Henry Kissinger and India, Pâkistân
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+ | [https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/henry-kissinger-100-us-nsa-indira-gandhi-a-bch-8632336/ Arjun Sengupta, May 27, 2023: ''The Indian Express''] | ||
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+ | |||
+ | Henry Kissinger celebrates his 100th birthday today (May 27). First as the United States National Security Adviser, then as Secretary of State, Kissinger led US interventions around the world during the 1970s, shaping events in China, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, with consequences that reverberate even today. | ||
+ | |||
+ | For some, he was a master in statecraft and diplomacy; for many, especially those who bore the brunt of his political and military interventions, he is a bully and a warmonger — even a war criminal. | ||
+ | |||
+ | With India, Kissinger’s relationship was tumultuous — and neither he nor President Richard Nixon under whom he served — made any attempt to hide their almost visceral dislike of this country and its then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The contours of this deep antipathy of the Nixon White House towards India were revealed in tapes that were declassified recently. (Details below) | ||
+ | |||
+ | ''' Kissinger was a proponent of (mostly unprincipled) realpolitik. ''' | ||
+ | |||
+ | Born on May 27, 1923, in Fürth, Germany, Kissinger, who is Jewish, fled Nazi Germany with his family in 1938. Upon coming to the US, Kissinger excelled academically at Harvard University and soon found himself rising in the ranks of the US political establishment. He would go on to play a prominent role in US foreign policy between 1969 and 1977 as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Kissinger’s approach to diplomacy was characterised by realpolitik, which emphasised pragmatic considerations and the pursuit of national interests ahead of moral and ethical concerns. It was Kissinger’s position that as long as decision-makers in major states were willing to accept the international order, it was “legitimate” — and questions of public opinion and morality could then be dismissed as being irrelevant. | ||
+ | |||
+ | This meant that Kissinger’s diplomatic successes were accompanied by a bloody legacy of undermining sovereignty and democratic functioning of smaller countries. He was behind the US bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War, the US’s involvement in the 1973 Chilean military coup, the US’s tacit support to Argentina’s military junta, and notably, the US support for Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War, ignoring and condoning the terrible atrocities committed by the Pakistani state and army on the Bengali people of what was then East Pakistan. | ||
+ | |||
+ | ''' It was the crisis in East Pakistan that brought India face-to-face with Kissinger’s policies. ''' | ||
+ | |||
+ | General elections were held in Pakistan in 1970 to elect members of the National Assembly. Voting took place in 300 general constituencies, of which 162 were in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). | ||
+ | |||
+ | In a landslide victory, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won 160 out of 162 seats in the East, securing an absolute majority in the assembly. To stall the rising tide of Bengali nationalism in the East, Pakistan’s political and military elite, mostly from the Punjab in the West, stalled the inauguration of the new assembly, triggering civil unrest. | ||
+ | |||
+ | On March 25, 1971, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight, a brutal crackdown on East Pakistan’s nationalist movement, in which anywhere between 300,000 to 3 million Bangladeshi civilians were killed, and as many as 10 million refugees poured into India. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Pakistan was a key ally of the US during the Cold War for reason of its strategic location and as a counterbalance to India, which had aligned itself with the Soviet Union. Kissinger, NSA to President Nixon at the time, also hoped to use Pakistan for diplomatic openings to China, again as a part of his grand strategy to counter Soviet influence. | ||
+ | |||
+ | With the Pakistani atrocities continuing unabated, the US Consul General in Dhaka, Archer Blood, wrote to Washington DC to intervene, but met with what Blood would describe as a “deafening silence”. As the US continued to supply military and economic aid to Pakistan, Blood and his staff drafted a strongly worded dissent memo. | ||
+ | |||
+ | “Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen any deservedly negative international public relations impact against them,” the telegram read. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Blood would immediately be recalled to the US, with the rest of his diplomatic career marred by his show of dissent. | ||
+ | |||
+ | ''' Both Nixon and Kissinger had a strong dislike of Indira, and disdain for Indians. ''' | ||
+ | |||
+ | As a steady stream of refugees entered the country, India, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, went to war with Pakistan in December 1971. A month prior to India’s intervention, Indira had met with Nixon and Kissinger, who were unsympathetic to India to the point of being obnoxious. | ||
+ | |||
+ | During conversations between Nixon and Kissinger in the aftermath of the meeting, both men called Indira a “b**ch”, with Kissinger accusing her of “starting a war” there. Kissinger called Indians “b*****ds”, and “the most aggressive people around”. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Earlier, at a meeting on June 17, 1971, Nixon and Kissinger badmouthed India freely, calling Indians the “most sexless” and “pathetic” people, and “superb flatterers”, and Indian women “most unattractive women in the world”. | ||
+ | |||
+ | This meeting, held between 5.15 pm and 6.10 pm, was captured by the Oval Office taping system, and appears as Conversation 525-001 of the White House Tapes that were declassified in 2020. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Towards the 50th minute of the 54-minute, 42-second tape, Nixon says: “Undoubtedly the most unattractive women in the world are the Indian women. Undoubtedly.” | ||
+ | |||
+ | He continues: “The most sexless, nothing, these people. I mean, people say, what about the Black Africans? Well, you can see something, the vitality there, I mean they have a little animal-like charm, but God, those Indians, ack, pathetic. Uch.” As he says this, there is laughter. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Both Nixon and Kissinger had deep misgivings about then US Ambassador to India Kenneth B Keating, and Nixon is heard on the tape wondering why Keating was on the side of the Indians. | ||
+ | |||
+ | In response, Kissinger says: “They (Indians) are superb flatterers, Mr President. They are masters at flattery. They are masters at subtle flattery. That’s how they survived 600 years. They suck up — their great skill is to suck up to people in key positions.” | ||
+ | |||
+ | ''' When the 1971 war began, Kissinger and Nixon tried to make things difficult for India. ''' | ||
+ | |||
+ | When India went to war after Pakistan preemptively bombed nine Indian air bases, Nixon was livid. “She (Indira) suckered us. Suckered us…..this woman suckered us,” he exclaimed to Kissinger. | ||
+ | |||
+ | On December 6, three days into the war, Nixon came up with the idea of urging China to move troops to its border with India. “We have got to tell them that some movement on their part toward the Indian border could be very significant,” he told Kissinger. | ||
+ | |||
+ | However, Kissinger knew that any Chinese intervention could also draw in the Soviets. So he came up with a plan to send a naval fleet to the Bay of Bengal to “scare off Indira”. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Thus, on December 10, 1971, Task Force 74, including the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, was asked to proceed to the Indian Ocean. But the Soviets responded to the US action with their own naval vessels — and as the Enterprise stayed in the region for almost a month, it was constantly tailed by a fleet of Soviet ships. The presence of the Soviet navy effectively neutralised the US threat and India’s multi-pronged assault into East Pakistan could continue successfully. | ||
+ | |||
+ | On December 16, Pakistani forces in the East unconditionally surrendered to India, bringing an end to the war and Pakistan as it had existed since Independence. Despite all sorts of pressure by the US and Kissinger, India and Indira stood firm, ultimately achieving its objectives in the war. | ||
+ | |||
+ | ''' However, Kissinger would change his opinion on Indira Gandhi over time. ''' | ||
+ | |||
+ | He would later describe her as a person of “extraordinary character” and acknowledge her determination and assertiveness in pursuing India’s goals. | ||
+ | |||
+ | “[The foul language has] to be seen in the context of a Cold War atmosphere 35 years ago, when I had paid a secret visit to China when President Nixon had not yet been there and India had made a kind of an alliance with the Soviet Union,” Kissinger told NDTV in 2005. | ||
=Henry Kissinger and Pâkistân= | =Henry Kissinger and Pâkistân= | ||
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M. K. NAQVI | M. K. NAQVI | ||
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+ | HENRY KISSINGER AND INDIA, PÂKISTÂN]] | ||
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+ | HENRY KISSINGER AND INDIA, PÂKISTÂN]] | ||
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+ | HENRY KISSINGER AND INDIA, PÂKISTÂN]] |
Revision as of 15:18, 14 June 2023
This is a collection of articles archived for the excellence of their content. Readers will be able to edit existing articles and post new articles directly |
India
1971
Arjun Sengupta, May 27, 2023: The Indian Express
Henry Kissinger celebrates his 100th birthday today (May 27). First as the United States National Security Adviser, then as Secretary of State, Kissinger led US interventions around the world during the 1970s, shaping events in China, Africa, the Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, with consequences that reverberate even today.
For some, he was a master in statecraft and diplomacy; for many, especially those who bore the brunt of his political and military interventions, he is a bully and a warmonger — even a war criminal.
With India, Kissinger’s relationship was tumultuous — and neither he nor President Richard Nixon under whom he served — made any attempt to hide their almost visceral dislike of this country and its then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
The contours of this deep antipathy of the Nixon White House towards India were revealed in tapes that were declassified recently. (Details below)
Kissinger was a proponent of (mostly unprincipled) realpolitik.
Born on May 27, 1923, in Fürth, Germany, Kissinger, who is Jewish, fled Nazi Germany with his family in 1938. Upon coming to the US, Kissinger excelled academically at Harvard University and soon found himself rising in the ranks of the US political establishment. He would go on to play a prominent role in US foreign policy between 1969 and 1977 as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State.
Kissinger’s approach to diplomacy was characterised by realpolitik, which emphasised pragmatic considerations and the pursuit of national interests ahead of moral and ethical concerns. It was Kissinger’s position that as long as decision-makers in major states were willing to accept the international order, it was “legitimate” — and questions of public opinion and morality could then be dismissed as being irrelevant.
This meant that Kissinger’s diplomatic successes were accompanied by a bloody legacy of undermining sovereignty and democratic functioning of smaller countries. He was behind the US bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War, the US’s involvement in the 1973 Chilean military coup, the US’s tacit support to Argentina’s military junta, and notably, the US support for Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War, ignoring and condoning the terrible atrocities committed by the Pakistani state and army on the Bengali people of what was then East Pakistan.
It was the crisis in East Pakistan that brought India face-to-face with Kissinger’s policies.
General elections were held in Pakistan in 1970 to elect members of the National Assembly. Voting took place in 300 general constituencies, of which 162 were in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
In a landslide victory, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won 160 out of 162 seats in the East, securing an absolute majority in the assembly. To stall the rising tide of Bengali nationalism in the East, Pakistan’s political and military elite, mostly from the Punjab in the West, stalled the inauguration of the new assembly, triggering civil unrest.
On March 25, 1971, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight, a brutal crackdown on East Pakistan’s nationalist movement, in which anywhere between 300,000 to 3 million Bangladeshi civilians were killed, and as many as 10 million refugees poured into India.
Pakistan was a key ally of the US during the Cold War for reason of its strategic location and as a counterbalance to India, which had aligned itself with the Soviet Union. Kissinger, NSA to President Nixon at the time, also hoped to use Pakistan for diplomatic openings to China, again as a part of his grand strategy to counter Soviet influence.
With the Pakistani atrocities continuing unabated, the US Consul General in Dhaka, Archer Blood, wrote to Washington DC to intervene, but met with what Blood would describe as a “deafening silence”. As the US continued to supply military and economic aid to Pakistan, Blood and his staff drafted a strongly worded dissent memo.
“Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while at the same time bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government and to lessen any deservedly negative international public relations impact against them,” the telegram read.
Blood would immediately be recalled to the US, with the rest of his diplomatic career marred by his show of dissent.
Both Nixon and Kissinger had a strong dislike of Indira, and disdain for Indians.
As a steady stream of refugees entered the country, India, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, went to war with Pakistan in December 1971. A month prior to India’s intervention, Indira had met with Nixon and Kissinger, who were unsympathetic to India to the point of being obnoxious.
During conversations between Nixon and Kissinger in the aftermath of the meeting, both men called Indira a “b**ch”, with Kissinger accusing her of “starting a war” there. Kissinger called Indians “b*****ds”, and “the most aggressive people around”.
Earlier, at a meeting on June 17, 1971, Nixon and Kissinger badmouthed India freely, calling Indians the “most sexless” and “pathetic” people, and “superb flatterers”, and Indian women “most unattractive women in the world”.
This meeting, held between 5.15 pm and 6.10 pm, was captured by the Oval Office taping system, and appears as Conversation 525-001 of the White House Tapes that were declassified in 2020.
Towards the 50th minute of the 54-minute, 42-second tape, Nixon says: “Undoubtedly the most unattractive women in the world are the Indian women. Undoubtedly.”
He continues: “The most sexless, nothing, these people. I mean, people say, what about the Black Africans? Well, you can see something, the vitality there, I mean they have a little animal-like charm, but God, those Indians, ack, pathetic. Uch.” As he says this, there is laughter.
Both Nixon and Kissinger had deep misgivings about then US Ambassador to India Kenneth B Keating, and Nixon is heard on the tape wondering why Keating was on the side of the Indians.
In response, Kissinger says: “They (Indians) are superb flatterers, Mr President. They are masters at flattery. They are masters at subtle flattery. That’s how they survived 600 years. They suck up — their great skill is to suck up to people in key positions.”
When the 1971 war began, Kissinger and Nixon tried to make things difficult for India.
When India went to war after Pakistan preemptively bombed nine Indian air bases, Nixon was livid. “She (Indira) suckered us. Suckered us…..this woman suckered us,” he exclaimed to Kissinger.
On December 6, three days into the war, Nixon came up with the idea of urging China to move troops to its border with India. “We have got to tell them that some movement on their part toward the Indian border could be very significant,” he told Kissinger.
However, Kissinger knew that any Chinese intervention could also draw in the Soviets. So he came up with a plan to send a naval fleet to the Bay of Bengal to “scare off Indira”.
Thus, on December 10, 1971, Task Force 74, including the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, was asked to proceed to the Indian Ocean. But the Soviets responded to the US action with their own naval vessels — and as the Enterprise stayed in the region for almost a month, it was constantly tailed by a fleet of Soviet ships. The presence of the Soviet navy effectively neutralised the US threat and India’s multi-pronged assault into East Pakistan could continue successfully.
On December 16, Pakistani forces in the East unconditionally surrendered to India, bringing an end to the war and Pakistan as it had existed since Independence. Despite all sorts of pressure by the US and Kissinger, India and Indira stood firm, ultimately achieving its objectives in the war.
However, Kissinger would change his opinion on Indira Gandhi over time.
He would later describe her as a person of “extraordinary character” and acknowledge her determination and assertiveness in pursuing India’s goals.
“[The foul language has] to be seen in the context of a Cold War atmosphere 35 years ago, when I had paid a secret visit to China when President Nixon had not yet been there and India had made a kind of an alliance with the Soviet Union,” Kissinger told NDTV in 2005.
Henry Kissinger and Pâkistân
Kissinger: a friend of Pakistan
APROPOS of Mr Abdullah’s letter, ‘A wish’ (Jan 29), criticising President Musharraf for looking at Henry Kissinger (Jan 29), I have to inform him that Mr Kissinger, though a practising Jew, the second important man after president Nixon in the US, prior to and during 1971, was a friend of Pakistan.
It was perhaps due to the help provided by president Yahya Khan for becoming a bridge between Washington and Beijing. (At this time president Nixon had mused: “By not recognising China, we are saying that one billion people do not exist”.)
Both Nixon and Kissinger wanted to help Pakistan during the Pakistan-India war but the entire US administration, mesmerised by Indian lobby, went against Pakistan – and manoeuvred Nixon into installing the help.
He had to turn an enemy, or what we think of him, due to the change in the US policy after Nixon’s resignation.
When he met Z. A. Bhutto in Larkana in August 1974, Kissinger asked him to extend diplomatic recognition to Israel in the wake of Arabs recognising it after Ramazan War of 1973.
To this suggestion, Bhutto replied to him with all his hate-America policy: “We are the men of desert, Indus is in flood, and we are affected by torrents. My emotions are high so I cannot do what my people won’t accept”.
Well then, Kissinger told him that he must give up the idea of developing the nuclear programme; and compensation would be offered for the nuclear energy, and also more benefits for recognising Israel. The answer was an emphatic ‘no’. Did it seal Bhutto’s fate? This was what Mr Abdullah refers to as the threat of ‘making an example out of Z. A. Bhutto.’
The question of recognising Israel is nothing new. Tel Aviv has been trying it right from 1948 through the US and the UK. In trying to create good will, the Mumbai-born Israeli president Shimon Perez has congratulated the president of Pakistan on becoming a civilian president recently.
Before his death Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah had said that he was neither against Jews nor against establishing a state of their own, recognising their state would be premature; we are not yet ready for that.
Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and President Musharraf have tried to know if our nation is ready now.
M. K. NAQVI Karachi