Safety
(Created page with "{| class="wikitable" |- |colspan="0"|<div style="font-size:100%"> This is a collection of articles archived for the excellence of their content.<br/>You can help by converting...") |
Latest revision as of 19:04, 7 January 2014
This is a collection of articles archived for the excellence of their content. Readers will be able to edit existing articles and post new articles directly |
[edit] Safety
How safe is it to fly in India?
Capt A Ranganathan
Saturday’s crash raises the obvious question: How safe is it to fly in India? ‘‘After a crash, if the pilot is alive, nail him. If he is dead, blame him,’’ goes a saying in our circles. The blame game has already begun even as vital safety deficiencies get swept aside.
After the crash, the chairman of AAI went on record to say that both the Mangalore runway and the airport met International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) standards. But the fact is, the aiming point (the point where the undercarriage of the aircraft is supposed to touch down on the runway while landing) does not conform to ICAO standards.
Close Shaves
Apr ‘10: Vertical separation between AI’s Hyd-Del flight and KF’s Del-BBSR flight fell to 700ft; 1,000ft is a must May ‘09: AI’s Mum-Del and Jet’s Mum-Kol flight cleared for take-off simultaneously Feb: Prez convoy chopper landed in front of taxiing AI flight Oct ‘08: Nose wheel of Go Air flight fell off in take-off at Mumbai Pilot rest rules have many shortcomings
Also, if the overrun area had 90 metres of sand laid out as per ICAO specifications for the runway-end safety area, then isn’t it strange that the aircraft did not slow down? Are all the other airports in India in a similar state of (un)preparedness for a possible accident?
The Instrument Landing System was damaged during the overrun. Yet, the airport was kept open for commercial flights, using only the non-precision approach facilities, even after sunset. A non-precision approach is one where there is no electronic glide path to guide the pilot down a predetermined angle for landing. Was that a commercial decision or a safety decision?
Safety studies have established that more than 74% of approach and landing accidents have happened during non-precision approaches and in night conditions. Mangalore has just witnessed a fatal crash. The Kingfisher Airlines accident in Mumbai in December 2009 was also from a non-precision approach. Was it wise then to open the airport without the ILS and allow non-precision approaches?
Are all our airports capable of quick emergency response and rescue efforts? Areas surrounding the airports are all built up and there is no clear passage for crash tenders to access an aircraft in case of an accident during approach or during a take-off.
Fatigue is another big factor in aviation accidents. We are still following an outdated circular issued in 1992 for pilot rest rules. A new, scientifically-backed Civil Aviation Requirement issued in 2007 was shot down by the ministry, mainly to accommodate airlines like Air India and Air India Express. The 1992 rest rules currently followed in India have many shortcomings. The DGCA had to waive certain restrictions to permit these violations. Scientific studies have shown that the performance levels and response times degrade with ‘‘time since awake’’. The AIE captain may have flown just 7 hours with a break at Dubai. However, he is not a machine to switch on and off during the break. Had India honoured the 2009 deadline set by ICAO for adopting scientifically-backed pilot rest rules, the Mangalore air crash may have not occurred.
ICAO has published several annexes and documents to implement safety standards. In spite of being a signatory to the ICAO convention, we have several airports with incorrect runway markings and lack of proper landing aids. The compulsion to operate flights in spite of the lack of standard configuration can lead to accidents. Our system which is mired in corruption has managed 10 years without fatal airline crashes. The party was spoilt in Mangalore.
(Capt Ranganathan is an air safety expert with 20,000 hours of flying experience. He was part of DGCA’s core group on approach and landing accident reduction. He has also compiled an adverse weather operations training kit for DGCA.)