Revision as of 09:54, 10 October 2016

Covert missions: 1971- Aug 2016

Special forces of the Indian Army
The Times of India

Covert missions carried out by India, The Times of India 30 Sep, 2016

These are some past secret operations conducted by the Indian Army in the neighbourhood.

1971/ East Pakistan

Army closely collaborated with Mukti Bahini inside then East Pakistan in the build-up to the 1971 Bangladesh war. The operation has not been officially acknowledged.

19?? / Kashmir

Indian Special Forces and Ghatak platoons of infantry are known to conduct tactical ops across the LoC in Kashmir to cause small-scale damage and send a strong point across.

1995 Myanmar (Apr-May)

India and Myanmar (then Burma) conducted a joint military operation blocking around 200 NSCN, ULFA and KLO militants moving through the Myanmar-Mizoram border towards Manipur after picking up an arms consignment from Bangladesh.

2002/ Operation Parakram

Indian troops were engaged in limited action across the border a few times, for instance in 2002 during Operation Parakram

2003/ Bhutan

Operation All Clear, conducted inside Bhutan in December 2003 to eliminate Northeastern militant groups. Operation acknowledged by the government. About 30 militant camps, including ULFA, NDFB and KLO hideouts, were targeted, leading to 650 militants being "neutralised".

2006/ Myanmar (January)

India and Myanmar reportedly conducted joint military operations inside Myanmar, targeting NSCN (K) militants in exchange of transfer of some military equipment to Myanmar Army by India.

2011, July/ Operation Ginger

Vijaita Singh, Josy Joseph, Operation Ginger: Tit-for-tat across the Line of Control, The Hindu

Documents pertaining to the 2011 surgical strikes, code-named Operation Ginger, conducted by India across the LoC after a Pakistani attack on a remote Army post in Gugaldhar ridge in Kupwara claimed 6 soldiers.
From The Hindu

Documents pertaining to the 2011 surgical strikes, code-named Operation Ginger, conducted by India across the LoC after a Pakistani attack on a remote Army post in Gugaldhar ridge in Kupwara claimed 6 soldiers.
From The Hindu

Documents pertaining to the 2011 surgical strikes, code-named Operation Ginger, conducted by India across the LoC after a Pakistani attack on a remote Army post in Gugaldhar ridge in Kupwara claimed 6 soldiers.
From The Hindu

Documents pertaining to the 2011 surgical strikes, code-named Operation Ginger, conducted by India across the LoC after a Pakistani attack on a remote Army post in Gugaldhar ridge in Kupwara claimed 6 soldiers.
From The Hindu

Documents pertaining to the 2011 surgical strikes, code-named Operation Ginger, conducted by India across the LoC after a Pakistani attack on a remote Army post in Gugaldhar ridge in Kupwara claimed 6 soldiers.
From The Hindu

Over a few weeks in the summer of 2011, India and Pakistan staged two of the bloodiest cross-border surgical strikes in which at least 13 soldiers were killed, and six of them decapitated. Five of those heads were carried across the border as trophies — two to Pakistan and three to India.

Official documents, video and photographic evidence accessed by the The Hindu, chillingly capture the two cross-border raids and the brutality of the tit-for-tat cycle which seems far deadlier than what is publicly acknowledged.

Major General (retired) S.K. Chakravorty, who planned and executed the operation as the chief of Kupwara-based 28 Division, confirmed the raid to The Hindu.

However, he refused to discuss further details.

The Pakistani raiders struck a remote army post in Gugaldhar ridge in Kupwara, on the afternoon of July 30, 2011, surprising the six soldiers from the Rajput and Kumaon regiments. The 19 Rajput Battalion was to be replaced by 20 Kumaon around the time the Pakistani Border Action Team (BAT) struck. The attacking team took back the heads of Havildar Jaipal Singh Adhikari and Lance Naik Devender Singh of 20 Kumaon. A soldier of the 19 Rajput, who reported the attack, died later in a hospital.

Reconnaisance mission

In revenge, the Indian Army planned Operation Ginger, which would turn out to be one of the deadliest cross-border raids carried out by the Indian Army in recent memory.

To carry out the revenge attack at least seven reconnaissance — physical and air surveillance mounted on UAV — missions were carried out to identify potential targets.

Consequently, three Pakistani army posts were determined to be vulnerable: Police Chowki, a Pakistani army post near Jor, Hifazat and Lashdat lodging point. The mission was to spring an ambush on Police Chowki to inflict maximum casualty.

According to a secret report of the raid, accessed by this newspaper, different teams for ambush, demolition, surgical strike and surveillance were constituted following the Gugaldhar beheadings.

A few days after the beheading, Indian Army discovered a video clip from a Pakistani militant who was killed in an encounter while crossing into Kashmir, showing Pakistanis standing around the severed heads of Adhikari and Singh displayed on raised platform. The Hindu has a copy of the video.

After repeated recce over two months, the Army launched Operation Ginger on Tuesday, August 30. According to one of those involved in the operation, “We decided on Tuesday because in the past, including in Kargil war (of 1999) we always tasted victory on this day. We deliberately planned the operation just a day before the Eid as it was the time when Pakistanis least expected a retaliation,” he said.

For the strike, about 25 soldiers, mainly Para Commandos, reached their launch-pad at 3 a.m. on August 29 and hid there until 10 p.m. They then crossed over the Line of Control to reach close to Police Chowki. By 4 a.m. on August 30, the planned day of the attack, the ambush team was deep within the enemy territory waiting to strike.

Over the next hour, claymore mines were placed around the area and the commandos took positions for the ambush, waiting for clearance through secure communication route. At 7 a.m. on August 30, the troops saw four Pakistani soldiers, led by a Junior Commissioned Officer, walking towards the ambush site. They waited till the Pakistanis reached the site then detonated the mines. In the explosions all four were grieviously injured. Then the raiding commandoes lobbed grenades and fired at them.

One of the Pakistani soldiers fell into a stream that ran below. Indian soldiers rushed to chop off the heads of the other three dead soldiers. They also took away their rank insignias, weapons and other personal items. The commandos then planted pressure IED’s beneath one of the bodies, primed to explode when anyone attempted to lift the body.

Hearing the explosions, two Pakistani soldiers rushed from the post but were killed by a second Indian team waiting near the ambush site. Two other Pakistani army men tried to trap the second team but a third team covering them from behind eliminated the two, says an official report.

While the Indian soldiers were retreating, another group of Pakistani soldiers were spotted moving from Police Chowki towards the ambush site. Soon they heard loud explosions, indicating the triggering of the IEDs planted under the body, according to the report. According to assessment, at least two to three more Pakistani soldiers were killed in that blast.

The operation had lasted 45 minutes, and the Indian team left the area by 7.45 a.m. to head back across the LoC. The first team reached an Indian army post at 12 noon and the last party by 2.30 p.m.. They had been inside enemy territory for about 48 hours, including for reconnaissance. At least eight Pakistani troops had been killed and another two or three more Pakistani soldiers may have been fatally injured in the action. Three Pakistani heads — of Subedar Parvez, Havildar Aftab and Naik Imran — three AK 47 rifles and other weapons were among the trophies carried back by the Indian soldiers.

No traces

“But this was not without the heart pounding moments. We got a message on our secure line that one of our jawans accidentally fell on a mine and blew his finger while exfiltrating. Till the time you have seen the person, it was difficult to say what exactly could have happened. He came back safely with his buddies,” said the source.

The severed heads were photographed, and buried on the instructions of senior officers. Two days later, one of the senior most Generals in the command turned up and asked the team about the heads. “When he came to know that we had buried them, he was furious and asked us to dig up the heads, burn them and throw the ashes into the Kishenganga, so that no DNA traces are left behind. We did so,” said the source.

The sequence of events

Operation Ginger: What you need to know, October 9, 2016, The Hindu

July 30, 2011 - An Army post near LoC in Kupwara, comprising six men, is raided by Pakistani Army. Two personnel - Jaipal Singh Adhikari and Lance Naik Devender Singh are killed and beheaded. When they were about to behead the third personnel, a quick reaction team arrives and Pakistani Army fled with two heads. Immediately after this, Operation Ginger is planned. Three targets are chosen.

Sometime in August, Army recovers a mobile phone from a militant’s body, which contained a video clip where some jihadis and Pakistani Army personnel are seen dancing around the severed heads of Adhikari and Singh.

Army plans Operation Ginger for August 30, 2011, a day before Eid when Pakistan would be least expecting any retaliation.

Seven reconnaissance — physical and technical are carried out with the help of UAVs and human intelligence.

Three targets are chosen — Police Chowki near Jor, Hifazat and Lashdat lodging points across LoC in Kupwara.

It is decided to spring an ambush on Police chowki-Jor to inflict maximum casualty as it housed 40 Pakistani Army people.

August 29, 2011: Four teams leave for the Police Chowki, which is actually an Army post located 400 yards away from the LoC. The troops reach their launchpad at 3 am and stay put till 10 pm.

Around 12 midnight, the teams cross the LoC and take position metres away from the Police Chowki around 4 am.

From 4 am to 7 am, the teams fan out in different directions. They ring the area around the police chowki with claymore mines.

At 7 am, the troops observe four Pakistani soldiers walking towards the ambush site, they are trapped in the mines and fall down. Indian Army lobs grenades and opens fire at the four men. One of them is swept away after he fell down in a river stream flowing along. Anticipating immediate response from the Police Chowki, the team decapitated the three available bodies and collected the severed heads, weapons, mobile phones, insignias and their name badges.

To inflict more casualties, the team planted pressure IED’s beneath the bodies, which would have exploded had anyone lifted them.

Two Pakistani personnel who rushed from the police chowki, were killed by the another team waiting near the ambush site.

Two other Pakistani Army men tried to trap the demolition team, another special party waiting a little behind eliminated these two with small arms fire.

The operation lasted 45 minutes.

The first team came back at 12 noon and the last party reached by 2.30 pm.

In the meantime, the GOC 28 Infantry Division received a message that one of the jawans accidentally fell on a mine and injured his finger, he is the only one who has not returned. Finally at 6 pm, the jawan showed up.

Indian Army buries the severed heads of Pakistani Army men. It is then decided to burn the heads and flow them in Kishenganga river.

2011-14

Tactical level strikes were carried out on September 1, 2011, July 28, 2013, and January 14, 2014 Covert becomes overt: Congress spells out three strikes UPA carried out, Shubhajit Roy | New Delhi | Updated: October 6, 2016, Indian Express

Five Indian and three Pakistani soldiers were killed in a shooting between August 30 and September 1, 2011 across the Line of Control in Kupwara district/Neelum Valley.

The Congress on Monday claimed the UPA II, like the NDA government, had also conducted “surgical strikes” — but without making them public. The party listed three dates — September 1, 2011; July 28, 2013; and, January 14, 2014 — when the strikes took place. The Manmohan Singh government, known for its publicly stated policy of “strategic restraint”, was in power at the time.

While the strikes were not made public, a look at events around those dates offers some clues into what could have transpired.

September 1, 2011

Five Indian and three Pakistani soldiers were killed in a shooting between August 30 and September 1, 2011 across the Line of Control in Kupwara district/Neelum Valley. Both countries accused the other of initiating hostilities.

Pakistani media reports claimed fighting started when Indian security forces opened fire on a Pakistani checkpoint on the LoC in Neelum Valley in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Spokesman of the Inter Services Public Relations, Major General Athar Abbas, confirmed the incident while talking to BBC Urdu. He said the attack was unprovoked. He also claimed that three soldiers were going from one post to another when they got lost due to bad weather and, after a 24-hour search, their bodies were recovered.

But Lieutenant Colonel J S Brar, spokesman of the Indian Army, claimed that Pakistan had made an infiltration bid in Keran sector of J&K’s Kupwara district on August 30, which was foiled by Indian security forces.

Brar claimed that on the night of August 31, an Indian border post was fired at by Pakistani troops. Both sides exchanged fire for hours, leading to the casualties.

Prior to that incident, ties between the two countries had been on a mend. About six months earlier, the then PM Manmohan Singh had invited Pakistan PM Yousaf Raza Gilani to watch the Cricket World Cup final in Mohali, being played between India and Pakistan on March 30. A day before the meeting of the PMs, home secretaries from both countries were scheduled to meet to discuss the progress on the 26/11 terror probe.

Focus was also on economic ties. In April 2011, the commerce secretaries met in Islamabad. The thrust was on Pakistan granting the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India, and India removing the non-tariff barriers to Pakistani products.

In May, 2011, India released a list of 50 ‘Most Wanted Fugitives’ hiding in Pakistan, including Dawood Ibrahim and Hafiz Saeed, meant to pressure Pakistan after the killing of Osama bin Laden in his compound in Abbottabad. But after two errors were discovered on the list, the CBI removed it from their website pending a review and the Pakistani interior ministry rejected it altogether.

July 28, 2013

On July 27, a Pakistan Army soldier was reportedly killed and another seriously injured in “unprovoked” firing by Indian troops from across the LoC, Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper reported. According to Pakistan Army’s ISPR wing, the incident took place on Rawlakot’s Nezapir sector near the LoC.

The Pakistani foreign office strongly condemned the shooting, saying it was “unfortunate that such an incident should have taken place at a time when the two governments are making sincere efforts towards improving relations”. But the Indian Army blamed Pakistani troops for violating ceasefire.

Later, on the night of July 30, 2013, there were reports that four Pakistani men were killed near Katwar post in India. India said the men were “intruders” and “militants”, but Pakistan disputed that claim and said the men were “local civilians” plucking herbs and had strayed close to the LoC when they were abducted by Indian soldiers.

The year 2013 had started on a tense note. On January 8, 2013, Pakistan Army’s Border Action Team, wearing black combat uniforms, crossed the LoC and ambushed an Indian Army patrol team, killing two soldiers of the 13 Rajputana Rifles and injuring two others. The skirmish reportedly lasted about 30 minutes, after which the intruders retreated from Indian territory. Two soldiers were killed and their bodies were reportedly found mutilated, with one decapitated.

All through 2013, diplomatic talks between the two countries could not move forward because of the tense atmosphere.

January 14, 2014

On January 13, 2014, the then Army Chief General Bikram Singh said that a strong reply had been given to last year’s cross-border raids by Pakistan, referring to reports that 10 Pakistani soldiers had been killed in Indian action across the LoC.

Asked what retaliatory action had been taken, the Army Chief said that soldiers “have reacted well as required” and that there is an endeavour “not to escalate the situation into operational or strategic arena”.

“It depends, if rules are followed by our neighbours, we follow the rules. If rules are broken, then obviously we cannot stick to the rules. Even we are going to break the rules,” Singh had said.

Two days after January 14, 2014, Pakistan’s commerce minister Khurram Dastgir Khan visited India and met the then commerce minister Anand Sharma, and the two sides agreed to expedite the implementation of the liberal trade regime.

About three weeks earlier, the Directors General of Military Operation had met in Wagah after 14 years — their first meeting since the 1999 Kargil war. Coming at the end of a year that saw an unprecedented number of cross-border violations since the 2003 ceasefire agreement came into place, the meeting was seen as an effort to normalise the relationship.

During the meeting, the Indian side had strongly raised the issue of at least two cross-border raids that resulted in the death of seven Indian soldiers and also conveyed that it does not expect a repeat of 2013 that saw over 195 ceasefire violations on the LoC. DGMO Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia and Pakistan’s Maj Gen Aamer Riaz also decided to hold two flag meetings between the Brigade Commanders on the LoC.

The meeting of the two DGMOs was aimed at reducing tension on the border and had been agreed upon in September, 2013 — when the then PM Manmohan Singh met his counterpart Nawaz Sharif at the UN in New York.

2013/ ? on the LOC (January)

Jyoti Malhotra, Across The Thin Line, Sep 30 2016 : The Times of India

[In 2016] none other than former army chief, Gen Bikram Singh, has come on record to say that such strikes by Indian soldiers have taken place in the past as well, including in the wake of the decapitation of two Indian soldiers in January 2013 when Manmohan Singh's UPA was in power.

The difference [in 2016 was] that [PM] Modi made a political call to own the cross-LoC strikes. In 2013, no one knew that such a strike had even taken place.

2015/ Myanmar (June)

Indian Army's strike inside Myanmar took 70 commandos and 40 minutes to kill 38 Naga insurgents.

2016/ Myanmar border (Aug) 'Surgical strike' against NSCN (K)

Rajat Pandit | TNN | Aug 20, 2016, The Times of India 'Surgical strike' inside Myanmar by Army?

• A major gun battle took place between Army troops and suspected NSCN (K) militants along the India-Myanmar border

• The militants fled back into Myanmar leaving some weapons behind

MON (Nagaland): A major gunbattle took place between Army troops and suspected National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) militants along the India-Myanmar border, in the Mon district of Nagaland, on Friday. Unconfirmed media reports said at least 30 Indian paratroopers had conducted a "surgical strike" inside Myanmar, and quoted the NSCN-K+ as claiming that it had killed "five to six" commandos. However, Army sources rejected the reports and said the gunbattle took place inside Indian territory .

The fierce encounter took place near Throilu village in Mon district on "our side of the border" at about 5.30am, said Army sources. "Our troops had laid an ambush along a known infiltration route. After the ensuing gunfight, the militants fled back into Myanmar. They left some weapons behind. There were no casualties on our side," said a source.

In June last year+ , days after militants had killed 18 Army soldiers, Indian special forces had conducted a surgical military strike across the Myanmar border to inflict "significant casualties" on the groups behind that ambush, NSCN (K) and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL). Soldiers of Assam Rifles and NSCN(K) cadres exchanged heavy fire at about 4am near Chenmoho in Nagaland's Mon district, which shares its eastern border with Myanmar, state police said on Friday.

"There was heavy exchange of fire between NSCN (K) cadres and Assam Rifles soldiers. The incident was reported early in the morning. As of now, no casualties have been reported," Yangba Konyak, SP (Mon), was quoted as saying by news agencies. Sources said senior officials had reached the spot for stock-taking. NSCN(K) is a banned militant outfit which last March abrogated a 14-year-old ceasefire with the Centre.

Why covert operations should stay covert

Why these military ops should stay covert by Manimugdha Sharma The Times of India

Surgical strikes in enemy territory have always been kept a secret by Indian forces

Military historian and strategic affairs expert Mandeep Singh Bajwa said he could count at least two dozen instances [between 1947 and May 2015] when India struck inside enemy territory . “[That is] how militancy in Punjab ended and how it was curbed in Kashmir,” says Bajwa.

1971

In 1971, some very large-scale covert and overt operations were conducted without the Press hearing about it. One of them was Operation Jackpot under which Mukti Bahini commandos were aided and abetted by India to blow up Pakistan's naval assets in the east. This was long before the actual war. “Even before that, there was Operation Windfall where we silently moved two mountain divisions, one towards Balurghat and the other towards Jessore and Khulna. Initially, troops went across in civilian clothes, then in uniform. Pakistanis were completely outclassed and outsmarted by the Indians. That's how wars are fought and won,“ says Bajwa.

The late 1980s, 1990s

“When Pakistan started supporting the Khalistan movement and there were terror attacks on our cities, Rajiv Gandhi decided he had had enough of it. Pakistani cities like Lahore, Multan and Karachi were bombed, which Pakistan claimed were done by RAW . This forced General Zia to sue for peace through the Prince of Jordan and promise withdrawal of support to Sikh militancy ,“ says Bajwa.

His claims are supported by historian Dilip Hiro's 2015 book, The Longest August, which goes on to detail how Benazir Bhutto, after coming to power, promised Rajiv Gandhi that she would totally dismantle the Khalistan support system in Pakistan, triggering the total collapse of the separatist movement.

2000

“Similarly, in Kashmir, terrorism has been curbed through both overt and covert operations. Pakistan blamed India for the 2000 Lanjote massacre, which India denied. But after that, attacks on Hindus in Doda and Rajouri districts stopped,“ says Bajwa.

Uri: Sept 2016 reprisals for attack on

The sequence of events

Indian Army's Sept 2016 operation: the sequence of events
The Times of India

Indian Army's covert operations, 1971-2016: Continued below…
The Times of India

( Continued from above…) Indian Army's covert operations, 1971-2016
The Times of India

Indian Army's Sept 2016 operation: Planning
The Times of India

Indian Army's Sept 2016 operation: Planning
The Times of India

Indian Army's reprisals on 29 Sept 2016 for the attack at Uri
The Times of India

Rajat Pandit, Pak Crossed The Line, India Crosses LoC, Sep 30 2016 : The Times of India

PAYBACK FOR URI: In `Surgical Strikes', Army Hits 7 Terror Launchpads In PoK On A Dim-Moon Night, Kills 40-55

In a stunning reprisal for the Uri terror attack [on Sept 18, 2016], India conducted “surgical strikes“ on seven terrorist “launch pads“ across the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in the early hours of [29 Sept 2016] . Top government sources said that it was “not possible to immediately quantify“ the number of terrorists killed in the strikes carried out by crack Para-Special Forces who simultaneously hit five launchpads located 1.5-6.5 km inside PoK. “According to an initial estimate, as many as 40 to 55 terrorists were killed. But it will take some time to arrive at the approximate number of casualties after the Para-SF teams are properly de-briefed and photographs and videos analysed,“ said a source.

Unlike earlier engagements, the government and the Army boldly proclaimed they had undertaken a big operation across the LoC and justified it by citing an imminent terror threat.

Director General of Military Operation Lt Gen Ranbir Singh along with home minister Rajnath Singh and NSA Ajit Doval told leaders that around 200 soldiers were involved in the operation.

This marked the abandonment of “strategic restraint“: The doctrine which eschewed use of military reprisals for fear of a nuclear conflict and its replacement by a posture of effective military retribution and, more crucially , of pre-emption. It was a stark announcement that the fear of a nuclear showdown has ceased to be a deterrent for India The DGMO justified the action by citing “specific and credible' inputs of terrorist teams positioning themselves at launch pads at LoC “to carry out infiltration and conduct terrorist strikes inside J&K and in various metros“.

Disclosing that he had called his Pakistan counterpart to inform him of the raids, Gen Singh asserted that while the action had ceased, India could undertake similar operations whenever faced with threat to its nationals.

The action came against the clamour for reprisal and mounting pressure on the Modi government to walk its “tough-on-terror“ talk. But while BJP and the government has reason to celebrate, the tough response passed muster with the entire political class, with even opponents who accused Modi government for being `hawkish' applauding the feat of Army and pledging support: a development which could lead to setting of a new benchmark for response to Pakistan-backed terrorism.

The raids, coming a day after Pakistan defence minister Mohammad Khwaja's threat to nuke India, caught Islamabad unawares. It denied the strikes, but soon came around to accept that two of its soldiers had been killed and nine injured in “cross-border firing“. Its different power centres reacted differently, with the Army seeking to downplay the embarrassment, and the civilian leadership warning against more such adventures.

The covert Para-SF raids on the five launch pads were backed by “concentrated fire assaults“ to target two other launch pads -each typically has 10-20 terrorists, 4-5 guides and 5-10 assistants -and three Pakistan army posts across the LoC. The pads are used by terrorists just prior to crossing the LoC and never for more than a couple of days at a time.

After the five teams of 200 commandos from 4 Paras-SF and 9 Para-SF units returned safely after “achieving the desired full impact“ before sunrise on Thursday , Lt-Gen Singh also spoke to his Pakistani counterpart to inform him that the “operations aimed at neutralising terrorists“ had ended.

After UAVs and other intelligence gave “specific and credible inputs“ about the presence of terrorists being positioned at the launch pads kept under constant surveillance for the last few days, the Para-SF teams were directed to spring into action just after “last light“ on Wednesday .Carrying heavy weapon loads, they quietly slipped across the LoC around midnight to finally reach the launch pads by around 3am, skirting Pakistan army posts at altitudes ranging from 2,000 to 6,000 feet, said sources.

The commandos then let loose with all the firepower at their command, finishing their designated tasks by around 4.30am. Nine of them were injured, one slightly seriously in a mine blast. “But they do not leave their comrades behind... all safely made it back to our side before sunrise. Towards the end, Pakistan Army did indulge in some speculative firing but there were no casualties. During the entire operation, the Army and IAF were on high alert for any intervention or extrication mission if the need arose,“ said the source.

Convincing Pakistan’s friends

Indrani Bagchi, How Delhi built its case with Islamabad's friends Sep 30 2016 : The Times of India

India's preemptive strikes across the LoC were more than a military operation. The tightly-scripted action was to rework the framework of engagement with Pakistan, while the overt acknowledgement was necessary for the domestic audience.

The government laid out the ground in the preceding days, briefing key countries about the spike in infiltration and mounting evidence gathered by India including captured terrorists. These included the P-5 countries and key nations such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE, all Pakistan allies. China was briefed during the Sept 27 counterterrorism dialogue.

The Indian line that the strike came after intelligence pointed to an imminent large-scale strike may have been intended more for the domestic constituency . However, the government expects some degree of retaliation by Pakistan.

The next step was to mount a diplomaticpolitical offensive, which included giving information to the Pak envoy and responding to its invective in the UN.

Modi's Kerala speech lulled people into thinking proactive diplomacy would be all India would do but more robust actions followed this week -cornering Pakistan on Indus Waters Treaty and cancelling the Saarc summit. India is now expected to review the MFN status accorded to Pakistan and restricting Pakistan's use of Indian airspace.

DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh described the strikes as being “along the LoC“ but anybody looking at the targets, terrorist launch pads, is aware they are across the LoC. One of the DGMO's first actions was to inform his counterpart of the strike, clarify it was a oneoff and express sympathy for deaths of Pak soldiers stressing the intent was to go after terror camps. The strike was pitched as a counter-terror op, not a military operation, giving Pakistan reason to resist calls for retaliatory escalation.

After the strikes, national security adviser Ajit Doval called his US counterpart, Susan Rice.The White House readout later said Ambassador Rice “strongly condemned“ the attack in Uri.

Before going public, the government briefed the President, vice-president, former PM Manmohan Singh and the J&K leadership.Foreign secretary S Jaishankar later briefed foreign journalists, 28 envoys, think tanks and TV commentators.

Planning the operation

30 Sep, 2016 Surgical strikes across LoC: Planning the operation, The Times of India

It took the Indian Army 10 days to avenge the terror attack on its Uri camp. This is how events unfolded:

September 18

Terror attack on Uri Army camp, 19 soldiers killed, over 20 injured.

September 20

PM Modi briefed with detailed maps and sand models in military ops directorate with Army chief Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag and Northern Command chief Lt-Gen D S Hooda.

September 27

PM gives go-ahead for surgical strikes after another briefing in MO Directorate.

Constant Surveillance

• Army had 7 launch pads, 1.5km to 6.5km across LoC, under constant surveillance through spy drones.

• Launch pads are shelters from where infiltration bids are made.

• Terrorists belonging to multiple groups assemble here typically for 24-48 hours before trying to cross over.

• Each launch pad has 10-20 terrorists, 4-5 guides & 5-10 support people at any given time.

Cartosat images

• Army put to use Isro’s Cartosat images for the first time.

• Cartosat-2C added teeth to India’s military surveillance capabilities.

• It’s been providing high-resolution images of 0.65m, an improvement over the 0.8m resolution of earlier missions.

'Area of Interest' images

AOI images, which are taken from space and are corrected to a uniform scale, proved useful to the Army.

September 28

Soon after terrorists were spotted at the launch pads, five ParaSpecial Forces teams (150 para-commandos) were given the go-ahead to strike designated targets Wednesday afternoon.

First major use of Cartosat images for Army

India's Cartostat advantage
The Times of India

Chethan Kumar | TNN | Sep 30, 2016Surgical Strikes: First major use of Cartosat images for Army

• The surgical strike was facilitated by Isro's Cartosat images

• Cartosat images are called ‘eye in the sky’

• This satellite can click pictures of areas of interest, record videos of sensitive targets from space, compress it, and relay it back to earth

Surgical Strikes: First major use of Cartosat images for Army

BENGALURU: In what's being described as the first major use of the Cartosat family of satellites, the last one (2c) launched in June this year, sources in Isro said that the armed forces were aided by high-resolution images for the surgical strikes+ conducted across the line of control+ (LoC) in the small hours of Thursday.

A source in Isro said: "We've been providing images to the armed forces, the army in particular. While I cannot comment if any specific image was sent on a particular day in the previous week, I can say that Cartosat images are meant for this purpose and the army has used this."

Both Isro and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) have largely remained tight-lipped about the uses of the Cartosat family of satellites—which experts call India's 'eye in the sky'—built for dual use.

The Cartosat-2C in particular added more teeth to India's military surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and has been providing high resolution images of 0.65 metres, an improvement over the 0.8m resolution of the earlier missions.

"Cartosat also provided Area of Interest (AOI) based images for the armed forces," the source said. Another explained that based on requests, one or more scenes/images covering the AOI as specified is provided in as a single polygon (all the areas in one circle) in the form of a shapefile (non-topological geometry and attribute information for the spatial features).

According to the National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) in Hyderabad, AOI products are of two types—standard and precision-based ortho (where images taken from space are corrected to have an uniform scale—both of which are useful for the armed forces. Ortho rectified products are corrected for terrain distortions and camera tilt effects.

While the first Cartosat was launched in 2005, Cartosat-2A launched in 2007 was the first dual-use satellite with capabilities of monitoring missile launches in India's neighbourhood.

And, the Cartosat-2C is the best in the class that India boasts of although countries like the US and Israel boast of better ones. This satellite can not only click pictures of areas of interest, but also record videos of sensitive targets from space, compress it, and relay it back to earth.

Inadvertent corroboration by POK police

Pak army caught by surprise, lost 5 men, POK cop reveals in sting op, Oct 06 2016 : The Times of India

A senior officer of Pakistan police has purportedly admitted that India pulled off a surgical strike across the LoC last week, an Indian TV channel claimed on Wednesday .

According to a CNN-News 18 report, the police officer was given the impression that he was speaking to a senior cop, while actually talking to a journalist, and recorded, as part of a sting operation.

Ghulam Akbar, SP (special branch) of the Mirpur range in POK, reportedly began rattling off details about the events of September 29 and confirmed the claims made by India. “Sir, that was night...you can say roughly 3-4 hours... between 2am and 4 or 5am... the attack continued between that time,“ Akbar reportedly said.

He is heard purportedly confirming that India had struck at terror launch pads in areas, like Leepa, mentioned in reports on the attack. Akbar identifies areas that he “personally knew“ were attacked that night -Samana in Bhimber, Hazira in Poonch, Dudhniyal in Neelam, and Kayani in Hathian Bala.

Akbar is heard stating that the Pakistan army was caught unawares and lost five soldiers, whose names were re vealed but not broadcast by the channel, and that the bodies of an unknown number of terrorists were quickly removed by the Pakistani military . He said Pakistan army personnel put the bodies in ambulances and took them away , adding that many had been buried in villages. He said policemen “are evaluating the coffin boxes“.

The SP added that the Pakistan army cordoned off the aforementioned areas after the surgical strike.

In another revelation that could put Pakistan in a spot, Akbar also purported ly revealed that the Pakistan army facilitated the movement of jihadis in forward areas and arranges for their infiltration into India. “The army brings them, sir...it is in their hands,“ he is heard saying, and that he can't “give accurate numbers because the Pakistan army protects the jihadi infrastructure from even the local authorities and police.