International Court of Justice and India

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=Indian judges in the ICJ=
 
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The study found Greenwood worked as an arbitrator in at least nine investment arbitration cases during his tenure at ICJ. He was paid more than $400,000 in fees in two of those nine cases. More than $1 million in fees was paid to ICJ judges in nine of the 90 such cases compiled by ISSD. ICJ president Ronny Abraham and five past presidents were among the 20 current and former judges who worked as arbitrators during their term.
 
The study found Greenwood worked as an arbitrator in at least nine investment arbitration cases during his tenure at ICJ. He was paid more than $400,000 in fees in two of those nine cases. More than $1 million in fees was paid to ICJ judges in nine of the 90 such cases compiled by ISSD. ICJ president Ronny Abraham and five past presidents were among the 20 current and former judges who worked as arbitrators during their term.
  
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===The Diplomatic Win: how India pulled it off===
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA]]
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[https://epaper.timesgroup.com/Olive/ODN/TimesOfIndia/shared/ShowArticle.aspx?doc=TOIDEL/2021/09/25&entity=Ar02402&sk=815E053E&mode=text  Sep 25, 2021: ''The Times of India'']
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA]]
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India’s re-election in 2017 to the International Court of Justice was described by PM Narendra Modi as a proud moment for the country. Syed Akbaruddin, Permanent Representative to the UN then, spoke to Sachin Parashar about his upcoming book ‘India vs UK: The Story of an Unprecedented Diplomatic Win’, which reveals how India pulled it off:
[[Category:Law,Constitution,Judiciary|I  
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA]]
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''' India’s ICJ victory was described as a humiliating blow to UK’s standing. What made it possible? '''
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Our delayed decision to contest, a year later than other countries, made us realise that we had to raise our game to stay in the contest. Our political leaders, too, understood that they needed to pitch in. So while our diplomats worked globally, our leaders, from the PM to the external affairs ministers, did a lot of quiet diplomacy. That played a crucial but not very visible role.
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''' You reveal that US diplomats lobbied against India, and stopped only after you complained to ambassador Nikki Haley. Tell us more. '''
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The US establishment, if I may put it that way, made every effort to stop India from ‘disrupting’ 70 years of established practice. They targeted about 40 states they felt could swing the balance. In this quest, they fielded some ‘advisers’. One had a deep knowledge of India and contacts in our neighbourhood. Some of us know him as a ‘friend of India’. However, this ‘friend’ tried but failed to woo our true friends, the smaller states in the neighbourhood. The US did sway some others elsewhere. By our count, about 6/7. But these countries realised what the trends were. It was to stem such efforts that we turned to our friends in high places in the US system, such as ambassador Haley, who did help us when we desperately needed it. All this made us feel good that we had dependable friends too.
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''' China refused to engage. Wang Yi didn’t take Sushma Swaraj’s call. Was it because of Doklam? '''
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The shadow of Doklam was distinctly visible through the campaign. Before that, we had many tie-ups with China for mutual support. But that changed.
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''' You also reveal that Japan didn’t respond to India’s desperate pleas. '''
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Yes, it was a shock to many, within the Security Council and us too. We made attempts at every level: In Tokyo, in Delhi, in pullasides at other meetings.
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Japan froze us out. Perhaps Gaimu-sho – the tradition-bound Japanese foreign ministry – was led to believe that an Indian victory wasn’t possible and thought they were backing a winner in the UK.
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''' You prevented Swaraj from taking a call from then foreign secretary Boris Johnson towards the end. Why? '''
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In the heat of a battle, one fears the worst. There were many compromises floating around. We were convinced that we were on the cusp of victory and hence no arrangement was required. Hence I did take that difficult decision to advise minister Swaraj not to take any calls. It is to her credit that she listened.
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She was well within her rights to brush it aside. My concern was it is difficult to turn down political level overtures couched as equitable. In such situations, it’s best to handle at levels where we could stall an arrangement before the scheduled voting which would lead to a victory. Whether the intended call was to be an overture or a final acknowledgement of defeat by the UK is now only known to PM Boris Johnson.
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 +
''' Going by the book, all big powers ditched India but neighbours stood by it? '''
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Where key interests coincide, everything else is kept aside. An Indian victory was not seen by any of the permanent members in their interests. Hence they consistently voted for the UK, although each of them, barring China, were at times helpful in some manner. Our neighbours and many other small and medium states were the bedrock of our support. The key takeaway, therefore, is that we need to be multi-aligned so that when some of our key partners go their way, we remain strong with the support of others. We need to engage with the big but also invest in ties with others, especially our neighbours and friends who may not be big or great but who can stand with us in times of need.
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''' Do you think India decided to contest only after it moved ICJ in the Kulbhushan Jadhav case? '''
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Yes, we delayed for very long a decision on contesting. We had virtually decided not to contest and so an entire year went by with us showing no interest while others were campaigning for their candidates. Then in the aftermath of our moving the ICJ in the Jadhav case we realised that the Court was not a distant body where we had no interests but one in which our stakes needed our continuance.
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=See also=
 
=See also=
 
[[International Court of Justice and South Asia]]
 
[[International Court of Justice and South Asia]]
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[[Category:Foreign Relations|I INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA]]
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA]]
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[[Category:Law,Constitution,Judiciary|I INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND INDIA]]

Revision as of 06:52, 12 October 2021

This is a collection of articles archived for the excellence of their content.



Contents

Indian judges in the ICJ

2017: Dalveer Bhandari

Sachin Parashar, India wins int’l court judge race as ‘humiliated’ UK beats retreat, November 22, 2017: The Times of India


1st Time Britain Won’t Hold ICJ Post In 71 Yrs

New Delhi: India scored a dramatic diplomatic victory with the election of its candidate, Dalveer Bhandari, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after the UK withdrew its nominee in the face of overwhelming support in the UN General Assembly for the Indian judge.

Atop Indian diplomat quoted British poet Lord Tennyson, “the old order changeth, yielding place to new”, to describe the upbeat mood in the Indian camp and the major shift in equations between the UK and its former colony, with the development read as India’s biggest diplomatic coup in years.

This will be the first time in the 71-year-old history of the ICJ that there will be no British judge in what is described as “the world court”. Guardian described UK candidate Christopher Greenwood’s defeat as a humiliating blow to British international prestige and proof of its diminished status in international affairs.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi swiftly congratulated Bhandari in a tweet, calling his re-election to ICJ a proud moment and thanked members of the (UN general) assembly and (UN security) council. Foreign minister Sushma Swaraj tweeted “Vande Mataram” and “Jai Hind” as she singled out India’s permanent representative to the UN, Syed Akbaruddin, for special mention.

The extremely aggressive, in-your-face Indian campaign was led by India’s permanent representative.

India scuttles UK’s plan to leverage its P-5 status

It ensured that there were few takers for an arcane UK proposal that a “joint conference” be formed, as first reported by TOI on Sunday, to break the deadlock between the UNGA and UNSC. The old-fashioned attempt to leverage its status as a P-5 member failed as India insisted the will of the UNGA could not be ignored.

Bhandari’s election come as a shot in the arm for the Modi government with its increased diplomatic clout read in conjunction with improved ratings in the easeof-doing-business index and an upgrade by the ratings agency Moody’s that are seen as recognition of India’s reforms. “The extraordinary support from the UN membership is reflective of the respect for strong constitutional integrity of the Indian polity and the independence of the judiciary in India,” MEA said in a statement.

The UK needed support from eight members of the security council to stall voting and instead go for a joint conference. But several council members, who otherwise might have voted for Britain’s candidate Greenwood, were opposed to the proposal as they agreed with India’s position that it was an “undemocratic” move which would only further complicate the process.

Also, for a joint conference to be formed, all 15 council members would have had to publicly endorse UK’s proposal, something which countries like the US and France, which regularly profess their friendship and strategic partnership with India, would have been averse to.

In the last round of UNGA voting, Bhandari had 121 votes and Greenwood only 68. In the final round of voting conducted after Greenwood’s withdrawal, Bhandari got 183 out of 193 votes in GA and all 15 votes in the council.

Greenwood, Bhandari’s rival, broke norms

Bhandari’s world court poll rival broke norms, November 29, 2017: The Times of India


The UK’s Christopher Greenwood was among 13 former and seven current ICJ judges who worked as “arbitrators” during their tenure despite the International Court of Justice (ICJ) statute prohibiting them from doing so, an investigative report has said.

The report, published by Canada-based International Institute for Sustainable Development (ISSD), said India’s Dalveer Bhandari, who recently defeated Greenwood for the last vacancy at ICJ, was not among these judges.

ICJ statute prohibits judges from engaging in “any other occupation of a professional nature”. This probably explains why Bhandari consistently received nearly two-thirds of the votes in the UN General Assembly, and Greenwood lagged far behind. Greenwood later withdrew from the race, paving the way for Bhandari’s re-election to ICJ.

“Justice Bhandari as a matter of conscious choice does not do any arbitration cases,” sources told PTI.

The study found Greenwood worked as an arbitrator in at least nine investment arbitration cases during his tenure at ICJ. He was paid more than $400,000 in fees in two of those nine cases. More than $1 million in fees was paid to ICJ judges in nine of the 90 such cases compiled by ISSD. ICJ president Ronny Abraham and five past presidents were among the 20 current and former judges who worked as arbitrators during their term.

The Diplomatic Win: how India pulled it off

Sep 25, 2021: The Times of India

India’s re-election in 2017 to the International Court of Justice was described by PM Narendra Modi as a proud moment for the country. Syed Akbaruddin, Permanent Representative to the UN then, spoke to Sachin Parashar about his upcoming book ‘India vs UK: The Story of an Unprecedented Diplomatic Win’, which reveals how India pulled it off:

India’s ICJ victory was described as a humiliating blow to UK’s standing. What made it possible?

Our delayed decision to contest, a year later than other countries, made us realise that we had to raise our game to stay in the contest. Our political leaders, too, understood that they needed to pitch in. So while our diplomats worked globally, our leaders, from the PM to the external affairs ministers, did a lot of quiet diplomacy. That played a crucial but not very visible role.

You reveal that US diplomats lobbied against India, and stopped only after you complained to ambassador Nikki Haley. Tell us more.

The US establishment, if I may put it that way, made every effort to stop India from ‘disrupting’ 70 years of established practice. They targeted about 40 states they felt could swing the balance. In this quest, they fielded some ‘advisers’. One had a deep knowledge of India and contacts in our neighbourhood. Some of us know him as a ‘friend of India’. However, this ‘friend’ tried but failed to woo our true friends, the smaller states in the neighbourhood. The US did sway some others elsewhere. By our count, about 6/7. But these countries realised what the trends were. It was to stem such efforts that we turned to our friends in high places in the US system, such as ambassador Haley, who did help us when we desperately needed it. All this made us feel good that we had dependable friends too.

China refused to engage. Wang Yi didn’t take Sushma Swaraj’s call. Was it because of Doklam?

The shadow of Doklam was distinctly visible through the campaign. Before that, we had many tie-ups with China for mutual support. But that changed.

You also reveal that Japan didn’t respond to India’s desperate pleas.

Yes, it was a shock to many, within the Security Council and us too. We made attempts at every level: In Tokyo, in Delhi, in pullasides at other meetings.

Japan froze us out. Perhaps Gaimu-sho – the tradition-bound Japanese foreign ministry – was led to believe that an Indian victory wasn’t possible and thought they were backing a winner in the UK.

You prevented Swaraj from taking a call from then foreign secretary Boris Johnson towards the end. Why?

In the heat of a battle, one fears the worst. There were many compromises floating around. We were convinced that we were on the cusp of victory and hence no arrangement was required. Hence I did take that difficult decision to advise minister Swaraj not to take any calls. It is to her credit that she listened.

She was well within her rights to brush it aside. My concern was it is difficult to turn down political level overtures couched as equitable. In such situations, it’s best to handle at levels where we could stall an arrangement before the scheduled voting which would lead to a victory. Whether the intended call was to be an overture or a final acknowledgement of defeat by the UK is now only known to PM Boris Johnson.

Going by the book, all big powers ditched India but neighbours stood by it?

Where key interests coincide, everything else is kept aside. An Indian victory was not seen by any of the permanent members in their interests. Hence they consistently voted for the UK, although each of them, barring China, were at times helpful in some manner. Our neighbours and many other small and medium states were the bedrock of our support. The key takeaway, therefore, is that we need to be multi-aligned so that when some of our key partners go their way, we remain strong with the support of others. We need to engage with the big but also invest in ties with others, especially our neighbours and friends who may not be big or great but who can stand with us in times of need.

Do you think India decided to contest only after it moved ICJ in the Kulbhushan Jadhav case?

Yes, we delayed for very long a decision on contesting. We had virtually decided not to contest and so an entire year went by with us showing no interest while others were campaigning for their candidates. Then in the aftermath of our moving the ICJ in the Jadhav case we realised that the Court was not a distant body where we had no interests but one in which our stakes needed our continuance.


See also

International Court of Justice and South Asia

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