Mizoram, 1872: Expedition Of 1871
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Expedition Of 1871
In July, 1871, the Governor-General in Council decided on sending an Expedition against the Lushais. The force was to consist of two columns, one starting from chittagong, the other from Cachar; a contingent force was also to be supplied by the Bajah of Muni- pur.
Remembering the former unsuccess of small expeditions which had started late in the season, with badly organized commissariat arrange- ments, Lord Napier of Magdala, not however without opposition, succeeded in inducing the Government to sanction a much more costly enterprise.
Colonel Baban, who commanded an expedition from the Cbittagong side, in 1861, had, in giving the results of the experience he then gained, recommended that in any future opera- tions not less than from twelve to fifteen hundred fighting men should be sent from that side; that they should be ready to start from some point on the Kassalong river, not later than the first week in December, " and that a Commissariat officer of some experience, with an efficient establishment, should be at Chitta- gong early in November, to make the necessary arrangements for boats for the conveyance of troops, &c.. The supplies of a less perishable nature should also be sent on and stored, as soon as a force sufficient for their protection had arrived."
He stated that a thousand coolies would be the smallest number required, and that IIillmen alone would be of any use; he was also of opinion that another, though perhaps a smaller force, should operate at the same time from the direction of Cachar.
Colonel Raban’s Recommendations
It will be remembered that Colonel Lister had considered, as early as 1850, that the smallest force which would make an impression on the country, would be three thousand men. In the face of all these re- commendations, petty expeditions had been set on foot late in the season, at various times, with what miserable results we have already seen.
In 1871, all the recommendations made by Colonel Raban ten years before, were carried out. It was determined that each column should consist of three regiments, accompanied by a half-battery of artillery and a company of Sappers and Miners, representing a force of nearly two thousand men, with about an equal number of coolies, and a certain number of elephants* The detail of the regiments, Ac, which composed the left column, will be found further on, when we begin to relate the movements of the column.
Brigadier-General Bourchier, C.B., command- ing the North-eastern Frontier District, was selected to command the Cachar column, and after a consultation with Mr. Edgar, who went up to Shillong to give him all the in- formation he could about the country and routes to it, the General decided that the Tipai Mukh route would be the best, as he had determined to attack Lalboora.
No special instructions had been issued by Government as to the tribes to be punished by the left column, but the reasons which in- fluenced the General and Mr.Edgar to direct their energies against Vonolel's people were the following.
These people had, in 1869 and 1871, been concerned in the raids in Cachar, during which they had obtained great advantages over our Sepoys. They were also the re- motest and least accessible of all the Lushais from the Cachar side, and it seemed unlikely ‘that they, secure in their distant fastnesses, and confident that they were more than a match for our troops in jungle fighting, would be induced to make a voluntary submission by the terror inspired by our punishment of nearer and less warlike tribes than our own."
Rajah Of Munipur
Mr.Edgar also says: — "General Bourchier cousidered, and I fully agreed with him, that the only way in which we could force these people to submit, and to recognise that they must behave properly in future, was to show them that we could reach them, and that we had the power of crushing any opposition they could make to our occu- pation of their country.*'
As reference has been made to the Rajah of Munipur several times, and his contingent was destined to play a certain part in the Expedition, a glance at our relations with him may not be considered out of place.
As early as the middle of the eighteenth century the Munipuris applied to the British Government for aid against the Burmese, offering to pay a large annual tribute. It was determined to assist them, and an officer with a detachment was sent to their aid. He was recalled, however, when he had reached the capital of Cachar; and no further inter- course took place till the first war between the British and Burmese occurred in 1823.
The Burmese troops invaded Assam and Cachar, causing great alarm in our frontier district of Sylhet. Three of the Munipuri princes who had been quarrelling among them- selves, uniting against the common enemy, begged the protection of the British. Nego- tiations were opened with them, and a party of five hundred taken into British pay under the command of one of these princes, Gumbeer Sing. With this party, and the assistance of some British troops, he succeeded in driving the Burmese, not only from Cachar, but also from Munipur.
Subsequently this body, increased to two thousand men, and placed under the com- mand of a Captain Grant, was called the Munipur Levy.
Captain Grant compelled the Burmese to retire, and fixed the Nungth6 river as the eastern boundary of Munipur; but at the desire of the British Government, and with a view of pleasing the Burmese, this boundary was given up, and a more westerly one, the eastern base of the Yomadong Hills, substituted for it.
Gumbber Sing
The former was certainly the better boundary, and by giving it up our Government en- tailed upon itself a monthly expense of Rs.500, as compensation to Munipur for alienated territory, "and made it necessary, from the predatory habits of the tribes inhabiting the Yomadong Hills constantly endangering it, to secure the peace of the frontier by retaining at Munipur a Political agent."
Gumbeer Sing, having thus, with our assis- tance, obtained possession of Munipur, was declared independent. On his death, in 1834, a regency was established under Nur Sing, Chunder Kirtee, Gumbeer's son, being an in- fant.
In 1835 the British Government determined to discontinue all connection with the Muni- pur troops. Nur Sing was succeeded by his brother Devindro Sing.
Whilst the latter was preparing to ascend the throne, Chunder Kirtee, who had been living in Cachar, returned with a few followers to obtain the kingdom for himself. He crossed the hills, and being joined by most of the adherents of the two last Rajahs, he soon succeeded in driving Devindro Sing out of the country. He fled to Cachar, whither he was afterwards followed by some princes from Muni- pur, who had become dissatisfied with Chunder Kirtee, and together they made several attacks on the latter.
They were unsuccessful, "but their frequent attempts to upset the Munipur Government were distressing to the country and prejudicial to British influence’ Warnings proving useless to deter these men, and being fearful that a prince from Burmah was about to secure possession of the Munipur throne, our Govern- ment declared Chunder Kirtee Sing under its especial protection, and undertook to maintain him in his kingdom. The princes in Cachar disregarded this declaration, and were over- come by some British troops sent against them.
Since then, Chunder Kirtee has reigned in peace ; a Political Agent being still retained in Munipur.
Affray At Chiboo
For some time, Colonel McCulloch was the Political Agent, and from his intimate knowledge of the character and modes of thought of the Kookies, and his great experience in frontier matters, he was able, through Munipur, to influence the Eastern Lushais under Vonolel, whom he induced to come to terms, which were respected as long as the Colonel continued in Munipur, and during that time friendly rela- tions seem to have existed between the Lushais and the Ladoes, and the Kookies inhabiting the southern portion of Munipur; and the latter used to shoot over the hunting-grounds of the Lushais, in the neighbourhood of the salt-springs of Chiboo.
In the Spring of 1870, however, the Lushais lost seven men at this place, in an afiray with some Ladoes. Mr. Edgar thought that this, and the consequent bad feeling which was generated between the Munipuris and Lushais, were due principally to the decline of the in- fluence of the Political Agent over the Kookies, and his inability to control the intrigues of the Munipur officials ; and he considered that the Rajah himself would be willing to carry out a friendly policy, as it was manifestly to his ad- vantage to have in the friendly Lushais a strong barrier between his frontier and the powerful and savage tribes beyond, such as the Soktes and Khyrens. And if the Political Agent had . taken up a position with a tolerably strong force at Chiboo in December, 1870, it is probable that the Eastern Lushai chiefs would not have dared to make the raids in January, 1871, which have been already described.
The Rajah of Munipur volunteered to assist the last Expedition with a contingent force of five hundred men, under the command of two Munipur officers; and the Government of India, in accepting his services, directed him to place the contingent under the orders of General Bourchier.
Military Precautions
Major-General Nuthall, an officer of great experience on this frontier, was appointed to accompany the Munipur force, as Political Agent; through him the Rajah was requested to establish outposts along the hills east of Tipai Mukh, and south of the Munipur valley, and to advance his force south of Moirang, in the direction of Chiboo, with a view of pro- tecting the Munipur valley, and while securing the jSdelity of Kamhow and preventing him from aiding the Lushais, to enable the Munipur State to take every advantage of his assistance. At the same time this movement would tend to prevent the Lushais from retiring towards the East in our advance from Tipai Mukh, and afterwards closing on our rear and cutting off our communications.
