Indian Army: History (1947- )
This is a collection of articles archived for the excellence of their content. |
Contents |
Covert operations
Why these military ops should stay covert by Manimugdha Sharma The Times of India
Surgical strikes in enemy territory have always been kept a secret by Indian forces
Military historian and strategic affairs expert Mandeep Singh Bajwa said he could count at least two dozen instances [between 1947 and May 2015] when India struck inside enemy territory .
“[That is] how militancy in Punjab ended and how it was curbed in Kashmir,” says Bajwa.
1971
In 1971, some very large-scale covert and overt operations were conducted without the Press hearing about it. One of them was Operation Jackpot under which Mukti Bahini commandos were aided and abetted by India to blow up Pakistan's naval assets in the east. This was long before the actual war. “Even before that, there was Operation Windfall where we silently moved two mountain divisions, one towards Balurghat and the other towards Jessore and Khulna. Initially, troops went across in civilian clothes, then in uniform. Pakistanis were completely outclassed and outsmarted by the Indians. That's how wars are fought and won,“ says Bajwa.
The late 1980s, 1990s
“When Pakistan started supporting the Khalistan movement and there were terror attacks on our cities, Rajiv Gandhi decided he had had enough of it. Pakistani cities like Lahore, Multan and Karachi were bombed, which Pakistan claimed were done by RAW . This forced General Zia to sue for peace through the Prince of Jordan and promise withdrawal of support to Sikh militancy ,“ says Bajwa.
His claims are supported by historian Dilip Hiro's 2015 book, The Longest August, which goes on to detail how Benazir Bhutto, after coming to power, promised Rajiv Gandhi that she would totally dismantle the Khalistan support system in Pakistan, triggering the total collapse of the separatist movement.
2000
“Similarly, in Kashmir, terrorism has been curbed through both overt and covert operations. Pakistan blamed India for the 2000 Lanjote massacre, which India denied. But after that, attacks on Hindus in Doda and Rajouri districts stopped,“ says Bajwa.
2016: Army's Command Exit model
The Times of India, Feb 15, 2016
Army's command exit model cleared by Supreme Court, younger officers can now lead combat
Amit Anand Choudhary
The Supreme Court upheld Army's command exit model for lowering the age profile and consequent creation of additional vacancies of 1484 posts of Colonel saying that the policy change was in public interest to make the force more efficient. A bench of Chief Justice TS Thakur and Justice Kurian Joseph, however, directed the Centre to create 141 additional posts of colonel for combat support stream but turned down the plea to extend the benefit to Army Service Corps. The model was put in force in 2009 on the recommendations of AV Singh Committee which said that age of Colonels, who command a battalion comprising 800-odd soldiers, was a little over 40 years while the same for Pakistan and Chinese armies was 37 years. It had recommended a command-and-exit policy by which colonels would serve as battalion commanders for two to three years and exit to a non-command post by the time they reach the age of 40. To bring down the age to 37 years, it had recommended creation of an additional posts for colonels.
Upholding the policy, the bench said that the command exit model is "laudable" and intended to make Army more efficient and better equipped for combat situations. "There is nothing perverse, unreasonable or unfair about the policy that the age of officers serving in Combat Arms and Combat Arms Support will be lowered by creating additional vacancies to be allotted on Command Exit Model," the bench said. Army comprises three streams — Combat Arms, Combat Support Arms and Services — but the creation of additional posts was not made in the Services stream, compelling the officers to challenge the policy before Armed Forces Tribunal on the ground being discriminatory. Allowing the plea, the tribunal in March last year quashed the policy.
The Centre thereafter approached the Supreme Court which stayed the operation of the order. Additional solicitor general Maninder Singh told the apex court that the policy was in the larger interest of national security and it did not violate any right of the officers belonging to Services. The Centre during the hearing had also agreed to create additional 141 posts for Combat Arms Support. Agreeing with his contention, the Supreme Court allowed Centre's appeal. "We partly allow these appeals and while setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal direct that the appellants shall create 141 additional posts of colonel to be allocated to combat support stream," the court said. "We have, in that view, no hesitation in holding that there was neither any recommendation regarding reduction in age profile of unit commanders in services nor was there any recommendation for creation of additional vacancies to benefit officers serving in those formations," it said.
1987: ‘A coup was planned,’ Lt Gen Hoon
The Times of India, Oct 04 2015
Ajay Sura
Army had plotted to topple Rajiv govt in 1987: Retd Gen
Lt Gen P N Hoon, a former Army commander of the prestigious Western Command, has claimed there was a plot to topple Rajiv Gandhi's government in 1987. He has also claimed that three crack para-commando battalions, including one from the Western Command, were told to move for action in Delhi.
The 86-year-old Hoon, who joined BJP in December 2013 as adviser, defence and security, has alleged that the then Army chief, General KrishnaswamiSundarji, and Lt Gen S F Rodrigues, the vice chief who went on to become Army chief, were involved in the plot. Hoon hints in his just-released book, `The Untold Truth', that the plan for a coup was hatched at the behest of certain very senior politicians who did not share cordial relations with Rajiv . The Lt Gen states that at his farewell function in 1987 hosted by then Punjab governor Siddharth Shankar Ray in Chandigarh, GianiZail Singh had blamed Gandhi of corruption and negligence. Singh also said Rajiv was unconcerned about the 1984 anti-Sikh riots.
Hoon has claimed that as chief of the Western Command in May-June 1987, he was in Delhi on official work when he received a message that a letter had been received at command headquarters from army HQ seeking three paracommando battalions. The battalions included the First-Para Commando, which was under the Western Command, and the 9th and 10th Para Commando, which were under the Northern and Southern Commands. According to Hoon, these three battalions were ordered to be placed under Rodrigues.He said he immediately briefed Rajiv and his principal secretary Gopi Arora about the development and showed them the letter. “I also explained to them how dangerous this move could be, not only for the country , but also for our political system,“ Hoon said. He claims to have ordered the Delhi area commander, under the Western Com mand, not to move any troops without his permission. Hoon, who retired in October 1987, states that one minister in Rajiv's Cabinet, V C Shukla, was aware about the possibility of Army action. In Chapter 10, titled `GianiZail Singh vs Rajiv Gandhi', he says Shukla specially came down to Chandimandir to meet him. Hoon, however, concluded that Zail Singh didn't take any action against Rajiv's government fearing that it would lead to transfer of power from a democratically elected government to the armed forces.
Air Marshal Randhir Singh, a veteran of many wars, disagrees with Hoon and says there's never been any attempt at a military coup.Terming it Gen Hoon's “own perception,“ Colonel K S Pathak, a veteran and one of the founders of the special forces, says there may have been mobilization of troops in Delhi but it was for other reasons.
2012: Non-Notified Movement by Army Unit
From the archives of The Times of India
Late Jan 16 night, intel agencies report non-notified movement by a key military unit from mechanised infantry based in Hisar This is part of Mathurabased 1 Corps, commanded by Lt Gen A K Singh Column moves towards Delhi, 150 km away This is the day Gen VK Singh moved SC on his DoB Lookouts alerted. Standard protocol since 1984, when Sikh units mutineers advanced on Delhi after Op Bluestar. Lookouts confirm movement of an entire unit of mechanised Infantry with armoured vehicles mounted on 48 tank transporters Concern, as no such movement notified. Further, Army Day celebrations had ended on Jan15
Worse, reports of another movement of a large element of Agra-based 50 Para Brigade towards Delhi Lookout activated south of Delhi. Columns put under lens Defence minister informed. Centre activates contingency plan. Terror alert issued. Police told to check vehicles on highways leading to Delhi to slow traffic Defence secy Shashi Kant Sharma told to cut short Malaysia visit Sharma reaches office late at night, tells DGMO Lt Gen AK Chaudhary to explain Lt Gen Chaudhary calls it a routine exercise. Paras under his direct command DGMO told to return with full facts on mechanized unit movement He explains mechanized unit checking ability to deploy quickly during fog DGMO told to send back both columns immediately Mechanised unit was in Bahadurgarh near Najafgarh. The Paras were off Palam PM informed early on January 17
ARMY’S EXPLANATION
Mechanized unit checking out ability to move fast in fog Couldn’t have headed towards Ferozepur, Pak would have panicked Agra-based Paras checking feasibility of being transported by road to marry with Hercules C 130J transport planes stationed at Hindon Army says it found glitches during Paras exercise, such as missiles stored in Bharatpur Para columns had to take detour, stop at Bharatpur to pick up missiles
UNANSWERED
Why did the columns have to drive to Delhi outskirts to test readiness? The route Paras took strange. They parked themselves at Palam. The route to Hindon from Palam—Outer Ring Road, NH-24—too congested Ideally, they should’ve crossed Yamuna at Agra, driven parallel to GT Road If the idea was to marry with C 130J jets, IAF should’ve known The C 130Js were not even at Hindon that day Between Jan 15 and Jan 26, capital full with army units for R-Day. Normally, such exercises avoided during this time Why was DGMO not in the know of unit movement? If these movements were part of routine, what was the need to stop them? Why was the defence minstry not in the know?
Myanmar border
2016: 'Surgical strike' against NSCN (K)
Rajat Pandit | TNN | Aug 20, 2016, The Times of India 'Surgical strike' inside Myanmar by Army?
- A major gun battle took place between Army troops and suspected NSCN (K) militants along the India-Myanmar border
- The militants fled back into Myanmar leaving some weapons behind
MON (Nagaland): A major gunbattle took place between Army troops and suspected National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) militants along the India-Myanmar border, in the Mon district of Nagaland, on Friday. Unconfirmed media reports said at least 30 Indian paratroopers had conducted a "surgical strike" inside Myanmar, and quoted the NSCN-K+ as claiming that it had killed "five to six" commandos. However, Army sources rejected the reports and said the gunbattle took place inside Indian territory .
The fierce encounter took place near Throilu village in Mon district on "our side of the border" at about 5.30am, said Army sources. "Our troops had laid an ambush along a known infiltration route. After the ensuing gunfight, the militants fled back into Myanmar. They left some weapons behind. There were no casualties on our side," said a source.
In June last year+ , days after militants had killed 18 Army soldiers, Indian special forces had conducted a surgical military strike across the Myanmar border to inflict "significant casualties" on the groups behind that ambush, NSCN (K) and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL). Soldiers of Assam Rifles and NSCN(K) cadres exchanged heavy fire at about 4am near Chenmoho in Nagaland's Mon district, which shares its eastern border with Myanmar, state police said on Friday.
"There was heavy exchange of fire between NSCN (K) cadres and Assam Rifles soldiers. The incident was reported early in the morning. As of now, no casualties have been reported," Yangba Konyak, SP (Mon), was quoted as saying by news agencies. Sources said senior officials had reached the spot for stock-taking. NSCN(K) is a banned militant outfit which last March abrogated a 14-year-old ceasefire with the Centre.
Suicide rate among soldiers
From the archives of The Times of India
Rajat Pandit
Suicides, fragging claim more jawans than terrorists’ bullets
Now, over four times more soldiers die battling their internal demons rather than fighting militants in Kashmir or the northeast. Stress-related deaths in the shape of suicides and “fragging” show no sign of flagging in the Army, with the toll alarmingly crossing the 100 mark year after year. Consider the shocking figures. Just since 2001, 1,082 soldiers have committed suicide in the Army’s highly disciplined environs, while another 73 have died of fragging (to kill a fellow soldier) episodes. While 102 soldiers took the extreme step of ending their lives last year, 26 have died this year so far. The situation is not much better in IAF, with over 20 airmen committing suicide every year. Navy is the best off, with its annual suicide cases remaining in single digits. Disclosing the latest figures in Rajya Sabha on Wednesday, defence minister A K Antony said, “Possible causative factors for soldiers committing suicide/fatricide are stress, personal problems and financial problems.’’ “The government has taken several steps, like counselling, improvement in food and clothing, married accommodation, leave concessions, facilities for movement of troops from border areas and a grievance redressal mechanism in states,” he added. But the measures do not seem to be working, even as the yearly tolls due to terrorism and road accidents have been brought under control over the last few years. Just 24 soldiers, for instance, were killed in action while fighting terrorists in J&K last year. With the Army establishing “clear-cut ascendancy’’ in counter-infiltration and insurgency operations, the death toll of security forces has steadily declined since a high of over 300 in 2004. On the stress-related front, the MoD-Army combine has got a fresh “psycho-social analytical study” done by the Defence Institute of Psychological Research (DIPR). “The aim is to arrive at the tools to identify and spot the “at risk” soldiers. Two studies, one an impact analysis of counter-insurgency vis-à-vis peace areas and the other a psychological autopsy of suicides over the last three years, are being analyzed after being handed over to Antony,” said a source.
Army dogs
The Times of India, Jan 15 2016
Army dogs in R-Day parade after 26 years
Regal horses of the President's Bodyguards and BSF camels will have stiff competition in grabbing eyeballs during the Republic Day parade in 2016.A contingent of Army dogs will march smartly down the majestic Rajpath. Thirty-six German Shepherds and Labradors, along with their handlers, will constitute the Army dog contingent at the January 26 parade, marking the return of the canines to the annual event after 1990“They will just march past and not perform tricks,“ said an official. A contingent of Army dogs will take part in the Republic Day parade after 26 years. The Army currently has around 1,200 sniffer dogs, which are primarily used for “guard duties and tracking and detection of explosives and mines“ during counter-insurgency operations in J&K and the northeast, after being trained in the Remount and Veterinary Corps (RVC) Centre and College at Meerut. The dogs and their trainers have won one Shaurya Chakra, six Sena Medals, 142 COAS commendation cards, six VCOAS commendation cards and 448 GOC-in-C commendation cards over the years. The stellar role played by the canines was reinforced in August 2015 when Mansi, a four-year-old Labrador, and her Kashmiri master Bashir Ahmed War from the Territorial Army had made the supreme sacrifice while gallantly fighting a group of heavilyarmed infiltrators in the high-altitude Tangdhar area along the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K. The Army had also in 2015 scrapped its “humane euthanasia“ policy after it was found that it had “disposed of “ almost 2,000 horses, mules and dogs, who had outlived their active service in the force, over a three-year period.While a final policy is yet to be finalised, the Army has stopped the practice of killing of ageing animals, except for thosesuffering from incurable diseases and injuries.
