Revision as of 09:07, 12 January 2014

View from Pakistan

Kargil misadventure

January 28, 2007

REVIEWS: The most awkward of situations

Reviewed by Qurat ul ain Siddiqui

Dawn

Kargil misadventure

This may be “the most comprehensive document published so far in Pakistan on the Kargil misadventure.” It is an endeavour to present the author’s side of the picture, clarify his version of truth and bring to light his facts before a nation that “has been deliberately kept in [the] dark about the bitter facts in this regard.”

Siddique-ul-Farooque also questions the idea that before launching the Kargil Operation, General Musharraf had taken the then prime minister into confidence and that it was Nawaz Sharif who had turned it into a defeat by calling the troops back, despite the fact that much of the international community very clearly demanded that Pakistan withdraw its Northern Light Infantry troops and mujahideen from Kargil. The fiasco led to over 3,000 deaths of officers and jawans of the NLI and mujahideen. Statistics indicate that this was a greater loss than the one suffered by Pakistan during the 1965 war. Farooque also points out that no commission was set up to enquire what actually led to the defeat at Kargil and what the real causes were, so that similar mistakes are not made in the future.

The author presents four different hypotheses to the reader, one of which, he believes, can serve as an explanation as to what ‘prompted’ General Musharraf to launch the operation just when Pakistan had become a nuclear power and the Lahore Declaration had been signed with India to solve the lingering Kashmir dispute without having to give up on “national honour and prestige.” Farooque also refers to as the planning that went into the Kargil Operation, which supposedly began to take shape during Zia’s regime when India had occupied Siachen during his rule and he planned to occupy Kargil as a kind of vengeance. However, that did not come about then due to various political pressures. The plan was reconsidered during the second reign of PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto but she vetoed the move because she “knew we would have to surrender the territory when the matter was brought to the international community and that’s exactly what happened,” she said to a television channel.

Farooque goes to the extent of saying that the Kargil war was started so that the general with a “weak profile” and an average track-record would attain some sort of “prestigious military award,” in order to strengthen his case. However, another point of view is that the Kargil front was opened to attract the international community’s attention toward the Kashmir issue with the hope that “huge losses” might be inflicted on India and that the United Nations may step in to put an end to the war.

The impression given revealed that Pakistani troops did not initiate the attack and that it was actually the mujahideen who started it. However, another point of view says that the weapons and technology used against India “could never be in possession of the mujahideen.” The political wing of the government of Pakistan was then requested to devise some way out of the looming full-scale war with India and find a “diplomatic solution” to the crisis. This lead to talks with China and foreign minister’s level talks with India on June 12, 1999 where Sartaj Aziz was given a cold shoulder. The following day the prime minister was told as how the situation was deteriorating further as a result of which the leadership began to work on a “withdrawal plan.”

Farooque also quotes the editors of various newspapers to substantiate his claim on how mounting pressure from the United States led to the withdrawal of the troops. One of the editors said in his report: “On June 27, General Musharraf broke this news to the nation that a Nawaz-Clinton meeting was about to take place, meaning that he [the general] was trying to reach this target through the good offices of the Centcom chief … had already been worked out during the Musharraf-Zinni meeting in Islamabad.”

Pakistan was thus dragged into the most awkward of situations by seeking negotiations and a diplomatic solution while at the same time imposing war on India: “He (Nawaz Sharif) refused to accept the allegation of the Indian prime minister that Pakistan has back-stabbed India,” and instead urged “the Indian leadership to respond to our efforts of peace so that there is no more bloodshed and there is no more bloodshed of the Kashmiris” as “dialogue was the only way out to resolve differences between the two countries,” (Dawn, July 13, 1999).

A report in another local newspaper said that not only was Pakistan facing imminent political isolation from the United States but the Pakistan Embassy in Paris “was told that because of the perception in the French government that Pakistan was responsible for backing intruders in Kargil, France may not be able to fulfil its commitment for the delivery of Mirage III jets that were to be delivered to the Pakistan authorities in the next few days.” Along with the G-8 states and Japan, China also hoped that “India and Pakistan will respect the LoC and resume negotiations at an early date in accordance with the spirit of the Lahore Declaration,” the then Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Quiye said in Beijing.

Regarding the dark in which the public was kept as far as Pakistani casualties were concerned, Farooque quotes Dr Shireen Mazari, who said that “the information war was lost from the start because of the decision of not informing the public at home … clearly the lack of coordination at the highest level of decision making was the major factor.”

The book also contains a chapter titled ‘Coup d’etat’, which gives the writer’s perspective as to what led to the October 12 coup that toppled the Nawaz Sharif government, and somewhat predictably throws a negative light on the course taken by Pervez Musharraf and the alleged reasons at the back of that course: “General Musharraf feared court martial … decided to topple the government. This was the only course of action to save their skin.”

Understandably so, Farooque’s analysis holds a soft corner for Sharif’s “attempts” at bringing forth lasting peace between India and Pakistan. He also quotes former Naval Chief Admiral Fasih Bokhari, who resigned a week before October 12, saying to a US-based investigative news website: “I resigned … because I had come to know that he had decided to topple the Sharif government … because he feared he will have to face a court martial for masterminding the Kargil,” while on the other hand the then Director ISPR, Major General Rashid Qureshi said that Nawaz showed his ignorance toward the decision-making that lead to the Kargil Operation just when “he was sentenced to life imprisonment and his other accounts” were opened.

The book also refers to what General Anthony Zinni wrote in his book Battle Ready that Pakistan’s civilian leadership did not wish to withdraw as that would have meant complete humiliation — nothing less than political suicide.

Also included in the book is ‘American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil summit at Blair House’, a paper by Bruce Reidel, Clinton’s Secretary on South Asian Affairs who also happened to attend the July 4 meeting between Clinton and Sharif. The paper reveals that Sharif, who desperately wanted to save Pakistan’s face, was left with no choice but to withdraw troops from the Kargil front.

Since Kargil, the relations between India and the United States became increasingly cordial and Pakistan was alienated. However, relations improved with the US as Pakistan emerged as a crucial ally in the war against various disruptive forces in the South Asian region.

The book also contains an abridged version of the Kargil Committee report issued by the Indian government along with contents of five historic and most crucial agreements signed between India and Pakistan since 1947.

Kargil: Adventure or Trap! is based on a particular bias and the author is entitled to his subjective perception of the events and the political dynamics that led to them. However, despite the devotion to his own point of view, he does not refrain from raising the most essential of queries and, even if reluctantly so, leaving it open ended: “Why did Pakistan open this front after the signing of the Lahore Declaration?”

Kargil: Adventure or Trap! (White Paper) By M. Siddique-ul-Farooque Sagar Publishers. Available with Mr Books, 10-D Super Market, F-6/2, Islamabad Tel: 051-2278843-5 mrbooks@isb.comsats.net.pk www.mrbooks.com.pk 263pp. Rs400