Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP): history
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Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP): history
Religious authority amongst the Pakhtoon clans: 1849-1950
No man’s land
Reviewed by Safiya Aftab
.PNG)
Sana Haroon began her research on the ethnography and colonial era history of the Indo-Afghan tribal areas in 2001, when the world had just begun to refocus on Afghanistan after a decade-long hiatus. Her book, aptly subtitled Islam in the Indo-Afghan borderland, could not have been published at a more opportune time, when the progression and direction of the war on terror has brought the region into sharp relief. As the risk of possible US military action in the region increases, the conflict between the Pakistan army and the tribes has escalated and spilled over into the provinces thus posing a threat to the very foundations of the state.
But for all the fact that the tribal areas are front-page news, most Pakistanis are as perplexed by the turn of events there as is the international community. There is little or no understanding of the forces that shape opinions and dictate action amongst the people of the tribal belt. Frontier of Faith, which focuses on religious organisation and history of armed mobilisation in the region in the pre-Partition era, is an attempt to fill this gap.
1849-1901
Haroon begins with a narrative on British India’s early engagement with the tribes of the Northwest frontier, which took place in the aftermath of the conquest of Punjab in 1849. By the end of the century the frontier tribes had been mapped and a unique administrative model developed for the region, wherein tribes were paid for the protection of infrastructure and for policing the borders of the administered or ‘settled’ districts of British India. She also gives a fascinating account of the negotiations underpinning the delineation of the Durand Line, where the Amir of Afghanistan was asked to define the extent of his sphere of influence and political suzerainty, and British authority over the region which now constitutes the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) was formally acknowledged.
Even after the formation in 1901 of the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa), which comprised five administered districts and five tribal agencies, the relationship of the Crown with the Pakhtoon tribes remained unchanged. The system of raising tribal levies remained intact, as did the practice of monetary compensation to the maliks for ‘good behaviour.’
Religious organisations and Islamic revivalism
Having established the terms of the relationship between the tribes of the frontier regions and the state, Haroon goes on to explore the nature of religious organisations and Islamic revivalism in the area. She traces the development of Sufism in the Pakhtoon highlands, and documents how the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya order, with its emphasis on the study of hadith, came to dominate the Islamic revivalist agenda, furthered by teachers trained at the Darul Uloom Deoband.
But it is Haroon’s discussion of religious authority amongst the Pakhtoon clans that in some ways forms the core of her study, tracing as she does the way mullahs or local religious leaders used their authority to weld together the dictates of Pakhtoonwali or the tribal code with Islamic tradition. The mullahs were caretakers of the main point of congregation and male social interaction in the community, that is the mosque, and as such wielded significant power in terms of control over the dissemination of information and interpersonal relationships in the community. In particular, they had the power of ex-communication, which inevitably led to ostracism from society — a punishment that had severe implications in a close-knit community placed in a harsh physical environment. In a section on the militarisation of religious authority, Haroon describes how the dictates of the mullahs were enforced by their lashkars or armed militias, with the size of the lashkar varying proportionately with the authority and renown of the mullah. The lashkars were used to enforce agreements or punish the violation of the same, deal with moral transgression, and to further the mullahs’ political strategy which generally took the form of swift attacks on state property, if the state was perceived to have violated the terms of its agreements with the clans.
The author concludes her work in a more descriptive mode, tracing the history of the consolidation of autonomy by religious leaders in the region in the pre-Partition and immediately post-Partition era, a period when nationalist Pakhtoon movements offered unqualified support to the mullahs of the tribal areas in their effort to resist the forward policy of the British, aimed at countering the authority of the mullahs and of tribal leadership. An epilogue highlights how the existence of an ‘autonomous space’ could be — and has been — utilised by non-state actors such as participants of the Afghan jihad and now al Qaeda to protect their interests.
For a non-academic reader or the policy practitioner, it is this last linkage, briefly touched upon in the epilogue, which would be of prime interest, but the author has not really fleshed out this thesis. The historical narrative ends at 1950, after an account of the Pakhtoon clansmen’s role in the first Indo-Pak war centered in Kashmir; Haroon touches only briefly upon the relationship of the Pakistani state with centres of authority in the tribal areas. She describes how successive Pakistani governments have chosen to uphold the theory of the ‘intractability’ and ‘cultural distinctness’ of the tribal Pakhtoons, and have assisted in the projection of the tribal area as a region ‘uncompromised by modernity, westernisation and urbanisation,’ but does not comment on why this arrangement has persisted in spite of the fact that voices have been raised in the Pakhtoon political arena for the repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) Act and the merging of FATA with the rest of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP). The significance of the events described in the epilogue thus remains somewhat unclear, and the reader is left bemused as to how and why any sovereign government would allow a part of its territory to remain outside the realm of regular administration.
Nevertheless, the writer is a historian and not a current affairs specialist. Her account of the structure and practice of religious authority in the tribal areas is indeed fascinating, and possibly one of the most painstakingly documented accounts of the region. The discerning reader and amateur historian will be able to infer how the institutional and social framework she describes translates into the social organisation of the region today. One hopes that her scholarship of the region will continue, or be taken up by scholars of contemporary history, to trace the dynamics of the relationship between the Pakistani state and FATA.
Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan borderland
By Sana Haroon
C. Hurst and Co.
Available with Vanguard Books, Karachi
ISBN 1850658544
256pp. £25.00
Social leadership in Pakhtoon tribal communities
February 24, 2008
REVIEW: Excerpt from the book
(The numbers at the end of paragraphs are endnote marks. The endnotes are at the end of this article.)
Frederik Barth’s work: and subsequent writings
Analysis of social leadership in Pakhtoon tribal communities began with the political anthropologist Frederik Barth’s work, which was groundbreaking for its systematic consideration of tribal interrelations and oppositions. Barth’s analysis of the ancestrally derived tribal line resulted in his hypothesis that Sufis or ‘saints’ were ‘outsiders’ to the Pakhtoon jirga-style political assemblies and asserted no political power there.1
Subsequent anthropological and historical studies of Pakhtoon political relationships were strongly affected by his compelling appraisal of the cultural order of human and collective social action represented as the ‘segmentary lineage theory’ to explain the social and political rivalries that dominate through the region. But in accepting his theory wholesale, researchers have maintained his extrapolation that individuals who were not participant in the tribal genealogy were not significant members of tribal society.2 Akbar Ahmed suggests that the actual structure of the tribe did not involve religious authority in any form except in opportunist seizure of power in situations where ‘traditional’ maliki authority weakened.3 Christensen’s work on the late 19th-century north-west frontier suggests that religious leadership was inspired by millenarian sentiments and opportunistic motives and completely separate from and opposed to ‘secular authority’ in the region.4
Mullahs in Pakhtoon society
These understandings of history and society, reliant on oral and transcribed genealogies which described homogeneous clans and tribes of communities descended from a common mythical forefather Qais Abdur Rashid, cannot accommodate the membership of mullahs in Pakhtoon society as their participation was functional and not genealogical. By such reasoning, reinforced by the fact that organisation of the silsila and shaakh was rooted in separate myths of lineage, systems of representation and sources of patronage, mullahs have been understood to have been a mere ‘clients’ of the tribal system and incidental to its functioning. Yet in the space of the non-administered Tribal Areas, religious practice, deeply influenced by Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya revivalism and the village and community-based activities of the mullahs, gives little evidence of real distinctions between tribal social organisation and motivation, and the activities of the mullahs. Mullahs participated in village based community living: trading, interacting and marrying within the clan unit. In almost all cases mullahs were ethnically Pakhtoon, and in many cases were originally from the clan that they served.
It is difficult to reconcile the moral and ‘judicial’ authority of the mullahs with the more ‘secular’ council or jirga that heard cases and punished the guilty on similar points of conduct if secular authority and religious authority are considered in opposition to each other. They must be understood as concurrent and overlapping realms that turned to each other for legitimisation. The mullah was participant in the tribal jirga and was often asked to dispense justice on the basis of the established and indisputable principles of Shari’a.5 The village mullah was participant in maliki and jirga management as he would attend jirgas, read prayers before, and finally approve the decisions of a jirga at the conclusion of a meeting. He was open to affect the decision making process and offer advice according to his assessment. The mullah could also himself initiate proceedings against an individual or suggest strategy towards other clans or the British by approaching the malik and clan jirga. Real distinctions between maliki and mullah authority are hard to identify, undermining the thesis that these were essentially conflicting and competing forms of authority. In an equitable exchange of support, mullahs confirmed maliki authority and the institutional integrity of the jirga while the maliks legitimised the mullah’s directives.
Religious authority affirmed and strengthened the structures and coalescences of the tribal structure in the politics of clan-tribe representation to the colonial authorities as well, demonstrating their engagement with not only the community practices but with the contemporary discourse and representation of the tribe.6 In addition, the long standing relationship between the Kabul court and the maliks of the eastern Pakhtoon regions fostered the engagement of the mullah with the tribal structure. The amirate would use the mullahs to rally the eastern Pakhtoon clans. Mullahs would identify and address the leaders of these communities, the maliks, and send them ahead to Kabul, Jalalabad or Kandahar as required to receive instructions and allowances, thereby strengthening both the profile and the finances of the maliks. Mullahs were not capable of undermining the social hierarchies and structures of tribal existence, as has been pointed out by many anthropologists, but it is important to note that they did not seek to do so.
Mullahs of the Akhund Ghaffur-Hadda Mullah line saw themselves as culturally engaged with Pakhtoon society and participant in pakhtoonwali, the unwritten cultural code of Pakhtoon tribesmen that held the preservation of honour and exacting of revenge as its primary social principles. The mutual affirmation, influence and
constraining of the mullahs and Pakhtoon tribal culture lay in the fact that mullahs acted as custodians of pakhtoonwali, and used their religious authority to pass binding judgements rooted in pakhtoonwali in the arena of the tribal jirga.7
‘Islamic inclinations and Pakhtoon culture’
‘Islamic inclinations and Pakhtoon culture’ came together in the definition and management of honour, crime, and morality.8 In situations where murder had been committed, mullahs would oversee the payment of blood money or put the murderers to death on the spot, as required under the tribal code.9 It should be noted that while the payment of blood money had historically been practiced in Muslim societies other than the frontier and was a generally accepted point of Shari’a, the mullahs advocated and supported many other uniquely tribal customs as long as they were not expressly forbidden in the Quran or hadith.
One important example of such a practice was the burning of the house and possessions of criminal offenders. In one particular instance, a murder committed by a member of the Gullai Mohmand clan undermined the truce that had been crafted by the Haji Turangzai. In response, Haji Turangzai raised a lashkar to burn down houses in the Gullai village and applied a fine that was payable by the clan as a whole.10
Despite this balancing of religious and cultural principles, and mullah and maliki authority, tensions did often arise where the application of religious precept by the mullah and the cultural practices preferred by the community could not be reconciled. In one case Mullah Babra demanded the execution of alleged rapists, but his proposed punishment was rejected by one of the clans involved.11 In many other instances, when the mullahs of the Hadda Mullah line enforced points of social reform ordained under amr bil maruf such as eliminating the payment of bride-price and forbidding dancing boys at weddings, the mullahs’ punishments were very unpopular and strongly criticised. These tussles between religious and cultural interpreters could go either way, depending on the resources and persuasiveness of the particular mullah involved and there were instances where clans entirely rejected the directives of mullahs. But it is incorrect to extrapolate that in such situations Islam retreated from the mainframe of society. Religious leadership was not merely spontaneous and opportunistic — the mullahs’ authority and agendas emerged from the social and political circumstances of the 20th-century Tribal Areas and were sustained by the combined will and efforts of the mullahs themselves. In situations where their directives were contested, the mullahs, like all other groups in the Tribal Areas, fought fiercely to protect their interests — sometimes succeeding and sometimes failing.
Notes:
1 Frederik Barth, Political Leadership among Swat Pakhtuns (London, 1965), P.17.
2 The most important of these is Christine Noelle’s unequalled work on the history of State and Tribe in Afghanistan, (see P.155). See also Louis Dupree, ‘Tribal Warfare in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Reflection of the Segmentary Lineage System.’ In Akbar Ahmed and David Hart, Islam in Tribal Societies (London, 1984), and Cherry Lindholm, ‘The Swat Pakhtun Family as a Political Training Ground’ in Charles Lindholm Frontier Perspectives (Karachi, 1996).
3 Akbar S. Ahmed, ‘Tribe and State in Waziristan’ in Richard Tapper, ed. The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London, 1983).
4 R. O. Christensen, ‘introduction’, in McMahon, Report on the Tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajour together with the Utman-Khel and Sam Ranizai (Peshawar, 1981).
5 Kasuri, Mushahidat, P.55. Kasuri claims the mullah was head of the village council — a claim not substantiated by any other accounts. His description makes at least this much clear: that the mullah was a fully integrated member of the village or clan-level council although he was not considered to be a blood member of the tribe itself.
6 In several instances, mullahs helped try to secure good terms of ‘settlement’ between the clan and the Political Agent. In one case the Faqir of Alingar wrote to the Political Officer Mohmand on ‘behalf’ of the Safi clan to allay tensions between the community and the authorities and to secure allowances for them. In a different sort of case, Mullah Mahmud Akhunzada started a massive campaign against the Shia Orakzai to punish them for asking the Deputy Commissioner Peshawar for territorial recognition and allowances as a tribe, trying to prevent them, as Shias and as adversaries of his own favoured clans, from getting this status. The Mullah Mahmud Akhunzada’s movement against the Shia Orakzai is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
7 This synchronicity has been examined by Nawid in Religious Responses, P.98 and Akbar S. Ahmed in ‘Religious Presence and Symbolism in Pakhtun Society’, Akbar Ahmed and David Hart eds., Islam in Tribal Societies (London, 1984).
8 Muhammad Dawi, an Afghan writer and poet, about the Mullah Sahib Chaknawar. Syal, Nomyali Ghazi, P.48.
9 In 1923 the Karbogha Mullah oversaw the execution of Wattizai murderers of members of the Koedad Khel clan. See NWFP PD, May 1923.
10 NWFP PD, March 9, 1918.
11 NWFP PD, diary 32, 1915.
