read IPKF go back;following the catastrophic defeat of SLA at Elephant Pass in 2000 it was IPKF come back.And during the military rout of the LTTE in 2009,IPKF stay out.Still,Sri Lanka has constructed a memorial to the IPKF in the heart of Colombo.India not doing the same is the ultimate ignominy for the IPKF.

=2019=
==2019: Chennai flight to Jaffna ==
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL/2019/10/18&entity=Ar02507&sk=E5F5D956&mode=text  Ayyappan V, Oct 18, 2019: ''The Times of India'']

After redeveloping Jaffna international airport, Sri Lanka is looking at further collaboration with India, especially South India, to develop the northern province.

Sri Lanka President M Sirisena inaugurated the airport, which was redeveloped at Rs 1,950 million (Sri Lankan rupee) of which India funded Rs 300 million (Sri Lankan rupee). An Alliance Air flight from Chennai touched down on Thursday to mark the commencing of commercial operations at the airport after a gap of 40years following the LTTE-led civil war in the island nation.

At the inauguration Sri Lanka PM Ranil Wickremesinghe said that India-Sri Lanka collaboration has potential for economic development of the Jaffna region. “India has shown willingness to develop Jaffna and funds were given. India has invested Sri Lankan Rs 300 million to develop Jaffna airport. Fastest growing region in Indian Ocean will be South Asia. We should settle all issues by internal discussions and should not go to war that will lead to disappearance of South Asian miracle.”

Northern province governor Suren Raghavan said the development of Jaffna airport was a step to improve an area that was in tatters once. Hinting about the significance of Alliance Air flight landing at the airport on its day of inauguration, he said, “This is not a mere opening of an airport but to rebuild relations with international destinations. Now, it is easy to go to Chennai than to go to Colombo and then fly to Chennai.”

However, he pointed out the need to hand over land to around 2,000 families staying near Jaffna airport. “They are still like refugees and are yet to get their land back.”

High commissioner of India to Sri Lanka Taranjit Singh Sandhu said that bilateral ties between India and Sri Lanka have now truly touched the sky! “The inaugural flight was yet another example of India’s commitment to continue with people-oriented development projects in Sri Lanka. It was also a reflection of the shared commitment to further strengthen people-topeople ties between India and Sri Lanka which lies at the heart of the bilateral ties.”

==Rajapaksas’ pro-China legacy a cause for concern in India?==

[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2019%2F11%2F18&entity=Ar01600&sk=43D53B2D&mode=text  Sachin Parashar, Nov 18, 2019: ''The Times of India'']

PM Narendra Modi was among the first to congratulate Sri Lanka’s controversial military strongman and leader Gotabaya Rajapaksa after he emerged victorious in the presidential polls defeating his nearest rival Sajith Premadasa, who was considered favourably inclined towards India, by over 13 lakh votes. Modi said on Twitter that he looked forward to working closely with Gotabaya, brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, for deepening the “close and fraternal ties between our two countries and citizens, and for peace, prosperity as well as security in our region’’.

Gotabaya, who secured over 52% of votes, thanked Modi and the Indian people in response, as he said the two nations were bound by history and common beliefs and that he looked forward to working together on development and security. Gotabaya also accepted Modi’s invite to visit India.

This show of goodwill, however, masked serious concerns in India about Gotabaya, who is seen as a pro-China leader, not least because of his brother Mahinda’s China-centric economic and security policies when he was president.

Sri Lanka was among the countries where China’s so-called debt trap diplomacy played out first and many believe this was mostly because of Mahinda, whose election as president in 2005 coincided with China’s growing role in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure sector. Beijing’s “no-strings overseas aid and loans’’ to Mahinda saw China replacing Japan in no time as the largest donor to the nation. While the majority group, Sinhalese, voted overwhelmingly in favour of Gotabaya, he remains a despised figure among the minorities like Tamils and Muslims. The former defence secretary is credited with having ended the civil war in the country by brutalising and eliminating Tamil separatists.

As strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney said, with a pro-China communist government in Nepal, an implacably hostile Pakistan and the Rajapaksa family back in power in Sri Lanka, India faces daunting regional challenges.

“The pro-China Gotabaya’s ascendancy to power in Sri Lanka more than counterbalances the earlier ouster in the Maldives of a Beijing-backed autocrat, Yameen. Sri Lanka straddles vital sea lanes and is central to India’s maritime security,’’ he said. While there’s still the feeling that Sri Lanka, given its geography and economic dependence, cannot turn its back on India, it’s a fact that the Rajapaksas’ return to power is good news for Beijing. “This development could further erode India’s once-dominant influence in Sri Lanka,’’ Chellaney added.

To be sure, India wasn’t entirely unprepared for this. The government had been sending feelers to the Rajapaksas for over a year to dispel the notion that it was hostile to them. These efforts led to Modi hosting Mahinda here in September last year and again meeting him during his visit to Sri Lanka in June. Before that though, in an interview to an Indian publication in 2018, Gotabaya accused the Modi government of raising issues without having proper understanding. He had also said Sri Lankans felt there was “unnecessary influence’’ by India in his country’s internal affairs.

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=2020= 
==‘India first’ policy ==
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2020%2F08%2F26&entity=Ar01516&sk=E704E9C0&mode=text  Will have ‘India first’ policy, China port deal a mistake: Lanka, August 26, 2020: ''The Times of India'']


Sri Lanka wants to pursue a “neutral” foreign policy but will retain an “India First” approach in strategic and security matters, foreign secretary Jayanath Colombage has said.

Speaking to a Sri Lankan TV channel, Colombage said, “President (Gotabaya Rajapaksa) has stated that in terms of strategic security, we will follow an ‘India first’ policy. We cannot afford to be a strategic security threat to India and we don’t have to be. We need to benefit from India. The president has clearly said that you are our first priority as far as security is concerned but I have to deal with other players for economic prosperity.”

Along with pursuing a neutral foreign policy, Sri Lanka will protect India’s strategic interests, he added.

In his remarks, the foreign secretary, the first from the armed services, said the decision to give Hambantota port on a 99-year lease to China was a “mistake”.

Foreign minister S Jaishankar recently reached out to his counterpart Dinesh Gunawardane after the Rajapaksa team returned to government in a resounding victory.

The Rajapaksa government, given its history, has been seen as closer to China than to India, which gives the Indian government an opportunity to move the relationship.

The big issue that India would seek to resolve is the Eastern Container Terminal where a local protest has stalled the project. In their private conversations, Sri Lanka has assured India of protecting its interests, but this will have to be formalised, sources here said.

=2021=
== Amid SL-China row, IAF ferries 100-tonne fertiliser ==
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL/2021/11/07&entity=Ar01501&sk=40D668D8&mode=text  Nov 7, 2021: ''The Times of India'']

Two IAF C-17 Globemaster aircraft transported 100 tonne of nano nitrogen to Sri Lanka earlier this week, the Indian embassy said in a statement. The deployment was essentially to support Sri Lanka’s organic farming initiatives and to expedite availability of nano nitrogen fertiliser to the local farmers.

The delivery came in the middle of a row between China and Sri Lanka over supply of contaminated fertilisers by Chinese companies and China’s blacklisting of a Lankan bank for credit default.

“The C17 aircraft operations were coordinated in close liaison with Sri Lanka Air Force. The quick deployment of IAF aircraft and expeditious disembarkation overnight was indicative of close coordination between the two services. The aircraft crews were received by AVM Prasanna Payoe, Chief of Staff, Sri Lanka Air Force. COS thanked the IAF for their prompt response and continued support in essential matters,” the embassy said in a statement.

==SL scraps oil tanker deal; 2nd India pact nixed in 2021==
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL%2F2021%2F02%2F18&entity=Ar01114&sk=F6A0AD06&mode=text  February 18, 2021: ''The Times of India'']

Lanka scraps oil tanker deal; 2nd India pact nixed this year

Colombo:

Sri Lanka will reacquire 99 World War II-era oil storage tanks leased to Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) in the eastern port district of Trincomalee, energy minister Udaya Gammanpila announced on Wednesday. It is the second deal with India to be scrapped by Sri Lanka this year.

Last month, the Sri Lankan government scrapped the tri-lateral deal with India and Japan to develop the Colombo Port’s Eastern Container Terminal (ECT). Gammanpila said that talks with the Indian high commissioner in Colombo on this issue concluded last Sunday.

“I am happy to state that he was very flexible at the talks. He ignored the conditions mentioned in the agreement signed in 2017 in order to be helpful to us,” he said, referring to his discussions with high commissioner Gopal Baglay. “After WW II, these tanks were abandoned without being used. In 2003, they were leased to IOC. But we are happy to say Sri Lanka will soon have those tanks back,” the minister said. Sri Lanka in 2003 had leased out 99 oil tanks to IOC for 30 years for an annual payment of $100,000. PTI


=2022=
==SL blocks Chinese ‘spy ship’ visit after protests by India==
[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/article-share?article=07_08_2022_001_018_cap_TOI  Sachin Parashar, August 7, 2022: ''The Times of India'']


New Delhi: Following a strong protest by India, Sri Lanka has blocked the proposed visit by a Chinese “spy vessel” to the Hambantota port in southern Sri Lanka. In an official communication, the Lankan foreign ministry asked the Chinese embassy in Colombo to defer the arrival of the ship “until further consultations”. 

 India had earlier raised the issue with the Lankan authorities in Colombo and sought to know the purpose of the visit. The research vessel Yuan Wang 5 was scheduled to arrive in Hambantota, a port built by the Chinese, on August 11 and conduct “space tracking, satellite control and research tracking in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean Region’’.

=2023=
==Sri Lanka to give free visas to Indian tourists==
[https://epaper.indiatimes.com/article-share?article=25_10_2023_009_005_cap_TOI  Oct 25, 2023: ''The Times of India'']

Colombo : The Sri Lankan cabinet has approved the policy to issue free tourist visas to travellers from India and six other countries, foreign minister Ali Sabry said, amidst efforts to rebuild the debt-trapped island nation’s tourism sector.

Foreign minister Sabry in a statement said that this would be carried out as a pilot project effective until March 31, 2024.

The cabinet approved free entry to travellers from India, China, Russia, Malaysia, Japan, Indonesia, and Thailand with immediate effect.
Tourists from these countries will be able to obtain visas when visiting Sri Lanka, without a fee.

India is traditionally Sri Lanka’s top inbound tourism market. In the September arrival figures, India topped with over 30,000 arrivals or 26 per cent with Chinese tourists trailing at over 8,000 arrivals as the second largest group. Tourist arrivals to the island had slumped since the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings that left 270 persons, including 11 Indians, dead and over 500 injured.

Sri Lanka, which has been grappling with unprecedented economic turmoil since its independence from Britain in 1948, is also facing political unrest with protesters demanding President Rajapaksa’s resignation.

The economic crisis has prompted an acute shortage of essential items like food, medicine, cooking gas and other fuel, toilet paper and even matches. 

PTI

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