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without experiencing any opposition, by the valley of the Rapti to Etaunda. Colonel Nicoll reached Ikoa on the 25th February and left there two native battalions and a proportion of field guns, in order 'to check any attempt by the enemy on the valley of the Rapti from their fortified posts of Kadrung and Opadrung, to which they had retired on his advance. The remainder of the brigade marched up the valley of the Rapti and joined head-quarters on the 29th, the day after the action at Mokwanpur. At the same time Colonel Kelly, with the 1st Brigade, marching by one of the Baghmati routes, reached Ratanpur on the 27th February, having been obliged to make short marches owing to the nature of the road, which he described as " a bed of large stones." He experienced no opposition en route. On the evening of his arrival at Ratanpur he made a reconnaissance with a view to obtaining information and making a dash at Hariharpur, if it should promise a successful issue. The enemy showed in considerable force in a very strong stockade when half the ascent of the hill on which Hariharpur stands had been made, and Colonel Kelly ascertained that there were 1,000 men with two guns in the fort. On the 29th February he moved to Jur Jur, four miles to the west of Ratanpur, the road having to be made for the guns. On reaching Jur Jur it appeared from another recon- naissance that a strong point, 800 yards from one of the Gurkha stockades, had not been occupied. As the occupation of this neglected point appeared to be of great moment, Colonel Kelly considered it advisable to take it by surprise. A force of European Action near Hariharpur. and ~ative infantry, with two 3-pouider guns carried by bearers, started at 3 A.M on the 1st March, under Lieutenant-Colonel O'Halloran, and seized the position by 6 A.M., dislodging a Gurkha picquet. The enemy in very considerable numbers made a most desperate and obstinate - attempt to recover this point, and a reinforcement was despatched by Colonel Kelly to cover the rear of the post, which was threaten- ed. It was impossible, from the nature of the ground, to close or use the bayonet, and the musketry continued without intermission until 11-30, when the arrival of two 6-pounders and two 56-inch howitzers on elephants decided the affair in a few minutes, and left the British in possession of an almost natural redoubt, very advanta- geously situated for further operations. This success, however, was 30 FRONTIER AND OVEZUEAB EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA. not gained without some loss, five officers and fifty-four men being killed and wounded. After this repulse the Gurkhas apparently became disheartened, and on the 4th March, during a storm of rain, evacuated the fort and hill. From the date of the General's arrival at Etaunda a desire for peace had evidently pervaded the minds of the Nepalese chiefs, and an unsuccessful attempt had been made on the 25th February to obtain a suspension of hostilities. The intelligence of their reverses at Sekha Khuttri and Harihar- pur, however, spread consternation at Peace negotiations. Khatmandu, and the Durbar immediately resolved to make a tender of unqualified submission as the only means of averting the most disastrous consequences. The red seal having been hurriedly affixed to the Treaty of Segowlie it was despatched to the Gurkha Commander, Kazi Bak- tawar Singh, one of the chief sirdnrs, who on 3rd March informed the General of the fact, and said he would forward it to Chundur Seekur, the Nepal envoy. In reply he was informed that the Gurkha Government must not now expect the same terms m before the war, but if he had power to treat, Sir David Ochterlony would receive him. In the meantime approaches were pushed to within 600 yarde of the defences of Dlokwanpur, and a battery thrown up to open on the fort. Chundur Seekur soon appeared with the ratified treaty and pressed its acceptance in a submissive and abject manner. Sir David Ochterlony was instructed to ascertain that the spirit of hostility was complet.ely annihilated, and that the foe was sufficiently humbled, before accepting this treaty. In order 'to put their humility to the test it was explained to Chundur Seekur that the letter of the treaty would now give to the British all the territory in their occupation and would include the valley of the Rapti as well as Etaunda and Hariliarpur. At the same time he was assured that he must expect no concession beyond that stated in the .treaty, and was made to give a specific note in writing to this effect, and further to engage that the Raja should confirm the declaration in a letter to the Governor General. To all this the envoy readily assented, and even presented the ratified treaty on his knees at the General's Durbar, before all the vakils in camp. The General then accepted the treaty and despatched Lieu- tenant Boileau of his staff to act as Resident at Khatmandu until one should be nominated by the Governor General, The contest with the Nepalese was thus terminated in the beginning of March, and the requisite orders for the retrograde move- ment of the troops was at once issued to the leaders of the different columns engaged in the campaign. Lord Hastings was much pleased with the result to which Sir David Ochterlony had brought the campaign in so short a space of time, more particularly EO because the late period at which the operations had unavoidably been commenced, after the interruption to the preparations which occurred in November and December, had made him apprehensive of the arrival of the unhealthy season before there would be time to effectually humble the enemy. Sir David himself, too, bad dis- covered that the capture of bfokwanpur would be the most that could be effected in this campaign, for he found that it would not be safe to keep the troops in that valley after the middle of March; this therefore was not the least powerful of the motives which influenced him in granting the terms. The articles of the treaty were all punctually executed accord- ing to agreement. The Supreme Government, however, thought it would be a politic act to give up such part of the Terai as might not be required to form a straight and even frontier, in lieu of the portions stipulated in the treaty. The Marquis of Hastings, therefore, after every article had been executed, gave notice to the Raja that the Hon'ble E. Gardner was appointed Resident, and empowered to conclude a new arrangement on this basis. This was subsequently effected after the boundary had been surveyed and laid down with pillars
this boundary constitutes the present frontier to the east of the Gandak. The part of the Terai which skirted Oudh was retained and made over to the Nawab Vazir in extinction of a loan obtained from him during the war. This again came into our hands on the annexa- - tion of Oudh, and was restored to Nepal in 1860 for services per- formed by the Nepalese troops during the Mutiny. A treaty was also made with the Sikkim Raja by which we guaranteed him his possessions, thus shutting out the Nepalese from all means of aggrandizement to the east and circumscribing Nepal with British territory on three sides
this policy has no doubt done much to secure peace with Nepal since 1816. 1 See Bitchieon LV. 32 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA. Of the other columns mentioned above, with which it was Lord Hastings' intention to invade Nepal, Colonel Nicolls was afterwards ordered to take command of a force of 6,617 men at Sitapur and penetrate into the provinces of Doti and Salena. Lieutenant-Colonel Adams from Kumaun was to co-operate by moving on the back of the Gurkha position, Major-General John S. Wood, with a force of 4,866 men, was to act as a corps of observation on the Gorakhpur frontier for the purpose of wat,ching and overawing -Butwal in the first instance, and eventually reducing and occupying such part of the Terai between the Gandak and the eastern limits of Bahraich as were not yet brought under subjection to the British Government. Captain Latter had command of a force of 2,445 men assembled at Titrtlia with which to co-operate with the Raja of Sikkim. The early termination of the war prevented the employment of either of the detachments assembled under the command of Major- General John S. Wood and Colonel Nicolls as well as the projected move of Lieutenant-Colonel Adams from Kumaun on the back of the Gurkha position. Those officers had respectively assumed command of their detachments, and were proceeding to the destined quarters in which their military operations were to be carried out, when information of the conclusion of peace was received by them. The corps composing those detachments were consequently dispersed to their several stations. Captain Latter entered the hills with a portion of the troops under his command, in order to support the operations of the Sikkim Raja's troops, which had been continued with tolerable success, and to encourage the revolt of the Kirontis against the Nepalese Government. He advanced to within three miles of the fort of Nagar which the Sikkim troops had invested. In this position he received from Sir David Ochterlony inteiligence of the conclusion of peace, and he accordingly directed a cessation of hostilities on the part of the Sikkim force and discontinued all the proceedings which he had commenced against the Gurkha Government. General Ochterlony's conduct of this campaign differs materially from that of his previous successful cam. Concluding remarks. paign against Umar Singh at Malaun. There he carried on his operations with the most extreme caution, 1 Tihalie is in the Torai, dae eouth of Darjeeling. NEPAL. leaving nothing to chance, and working as methodically as if he had been besieging a fortress, in which light, indeed, we may look on the naturally strong position of the enemy. There is no doubt that tho chief reason for.his extreme cauti6n was the feeling that the Bengnl sepoy was not equal to the task of coping with the Gurkhas on their native hills
he was consequently very careful not to expose them to the chance of a severe repulse, which might have had a bad influence on, if not entirely destroyed, their nzorale, and rendered ultimate success in the difficult task before him hopeless. In his second campaign we cannot but look upon his turning movement in the neighbourhood of Bichia ICoh as a most hazardous one. A successful General has no criticism to fear, and this enterprise was doubtless prompted by urgent necessity, but had he not been aided by great good fortune it might have resulted in serious disaster. Its success, however, not only abridged the period of the campaign from months to weeks, but probably saved the army from an inglorious retreat at the beginning of the hot and siclily season, which mas due in about a month. There can be little doubt, nevertheless, that a few men on the edges of the defile might have almost annihilated the brigade without exposing themselves to much danger. This brigade, on entering the deep and: narrow ravine of Balu Khola, about a mile from Bichia Koh, had to march through in single file for five miles
tlie banks on either side were covered with trees, sometimes meet- ing overhead; at other times precipitous cliffs of great height rose on either side
fallen trees had to be removed here and there from the path
the final ascent was at least 300 feet, up which the men had to clamber with the assistance of the bushes. In face of any opposition the march was indeed a dangerous one, and such perilous enterprises are only justifiable when undertaken as a means of averting disaster, and when the saving of time is all-important. In conclusion, we must notice the fact that the Gurkhas attempted to poison the water in the passes both in this campaign and in that of 1814-15. Sir David Ochterlony in his depatches re- ports the death of some elephants and horses from this cause, but no men appear to have suffered. This is probably because the water poisoned was in stagnant recesses between the first and second atockade of the Bichia Koh, and was probably not used by the men. The water was supposed to be poisoned with mohoor root, VOL. IV. F 34 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROB INDIA. baskets of this being found in the vicinity. Precautions would have to be taken to guard against losing men from thie cause. Politiml and Military Transactions in India-Henry T. Prinsc p . . . . . . . . 1825 OfFcial Papers relating to the Nepal War . . . . 1824 Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Volume 11, Aitchison.. 1892 Rept on Nepal-Brevet-Major E. R. Elles and Major Newnham Davis . . . . .. 1893 Gurkhas-Lieutenant-Colonel Eden Vansittart . . 1%0Ci APPEND I X STRENGTH OF FORCE UNDER SIR DAVID OCHTERLONY, FEBRUARY 1816. Right Column, 1st Brigade-Colonel Kelly, 24th Foot. Her Majesty's 24th Foot . . . . Rifles 849 let Battalion, 18th Native Infantry . . ,, 747 ,, 21st ,, 8, . . ,Y 390 Z IY 2nd ,, , I ,, ,.. . . ,, 437 3 Chumparun Light Infantry . . . . . . ,, 1,246 Total ,, 3,669 Centre Column-Major-General Sir David OchCerlony. ~RD BBIGADE-LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MILLER, 39~~ FOOT. 4TH BRIQADE---COLONEL DICK, ~TH NATIVE INFANTRY. Her Majesty's 87th Foot . . . . Riflea 876 2nd Battalion, 4th Native Infantry . . 8, 784 8, 8th 8, 9 J a YY .=. a ,, 784 ,Y ,, 9th 9, 8, - ,, 810 ,, 12th ,, 9, . . ,, 894 7
- ,
yt 15th 8, ss . . ,, €95 8 $8 22nd ,, D 1,
- I
YY - 8, 860 9, 25th ,, 2, . . ,, 815 10 ,Y 1st ,, . 13th ,, I, I ,Y 425 11 Total ,,7,053 1 Becam the 36th Regiment in 1824
mutinied at Jullundur in 1857. 2 ,, ,, 41et ,, ,, 1824
,, ,, Sitapur in 1857. s ,, ,, 42nd ,, ,, 1824
now the 5th Light Infantry. 4 ,, ,, 23rd ,, ,, 1824
mutinied at Mhow in 1857. a ,, ,, 24th ,, ,, 1824
disbanded for disaffection in 1857. a Now the 1st Brahmone. 7 Beoame the 1st Regiment in 1924
mutinied at Cawnporo in 1857. 8 Now the 2nd Queen's Own Rajput Light Infantry. Bwame the 44th Regiment in 1824
mutinied et Agra in 1857. lo ,, 9, 60th ,, ,, 1824
,, ,, Nagode in 1857. 3 G PBONTIER AND OVERS&AS &SP.l%DITIONS PRO& INDIA. Left Column, 2nd Brigade-Lieutenant-Colonel Nicoll, 66th Foot. Her Majesty's 66th Foot . . . . Rifla 762 6th Grenadier Battalion1 . . . . ,, 627 8th 3, 99 . . .. ,, 688 1 1st Battalion, 8th Native Infantry .. ,, 72.4 2nd ,, 18th ,, ,, 8 - ,, 744 Total ,, 3,545 with 83 pieces of artillery. 1 Temporari!~ formod from the Grenadier companies of various nativo battalione. 2 Beoame the 9th Regiment in 1624
mutinied at Aligarh in 1857. 8 ,, ,.37th ,, ,,18W; ,, ,, Benarea in 1857. PART 11.
