This article is an extract from A Brief History Of Pakistan JAMES WYNBRANDT Foreword by Fawaz A.Gerges Copyright © 2009 by James Wynbrandt; Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wynbrandt, James.

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A Return To The World Stage (1999-2008)

General Pervez Musharraf's 1999 coup demonstrated that constitu- tional safeguards could not protect the civilian government from military takeover. Musharraf, who took the title of chief executive at the time of the coup, later removed President Muhammad Rafiq Tarar from office and installed himself as president.

From the time of the takeover Musharraf faced international pressure to restore democracy. But priorities changed in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. Across Pakistan's border in Afghanistan the ruling Taliban were shielding the putative architect of the 9/11 attacks, Osama bin Laden (b. 1957). Pakistan, which had helped foment radical and militant Islam, as had the United States dur- ing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, was once more the linchpin in a global struggle. Musharraf gained economic and military assistance in exchange for Pakistan's partnership in the U.S. -led War on Terror. But Musharraf faced bitter opposition to the alliance from Pakistanis who did not want to see fellow Muslims branded as enemies or terrorists. Meanwhile, violence wrought by Sunni and Shi'i religious extremists fanned divisions within Pakistan's Muslim community. Yet there were hopeful signs for the nation's future as well. Relations between Pakistan and India eased, and progress on the Kashmir issue was made.

However, Musharraf's autocratic style led to wide dissatisfaction across the political spectrum. In 2007, in an effort to shore up sup- port after eight years in power, he announced elections would be held; he allowed former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both exiles, to return and stand for election. Bhutto was assassinated soon after returning to Pakistan, but her party won the elections held in February 2008. With a coalition civilian government leading them, the citizens of Pakistan once more attempted to create a working democratic state respectful of both cultural traditions and individual freedom.

Musharraf's Coup d'Etat

On October 12, 1999, after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif tried to bar General Musharraf's commercial flight from landing in Pakistan, Musharraf staged a coup and took control of the government. He took immediate steps to consolidate his power: Nawaz Sharif; his brother Shabaz Sharif, the former chief minister of Punjab (r. 1997-99); and five other officials were arrested. They were charged with hijacking, kidnapping, and attempted murder, as the plane was running low on fuel and the refusal to allow it to land endangered the lives of all onboard. The coup was criticized by the international community for short-circuiting the democratic process; the United States stressed the need to restore civilian rule as quickly as possible.

In the aftermath of the October coup, police and paramilitary and military personnel detained scores of leaders and activists of opposi- tion political parties, according to Human Rights Watch. The arrests were made under laws governing sedition and the main- tenance of public order. Figures including Rama Sanaullah Khan, from the Punjab provin- cial assembly, and PML lead- ers Kulsoom Nawaz. Mamnoon Hussain, Shah Mohammad Shah, and Haleem Siddiqui were among those arrested and in some cases beaten and tortured.

The case against Nawaz Sharif was brought before an antiter- rorism court in Karachi. Found guilty of corruption, hijacking, tax evasion, embezzlement, and terrorism he was sentenced to General Pervez Musharraf seized power from seyeral terms of ufe imprison _ Nawaz Sharif in a military coup in October TT , , . ™~~ 1999, becoming Pakistan's ruler under martial menL He WaS Phoned in 2000 law. (Courtesy Pakistan Tourism Development and exiled On condition that he

Corporation) forfeit property worth some 500 million rupees (about $8 million) and not seek public office for 21 years. He moved to Saudi Arabia.

The Musharraf camp took the absence of large street protests against Nawaz Sharif's deportation as an indication that average Pakistanis had become disengaged from politics. Soon after the deportation, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian Affairs, Christina Rocca (served 2001-06), visited Pakistan. Although she expressed con- cern about the police crackdown on Nawaz Sharif's political party, she reaffirmed U.S. support for General Musharraf's rule.

On May 12, 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that Musharraf's coup was valid. Though the court found the takeover represented a constitutional deviation, the judges found military intervention had been undertaken as a necessity, the only way to bring about economic reforms and halt corruption. The court directed Musharraf to hold general elections by October 2002.

Economic Reforms

Musharraf had come to power promising economic reforms and effec- tive steps against corruption. The bar for economic growth was not set high for Musharraf. During the 1990s the growth rate in national income had dropped to less than 4 percent annually from more than 6 percent annually in the 1980s, due to government mismanagement and the economic sanctions imposed in response to Pakistan's nuclear- weapons program. Industrial growth rates dropped almost by half, from 8.2 percent to 4.8 percent annually during the decade. The percentage of households living in absolute poverty increased from 21.4 percent in 1990-91 to 40 percent in 2000-01. Corruption had brought the gears of government to near standstill.

Musharraf made economic development an early priority. He courted international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF Loans were used to invest in communications, energy, water supply, and railway infrastructure and highways and ports. For the first three years of his rule the economy remained stagnant before per capita income began to rise. The economy was kept from expanding too rapidly by following the IMF's model of economic stabilization.

Efforts at Religious Reform

Musharraf was a secular Muslim and a modernist. In an interview shortly after the coup his father Syed Musharraf-ud-Din, a career diplomat, was asked if Pervez prayed five times a day. "If the father doesn't, I don't see why the son should," he answered (quoted from Jones 2002, 19). In his first major policy address, in October 1999, Pervez Musharraf issued a challenge to demagogues exploiting reli- gion. "Islam teaches tolerance not hatred; universal brotherhood and not enmity; peace and not violence; progress and not bigotry. I have great respect for the Ulema and expect them to come forth and present Islam in its true light. I urge them to curb elements which are exploit- ing religion for vested interests and bring a bad name to our faith" (Musharraf 1999). But his efforts to curtail religious extremism had little effect. Musharraf tried to reform the antiblasphemy law, which declared that speaking against the prophet Muhammad or desecrating the Qur'an a capital crime. The law was open to abuse, for any dis- gruntled individual could accuse someone of blasphemy, and by law the accused would be imprisoned before an investigation occurred. Musharraf sought to have the law amended to require a preliminary investigation before an arrest. In a sign of how strong the influence of the religious conservatives had become, in May 2000 Musharraf announced an end to his effort to reform the law. Religious parties had threatened demonstrations and a general strike.

Likewise, efforts to disarm the public were announced with great fan- fare. Musharraf announced a ban on the public display of weapons in February 2001, but the law went unenforced. At rallies religious leaders were still protected by gun-toting bodyguards who went unchallenged by government or military authorities.

Government Reforms

On June 20, 2001, Musharraf removed Rafiq Tarar as president under the provisional constitutional order, which dissolved the already sus- pended Senate, and the national and provincial assemblies. Musharraf took the title of president for himself.

In August he introduced the Local Government System. The stated purpose was to give individuals at the grassroots level more say in local government. The system restructured governance by transferring authority previously exercised by provincial administrators down to the district and local level. The system was intended to create more responsive local governments and to decentralize the state's administra- tive power. Meanwhile, with Musharraf serving as both president and army chief of staff in combination with the crackdowns on opposition parties, political power became more centralized at the apex of the government.

The system created a three-tier structure consisting of the union, or local council; the tehsil council; and the district, or zilla council. The country would be divided into 105 zillas, or districts. Each zilla would be subdivided into tehsils, corresponding roughly to large counties, and tehsils themselves would consist of local, or union jurisdictions. Citizens would gain control through representatives they elected to these councils.

Harking back to the Basic Democracies System of Ayub Khan, rep- resentatives would be chosen in direct, nonparty elections; the rep- resentatives in turn would vote for provincial and national assembly members. One-third of the seats were reserved for women. The voting age was lowered from 21 to 18 years of age.

Foreign Policy and the Events of September II

During his first two years in power Musharraf sought to bolster his image and support within Pakistan by taking the traditional position regarding India and expressing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The former position upheld his popularity with his main base of sup- port, the military, while the latter placed him in good standing with the Islamists. He also had to reposition himself with the West, which was dismayed at yet another military coup in Pakistan.

His policy toward India was marked by tacit support of the Kashmir uprising — as army chief of staff under Prime Minister Sharif he had been responsible for the 1999 Kargil invasion. That the insurgency had ties to the Taliban seemingly caused Pakistan to play a proxy role in the province for its neighbor. In fact, "before 11 September he [Musharraf] had consistently supported Mullah Mohammed Omar's Kandahar regime. This was not because he sympathized with the Taliban's inter- pretation of Islam . . . but because he believed the Taliban served Pakistan's regional interests" (Bennett Jones 2002, 2). Under Musharraf Pakistan not only supported the Kashmir uprising but infiltrated man- power into the region. The overall effect of this for Musharraf was to placate his Islamist critics.

Yet, in July 2001 Musharraf met with Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee (r. 1996, 1998-2004) at Agra, India, to pursue a settle- ment on the Kashmir issue. At the Agra Summit the leaders also dis- cussed reducing the risk of nuclear confrontation, closer commercial ties, and freeing of prisoners of war. But a solution to the Kashmir dispute continued to elude the leaders, and the meetings collapsed. Nonetheless, the two expressed the need to forge a peaceful relation- ship, rejecting the venom of the past, and tensions between the two nations were eased by the meetings. However, on December 13, 2001, the relationship took a turn for the worse. Pakistani terrorists disguised as tourists planned to attack the Indian parliament and hold the legisla- tors hostage until they agreed to settle the Kashmir dispute. But security stopped their explosives-laden car from entering the compound; the terrorists were killed in an ensuing gunfight. The Pakistani government denied involvement, but in reaction Vajpayee ordered the Indian army to deploy on Pakistan's border, and the Indian navy sailed within striking distance of Karachi. Pakistan's ambassador to the United Nations threat- ened a nuclear response to an attack. The United States, eager to diffuse the crisis, broke into the Indian navy's communication system and sent a false message instructing the four warships to withdraw from the harbor (Sud, n.p.). Meanwhile, U.S. officials pressured the Indian government to pull back its forces from the border.

During 2000 and the first half of 2001 Musharraf's policy toward the United States focused on getting the sanctions lifted or, at the very least, the money returned that Pakistan had already paid for the undelivered fighter jets while employing his regional strategy. He managed to score a coup when President Bill Clinton came to Pakistan for a brief visit in March 2000 (and spoke for 15 minutes on Pakistani television), which caused anxiety in New Delhi — exactly what Musharraf had wanted. Clinton not only urged Musharraf to reinstate the democratic institutions of Pakistan's government, he also pushed for a settlement of the Kashmir conflict and assistance with getting the Taliban to turn over Osama bin Laden, whom the United States held responsible for two attacks against U.S. embassies in 1998. Of these three points, the only one Musharraf agreed to was the one in which he had no power to effect the outcome. He promised to intervene with the Taliban on behalf of U.S. interests, but as he later admitted in his memoirs, "After the Taliban came to power, we lost much of the leverage we had with them" (Musharraf 2006, 203). Musharraf simply rebuffed Clinton, who, as a lame-duck president, had little leverage during his final months in office.

In June 2001 the Bush administration reiterated the same three points to Pakistani foreign minister Abdul Sattar during his visit to Washington, D.C. Islamabad noted that Washington was prepared to take a tougher stance if these points were not acted upon, but the events of September 11 altered the dynamic of the region and once again brought Pakistan into a close alliance with the United States.

Within hours of the attacks the U.S. government concluded that they probably had been planned by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, where he had been given sanctuary by the Taliban. Any military reprisal would require Pakistan's cooperation.

Until the events of September 11 Musharraf had continued the Central Asia policy of his predecessors. He supported the Taliban government in Afghanistan, seeking stability in the region, improved access to Central Asia, and an ally in Kashmir against India. And since most Taliban were Pashtuns, they had a kinship with Pakistan's popu- lation along the border, which fostered friendly relations between the two nations. However, on September 12 Pakistani diplomats were given a choice by the U.S. government, delivered by U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage (served 2001-06): Pakistan could either support the Taliban, or it could support the United States. General Musharraf chose to join the United States in its War on Terror. He knew his decision would face opposition from fundamentalist elements who supported the Taliban and opposed the United States for its stanch sup- port for Israel and perceived anti-Islamic agenda. But Musharraf was a pragmatist and realist. Pakistan could not withstand the economic and military pressure and power of the United States if he refused to accede to its demands. Conversely, if he agreed, Pakistan stood to gain sub- stantial benefits in terms of economic and military assistance, as well as power and prestige on the world stage.

On September 14 Musharraf informed the army command of his decision. Musharraf reassigned some pro-Taliban senior army officers and retired others. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Pakistan assisted in unsuccessful negotiations aimed at persuading the Taliban to turn over or deport bin Laden. On September 19 Musharraf spoke to the nation in a televised address and explained his decision to the citizens. He said that only a small, vocal minority opposed his decision. But Pakistan was already awash in anti-American feelings. Though Musharraf gained the stature of an international statesman for joining the War on Terror, at home demonstrations against Musharraf and the United States were staged in Quetta, Karachi, Islamabad, Peshawar, and other cities.

In a matter of days after the attacks, the United States was permit- ted to use four air bases in Pakistan for support, rather than offensive, operations. Pakistan also allowed use of its airspace for overflights of military aircraft engaged in combat operations. In return Pakistan received some $600 million per year in aid, and $3 billion in loans was forgiven. The United States and coalition partners launched Operation Enduring Freedom to invade Afghanistan, remove the Taliban from power, and capture Osama bin Laden. Within two months the operation had driven the Taliban from power, though bin Laden eluded capture. In the aftermath of the U.S. campaign bin Laden was believed to have fled to Waziristan, in Pakistan's tribal areas. The U.S. war in Afghanistan caused another refugee crisis for Pakistan, as tens of thousands seeking safety fled over the Pakistan border.

Now fully vested in the situation in Pakistan, U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell (served 2001-06) traveled there in January 2002, fol- lowing the crisis caused by the attempted terrorist attack on India's parliament. Powell made all future military and economic assistance contingent upon Pakistan divulging the location of its nuclear weap- ons, which Pakistan reluctantly agreed to do. U.S. and British firms built a command and control system to ensure that the nuclear weap- ons were secured. Pakistan also agreed to de-mate its nuclear core from the trigger mechanism and store the two separately, as was the practice in India and other nuclear powers. As a reward the United States pro- vided Pakistan with an additional $1.2 billion in economic aid, and additional military equipment to aid the search for Osama bin Laden. The United States also used the crisis provoked by the attack on India's parliament to demand that Pakistan crack down on the rogue nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer (A. Q.) Khan (b. 1936), regarded as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Pakistan placed him under house arrest. A subsequent U.S. investigation discovered that a network cre- ated by Khan and the Pakistani military had funneled nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. The investigation also revealed that Pakistan's nuclear weapon was an exact copy of a U.S. nuclear weapon from the 1980s. The United States suspected China as the source of the design, and, concerned that its own nuclear program had been compromised, the government overhauled security at nuclear weapons installations.

Nuclear Proliferation

In September 2004 the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency reported that as early as 1995 Pakistan was providing Iran with the designs for sophisticated centrifuges capable of making bomb- grade nuclear fuel. In November a CIA report said the arms-traffick- ing network led by A. Q. Khan provided Iran's nuclear program with significant assistance, including the designs for advanced and efficient weapons components. George Tenet (served 1997-2004), the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, described Khan as being "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden" because of his role in providing nuclear technology to other countries (Rabman, B., 2). Khan remains in Pakistan, where he was pardoned in 2003 by Musharraf. In September 2005 Musharraf stated that after two years of interrogations, investiga- tors had been unable to learn if Khan had passed along designs for a Chinese nuclear weapon to North Korea and Iran. However, he said Khan had likely exported about a dozen centrifuges to North Korea to produce nuclear weapons.

Referendum on Musharraf

Seeking more legitimacy for his continued rule, Musharraf scheduled a referendum on his presidency for April 2002. The sole question on the referendum was "For the survival of the local government system, establishment of democracy, continuity of reforms, end to sectarianism and extremism, and to fulfill the vision of Quaid-i-Azam [the "Great Leader," referring to Pakistan's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah], would you like to elect President General Pervez Musharraf as President of Pakistan for five years?"

However, the constitution mandated the president be elected by mem- bers of the Senate and the national and provincial assemblies — which had been suspended in June 2001 — making the referendum illegal in the view of many, including the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), a coalition of 15 political parties headed by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The ARD, formed in the aftermath of Musharraf's 1999 coup, urged voters to boycott the election and organized demonstrations against it. However, an attempt by the opposition to halt the referendum was rejected by the Supreme Court. After the vote the government claimed that about 70 percent of the 78 million eligible voters had participated in the referendum and that 98 percent had voted in favor of an extension of Musharraf's presidency, but according to Human Rights Watch by most accounts the vote was rigged and the numbers grossly inflated (Human Rights Watch 2002). In preparation for the October 2002 general election Musharraf issued the Legal Framework Order of 2002 in August. Its stated pur- pose was to give the president the power to make laws as necessary to facilitate the general elections. Yet it also gave the president the power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve Parliament, much as the Eighth Amendment to the constitution had before it was rescinded. Opposition parties viewed the framework order as illegal and unconstitutional and refused to recognize Musharraf's dual roles as head of the military and head of state. As the election approached, the Islamic parties, which had formed a coalition called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA, or United Council of Action), tried to exploit the public's unhappiness with Pakistan's support for the U.S. -led War on Terror. Up until the October 2002 election the combined results for all religious parties together had never exceeded 7 percent of the vote; in the October election the MMA drew unexpectedly large support, becoming the third largest party in the national parliament. The coalition also won an absolute majority in the provincial assembly of NWFP, and formed the largest party in the provincial assembly in Baluchistan. Despite the impressive gains of the MMA, no political party won an absolute majority. The party that Musharraf had endorsed, the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), won a plurality with 34.5 percent of the vote, and the PPP came in second with 23.7 percent. In November Parliament and provin- cial assemblies elected Zafarullah Khan Jamali (r. 2002-04) of the PML- Q as prime minister, and Musharraf gave up the title of chief executive. Jamali affirmed Pakistan's support for the War on Tenor.

Musharraf's War on Terror

Though the government threw its support behind the War on Terror, Pakistan remained a haven for terrorist activity, as it had been well before 9/11. The madrasas run by fundamentalist clerics inculcated youngsters with lessons in jihad and anti-Western attitudes. In 1993 a Pakistani had come to the United States and murdered two CIA employees and wounded three others in an attack outside of CIA head- quarters in Virginia. That same year Ramzi Yousef (b. 1967) traveled to the United States and helped orchestrate the first bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, where six died and some 1,000 were injured. He fled to Southeast Asia where he conducted a bombing in Cebu City in the Philippines and aboard a Philippine airliner, which killed one passenger, and was arrested in Islamabad in 1995 while planning to carry out simultaneous bombings of 11 U.S. airliners. Two U.S. diplo- mats were shot to death by militants in Karachi in 1995, and two years later four U.S. businessmen were shot to death by militants in that same city. In the post- 9/11 world the threat was exemplified by the abduction and subsequent beheading in Pakistan of a U.S. reporter for the Wall Street Journal, Daniel Pearl (1963-2002), in February 2002. Three of the four suspected principals in the 2005 terrorist bombings in London that killed 55 had visited Pakistan the previous year.

In March 2003 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (b. ca. 1964), the former head of al-Qaeda operations, linked to both Ramzi Yousef and the Daniel Pearl murder, was arrested in Pakistan. Five army officers with possible ties to Mohammed were put in military detention as part of the investigation. The links between the military and terrorists and religious extremists aroused concern about the loyalties of the armed forces. Musharraf himself survived assassination attempts and planned attacks, several of which involved members of the military officer corps. In December 2003 he survived two attacks while traveling by car, and other planned attacks were reportedly uncovered and stopped.

Despite these assassination attempts Musharraf stayed the course. He was rewarded for his efforts with economic and military assistance from the United States, including an end to U.S. economic sanctions, an increase in foreign aid, and the waiver or payment rescheduling of more than one-third of Pakistan's external debt. Direct foreign invest- ment increased after 9/11 as well. Cash inflows enabled the government to balance its books, increase economic growth, and procure weapons. Internal revenue collection also improved, reducing deficits. Inflation, which had been running in double digits, declined. But some reforms were complicated by the events of 9/11. Almost half of Pakistan's GNP and most of its export earnings come from the agricultural sector, controlled by a few thousand feudal families. In February 2000 the government had announced plans for a massive land-reform program to end feudalism and the power of landed families. That October the government had issued a report calling for rapid land redistribution to empower landless peasants. But no action was taken at the time, and after Musharraf allied Pakistan with the West — an unpopular decision among many Pakistanis — he needed all the support he could get, and could not afford to antagonize the powerful feudal families. At the same time, many U.S. officials continued to doubt Musharraf's commit- ment to the War on Terror. In 2003 Musharraf dispatched some 70,000 to 80,000 troops to NWFP, FATA, and Baluchistan. Trained to battle Indian troops on open plains, the troops were poorly prepared and equipped for mountain warfare and sustained heavy initial casualties. Tribal leaders were paid to end the fighting. After the U.S. elections in November 2003, the Bush administration gave Pakistan another $1 bil- lion in military aid, including P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft, Phalanx weapons systems for naval ships, and 2,000 Tow antitank missiles. The CIA opened clandestine bases in Pakistan in late 2003 to search for bin Laden, but claimed its operations were hampered by the oversight and policies of Pakistan. Pakistani officials claimed supervision was needed for the Americans' safety, as they were unpopular and immediately identifiable. Whatever the level of cooperation, the Musharraf govern- merit was reluctant to flaunt its support for the United States because of hostility to the United States in the tribal areas and among Islamic militants. The Pakistani government had long been resented in the region for both its interference and its neglect.

Since the October 2002 elections the dispute over the validity of the Legal Framework Order (LFO) of 2002 had remained unresolved, leading to a legislative stalemate. In December 2003 Musharraf was able to gain the support of the MMA, the alliance of religious parties, in part by tem- pering his support for secularization initiatives such as efforts to roll back Hudood laws that the MMA wanted to keep in place. And in the run-up to the general elections of 2002, Musharraf created arbitrary educational qualifications for holding public office to disqualify members of moderate parties, while recognizing degrees from madrasas, so fundamentalist can- didates could run unimpeded. With the MMA in Musharraf's legislative camp, he now had the two- thirds majority required to adopt the LFO. Prosperity helped dampen dissent. Spurred by the end of the United States's foreign-aid embargo, Pakistan's GDP had increased by 6.4 percent in 2003/4, well above the target 5.3 percent. That December, by legisla- tive vote, the Legal Framework Order of 2002 became the Seventeenth Amendment of the constitution. Musharraf promised to relinquish on January 1, 2004, some of the authority and powers he had exercised since the coup, and he agreed to give up his military position on December 31, 2004. In return Musharraf received a vote of confidence from Parliament and the four provincial assemblies, and his five-year term ending in 2007 was endorsed. However, the opposition boycotted the vote, though they did not try to block the confidence vote itself from taking place. The Seventeenth Amendment also indemnified Musharraf for any actions undertaken since the coup of October 12, 1999.

With this new endorsement in hand Musharraf continued to crack down on militants. In June 2004 Pakistani troops attacked suspected al-Qaeda hideouts and a training facility in a tribal region near the town of Shakai in South Waziristan. Tension had grown in South Waziristan in the preceding month as authorities pressured tribesmen to evict hundreds of Central Asian, Arab, and Afghan militants, many of whom moved there from Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001. The militants refused to surrender and register with authori- ties despite a government offer of amnesty allowing them to settle in Pakistan if they renounced terrorism. The army eventually deployed 25,000 troops in South Waziristan.

Meanwhile, the international community accused Pakistan of con- tinuing to harbor and finance Afghani Islamic militants. In August 2004, President Musharraf vowed that Pakistan would not allow Islamic militants from Afghanistan and now living in Pakistan to disrupt elec- tions in Afghanistan. But diplomats familiar with the border region claimed Pakistan had been training, funding, and organizing such elements. Diplomats said militant training operations in Baluchistan were so extensive that it was not possible for the ISI to be ignorant of the activity. In September and October Pakistani air and ground forces attacked several suspected training bases in NWFP and tribal areas near the Afghan border. Hundreds of militants, soldiers, and civilians were reportedly killed.

Political Repression

Whatever lip service the Musharraf regime paid to restoring democracy, its actions served to stifle dissent. In 2003 Pakistani officials arrested Javed Hashmi (b. 1948), a leader of the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy and provisional head of the PML. Accused of urging army officers to rebel against General Musharraf, Hashmi was sentenced to seven years in prison. In April 2004 he was sentenced to 23 years in prison on sedition charges after a closed trial. In May Shahbaz Sharif, former chief minister of Punjab and brother of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, was deported upon his arrival in Pakistan following three years in exile. Hundreds of PML followers were reportedly arrested. The Supreme Court had ruled in April that Shahbaz Sharif had the right to return to defend himself in court against charges that included extraju- dicial killings — executions carried out by police, state agents, or other authorities without permission of courts or legal authority — while in office. But the government claimed a secret agreement prevented family members of the deposed prime minister from returning for a decade. Shahbaz Sharif maintained no such agreement existed. At the time of his arrival in Lahore, cellular phone service was blocked throughout the city.

Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamah resigned on June 26, 2004, without offering an explanation. Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain of the PML- Q was appointed caretaker prime minister (r. June-Aug. 2004) until Parliament chose Shaukat Aziz, the minister of finance who had super- vised the recent economic recovery, as prime minister (r. 2004-07).

In November 2004 Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who had been in jail for eight years awaiting trial on murder and corruption charges, was released on bail. Zardari criticized Musharraf and called for free elections. He was rearrested in late December while preparing to fly to Islamabad to address a politi- cal rally. At the same time hundreds of armed police officers set up barricades to prevent members of Ms. Bhutto's political party from going to the airport or attending the rally. After word of Zardari's arrest spread, supporters clashed with the police, smashing windows as the police fired tear gas and carried out baton charges. Zardari's arrest came days after General Musharraf confirmed in a Pakistani TV interview that he was withdrawing his promise to step down as army chief and become the country's civilian president by the end of 2004. He said that for the sake of the country's stability he would continue to hold both posts, which gave him sweeping powers, until elections scheduled for 2007.

In December 2004 U.S. president George W. Bush (r. 2001-09) praised General Musharraf after meeting him in Washington, D.C., call- ing him a crucial ally in the War on Terror and a force for democracy in Pakistan. American support helped encourage Musharraf to deal with domestic opposition as he chose. With the leaders of the two main opposition parties in exile — Nawaz Sharif in Saudi Arabia and Benazir Bhutto in London — his chief critics had been neutralized.

Factional and Religious Violence

Political, sectarian, and criminal violence increased throughout Pakistan during the Musharraf years, a tragedy exemplified by the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. During 2007, an average of one suicide bomb per week was detonated in Pakistan. The violence was caused in part by a lack of state authority combined with the power of local insurrectionist groups. In 2007 vio- lence associated with terrorist activities was estimated to have cost the lives of more than 1,500 civilians, and almost 600 security personnel and 1,500 insurgents. This was more than double the total of the previ- ous year, and a remarkable increase over the 189 total such fatalities recorded in 2003. Not surprisingly, the problem of violence associated with terrorism was worse in areas where insurrectionists and the gov- ernment forces mobilized to counteract them were most active.

Sectarian violence also increased markedly in 2007. In a total of 341 acts of such violence, more than 440 people were killed, and 630 were injured. The previous year saw only 38 such incidents, resulting in 201 deaths and 349 injuries. The problem is hardly Pakistan's alone. More than 80 percent of the suicide bombers in Afghanistan are recruited and trained in Pakistan.

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

More than 100,000 Pakistani soldiers are deployed in FATA to fight the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other militant groups. More than 1,680 persons were killed here as a result of this battle during 2007, making this the second most violent subnational geographic unit in South Asia after Sri Lanka's Northern Province. Though primarily affecting North and South Waziristan and Kurram, the violence also is felt in the other four agencies — Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, and Orakzai. In September 2006 the government signed a peace agreement with tribal leaders in North Waziristan. This dismayed many who counted on Musharraf to take a strong hand against Islamic militants. Violence flared again after the July 2007 siege of the Lai Mosque, or Red Mosque, in Islamabad. A hotbed of Islamic militancy, clerics had been inciting students to stage antigovernment actions and engage in Islamic vigilantism, try- ing to force the public to obey sharia, or Islamic religious laws. The clerics' refusal to surrender to authorities led to the eight-day siege of the mosque by the army. The army's assault on the mosque resulted in 87 reported deaths. The public for the most part did not support the extremists' position, and relatively little public demonstrations of anger were staged in the aftermath in most of the country. However, violence surged in the tribal regions, and the 10-month old cease-fire agreements with tribal leaders broke down.

In August militants in the tribal areas captured 242 soldiers from the Pakistani army. The government freed two dozen incarcerated mili- tants to win the soldiers' release. But alarmed at the growing lawless- ness and loss of control over the region, in November 2007 the army began a large operation against militants in the Swat Valley. In January the army commenced a major military offensive in South Waziristan. However, in early February 2008 the Pakistani government and the Taliban agreed to a cease-fire. Again, those looking for decisive action against the militants — an approach many Pakistanis opposed, seeing it as a U.S. -driven policy — were disappointed.

NWFP

NWFP has become a major battleground for Islamic insurrectionists. In 2007 this conflict claimed the lives of at least 1,190 people, com- pared to a total of 163 deaths due to such activity recorded in 2006. Twenty-two of the province's 24 districts harbor various levels of militant activity. The NWFP is now regarded by terrorism experts as the heart of Islamic militant mobilization in the Pakistan-Afghanistan

Pashtun Tribes of the NWFP and FATA

region. This is all the more noteworthy as NWFP traditionally had a strong federal presence, unlike the largely ungoverned FATA. The pro- cess of radicalization increased markedly since the Islamist alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, won an absolute majority in the provin- cial assembly in 2002 after Musharraf reportedly rigged the election in their favor. The trajectory of violence in NWFP is especially troubling to experts, who note that past experience in South Asia has shown that once antistate violence reaches a critical threshold it is difficult to contain or reverse.

Baluchistan

While Islamic extremists have increased their activities in recent years in Baluchistan, the majority of the unrest in the province is linked to the Baluchi nationalist movement, and there is no evidence of coop- eration between Baluchis and either Pashtun Islamist militants, the Taliban, or al-Qaeda.

A revival of nationalism in Baluchistan emerged in the new century spearheaded by the Baluch Liberation Organization, a group possibly linked to the Baluch People's Liberation Organization; the latter had led the uprising under Zulfikar Bhutto, who brutally suppressed the rebel- lion. The disparity between the poor economic state of the province and the wealth it produced for the rest of the nation helped fuel the unrest. So did the lack of royalty payments to the province or its tribes for gas extracted from their land. In December 2004 nationalists staged several attacks that claimed dozens of lives across the province. Forces of the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary patrol, were also attacked. The Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed credit for most of the attacks.

The BLA established guerrilla training camps for Baluch militants; even the government, loathe to show signs of vulnerability, admitted the existence of at least 15 such facilities, each reportedly with 300 to 500 recruits. The government pursued a policy of isolating and con- taining the nationalists in Baluchistan, though Musharraf indicated he was willing to take stronger measures. "Don't push us," he said in a warning to the BLA and their supporters, "This is not the 1970s, and this time you won't even know what has hit you" (Rahman, 2004, 1).

Musharraf was referring to a previous Baluch insurgency that occurred in the aftermath of the loss of East Pakistan. The nation was now much more militarily powerful. But Musharraf did not have the popularity or support in Punjab and Sind that had allowed Bhutto to use his harsh tactics in Baluchistan. In addition, the involvement of military officers in attempts on Musharraf's life indicated a lack of complete support within the armed forces. And the army was engaged in battling foreign fighters in South Waziristan — Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, and others — complicating any potential campaign in Baluchistan. Moreover, Baluchistan contains the gas fields and mineral deposits upon which much of the country and the economy depend; military action and insurgent strikes against economic targets could cripple the nation.

The government was also constructing a new seaport in Baluchistan, Gwadar Port, begun under Nawaz Sharif. It was planned as an adjunct to Pakistan's sole international seaport, Karachi, which had dominated as well as constrained the country's maritime trade. The government relied on imported labor to construct the facility and other projects, another sore point with Baluchis, who demanded more jobs for local residents.

As of 2007 all 30 districts of Baluchistan were affected by either tribal insurgency or Islamist extremism or both. The tribal insurgency, driven by Baluchi nationalism, accounted for most of the violence. All told, as many as 1,170 people were killed in Baluchistan as a result of this activity from 2004 to 2008.

In 2006 government forces killed Akbar Khan Bugti, a Baluchi in- surrectionist leader, one of at least 450 people killed in the province that year as a result of militant activity. In 2007 the level of nationalist violence declined, as some leaders left the country or were effectively neutralized by government action, and the death toll attributed to such violence declined to about 245. Yet despite the decline in deaths, sabo- tage and bombings of gas pipelines, railway tracks, power transmission lines, bridges, communication infrastructure, and military and govern- ment facilities were widespread.

Traditionally, the government observed "A" and "B" areas of Baluch- istan, the former under the jurisdiction of Pakistani police, the latter where police do not operate. A community-based "Levies" force kept order in these latter areas, as they had for centuries. An experiment beginning in 2004 to reduce violence by allowing the police into "B" areas has been a failure, as crime in these areas has grown dramatically in the aftermath of the shift in law-enforcement strategy.

Sunni-Shi'i Violence

Between 1990 and 2005 some 1,200 people died in clashes between Sunni and Shi'i extremist groups in Pakistan. Sunnis make up 77 per- cent of the country's population and Shi'is 20 percent. The roots of the current violence can be traced back to the regime of Zia ul-Haq. A Sunni, Zia had Zulfikar Bhutto, a Shi'i whom he deposed, executed. Many Shi'is viewed Zia's efforts to enhance the role of Islam in Pakistan as a "Sunnification" of the country, as the laws were based on Sunni interpretations of Islamic strictures. The Shi'i revolution in Iran that brought Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-89) to power in 1979 had already inspired the radicalization of some Shi'is in the region. As the conflict between the two sects intensified, Shi'is and Sunnis formed political parties and militia groups. Meanwhile, the Taliban, a Sunni group, pro- vided training for militants dedicated to this internecine battle.

Two prominent Sunni figures were assassinated in 2003/4: Maulana Azam Tariq (b. 1962), a leading militant, in fall 2003, and Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, a pro-Taliban cleric, in May 2004. Shi'i militants were blamed for both killings. In May 2004 a suicide bombing in a Shi'i mosque led to a chain of violence that claimed more than 90 lives and 200 injuries. Police and members of the armed forces were implicated in some of the attacks.

Kashmir

It is estimated that the dispute in Kashmir has cost more than 50,000 lives since 1989, when the latest cycle of violence began, and the clos- ing years of the first decade of the 21st century (HRWF 2007).

In another effort to resolve the dispute Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar (served 2002-05) went to Delhi in late June 2004 for two days of discussions with Indian prime minister Vajpayee. In a show of good faith before the meeting began, Vajpayee had declared a cease-fire on the Kashmir frontier, announced the reopening of cross-border road links, and pledged to maintain a freeze on nuclear testing. In February 2005 Pakistan and India agreed to establish a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, the capitals of the Indian- and Pakistan- controlled portions of Kashmir, respectively. The highway between the two capitals had been more or less closed since 1947, when the sub- continent was partitioned to create Pakistan and India, separating tens of thousands of families.

The Kashmir bus-service agreement did not address the disputed Line of Control (LOC), which cuts through Kashmir. It allowed author- ities on the two sides to issue an "entry permit" to passengers. India had earlier insisted on conventional passports and visas for those traveling across Kashmir, a practice that Pakistan rejected on the grounds that it would make the LOC a national border. In March 2005 a 220-foot-long bridge, now called the Peace Bridge, was rebuilt crossing the LOC near Salamabad in Indian-held Kashmir.

On April 7 the first crossing occurred. Thirty Pakistanis walked across from west to east to board buses for a reception in Salamabad before proceeding to Srinagar. About three hours later 19 Indians made the reverse crossing, east to west. They boarded buses bound for Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Continuing in the spirit of rapprochement, in April Musharraf and Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh (r. 2004- ) met in New Delhi and pledged to increase trade and continue their peace efforts. Before beginning negotiations, the two watched the first hour of a cricket match between their national teams together. Improved relations would enable both countries to cut defense expenditures. In 2004 Pakistan had spent about $3.7 billion, or 25 percent of its budget, on defense.

On October 8, 2005, a 7.6-magnitude earthquake centered in Pakistan- controlled Kashmir struck the area, the worst natural disaster in the nation's history. By early November the government put the death toll at 79,000 in Pakistan. An estimated 1 ,400 died in Indian-controlled Kashmir, where more than 30,000 masonry buildings collapsed in Srinagar. At least 69,000 people were severely injured in the earthquake.

In the wake of the earthquake India and Pakistan agreed to open crossings through the Line of Control between the contested areas of

A Massive Earthquake

On October 8, 2005, an earthquake registering 7.6 struck an iso- lated mountainous area in NWFP, Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, and a small corner of India. It was the worst earthquake in Pakistan in at least a century and the worst natural disaster to befall it since the nation's birth in 1947. At least 50,000 people died, and more than 75,000 were injured. As many as 550,000 families were left homeless by the disaster. The government had difficulty responding to the emer- gency due to damage to infrastructure, limited resources, and poorly coordinated relief efforts. The government's perceived failure under- mined the legitimacy of Musharraf, who had come to power claiming only the military had the capability to run the government effectively. The slow and limited search and rescue efforts were exacerbated by the relatively weak response from the international community, which had already been overextended by the massive natural disasters that year, including the tsunami that swept the coast of the Indian Ocean and Hurricane Katrina, which devastated the Gulf Coast of the United States. In the aftermath of the quake India and Pakistan made gestures to demonstrate mutual concern. Rules governing access to the heavily militarized border areas were suspended, enabling the flow of supplies and assistance. Pakistan accepted aid from its long-time enemy, but refused the offer of helicopters unless Pakistani crews were allowed to operate them, a condition that India declined to accept. Kashmir for the first time in decades. Phone links, which had been sev- ered since the rebellion in the Indian-controlled area 16 years before, were also restored.

Musharraf's Tenuous Hold on Power

By 2005 Pakistan was receiving $700 million annually in bilateral assistance and $84 million monthly from the United States to under- write its anti terrorist efforts, as well as $1.7 billion from international financial institutions, secured with the support of the United States. By 2006 foreign reserves had risen to $16 billion, though foreign debt rose to $40 billion. As of the following October, the eighth anniversary of Musharraf's coup, the economy had grown almost 50 percent, and income had risen by almost 25 percent. Throughout this eight-year period, GDP per capita increased at nearly twice the rate of growth of the population. Yet this did not greatly affect the prevalence of poverty. The lower classes did not see the benefits that the upper classes did, as the expansion came mainly from sectors that offered high returns to investors, such as real estate development and the modern service sec- tor, neither of which provided much employment for the lower class. That same month the government was projecting a 7 percent to 8 per- cent annual increase in GDP over the next several years, though many economists took this to be overly optimistic.

Musharraf worked to make the country attractive to foreign inves- tors. However, the lack of political stability slowed international invest- ments, as did religious fundamentalism and its anticonsumerist ethos. Recent examples of foreign investment include U.S. tobacco company Altria's purchase of a domestic cigarette manufacturer and investments by consumer companies such as MacDonald's and PepsiCo and mobile telephone companies from the Middle East and China. However, such businesses do not offer the long-term economic stability that invest- ments in more basic industries typically provide. Moreover, Pakistan's budget deficit continued growing, exports stagnated, and power short- ages, artificial price controls, and inflation continued to plague the economy.

Pakistan's economic story has been characterized as "growth without development." Though per capita income increases of the last half- century have been respectable, the country was still behind on most social and political indicators of progress: education, health, sanitation, gender equality, fertility, corruption, political instability, violence, and democracy.

The Seventeenth Amendment to the constitution had stated that, after December 31, 2004, the offices of president and chief of army staff shall not be held concurrently by the same person. However, a month before Musharraf was to give up his military position, the Senate chair- man, acting as president while Musharraf was out of the country, signed into law a bill allowing Musharraf to continue to hold both posts. While the Supreme Court was considering the question of whether his current tenure was legal, Musharraf suspended the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry in March 2007 on charges of abuse of power and nepotism. The charges were widely viewed as an attack by Musharraf on the judge's increasingly independent rulings; the general was thought to have feared that Chaudhry would some- day declare unconstitutional Musharraf's intention to be reelected as president while retaining his army position. The suspension sparked protests led by lawyers and increased calls for Musharraf's resignation.

Increasingly under pressure and isolated, Musharraf cast about for a way to retain power. To tamp down public discontent, Musharraf called for new elections. He suggested that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif might be allowed to return to Pakistan and stand for office. In July news that Musharraf had met Benazir Bhutto in Abu Dhabi to discuss a pos- sible power-sharing arrangement became public. The same month the Supreme Court reinstated Chief Justice Chaudhry, declaring his sus- pension illegal. In August, after the chief justice's return, the Supreme Court freed one of the country's most prominent opposition politicians, Javed Hashmi of the PML, whom Musharraf had jailed four years before for criticizing the military. In the same month it ruled Nawaz Sharif had an inalienable right to return to Pakistan. The Supreme Court was emerging as the only potential check on Musharraf's power besides the military itself. With political turmoil deepening, Musharraf hinted he might declare a state of emergency, as allowed under the constitu- tion, should he deem the country's security threatened by war, external aggression, or internal disturbance beyond the authority of the provin- cial government's authority to control.

Nawaz Sharif returned in September but was promptly arrested, charged with corruption, and deported to Saudi Arabia. He was allowed to return to Pakistan in November but was forbidden from running for Parliament. But he threatened to lead mass protests if emergency rule was not lifted.

Bhutto, whose negotiations with Musharraf had failed, returned to Pakistan on October 18 and began campaigning. On the eve of her return a presidential ordinance had granted Bhutto and other opponents amnesty from all pending corruption cases in return for support for Musharraf's rule for another term.

Musharraf announced he would run for president in a separate election in October, pledging that if elected he would give up his posi- tion as army chief of staff. Opposition parties boycotted the election as unconstitutional. Musharraf was reelected to the presidency by par- liamentary vote in the national and provincial assemblies. Opponents contested the constitutionality of the election and of Musharraf's dual roles. The result remained in limbo pending a Supreme Court ruling on the issues. Meanwhile, in late November 2007 Musharraf resigned as army chief of staff, appointing General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to the position.

With the Supreme Court poised to rule on the constitutionality of the presidential election and Musharraf's rule, Musharraf declared a state of emergency on November 3, 2007, despite international pro- tests. He claimed emergency rule was necessary to counter the Islamic militants in the tribal areas. He appointed a new Supreme Court; mean- while, thousands of opposition-party activists, lawyers, and judges were arrested. The state of emergency was lifted in mid-December. her party's candidates. Here she addresses a group of supporters during the campaign. She was assassinated in December while leaving a rally in Rawalpindi. Bhutto had returned to London for a few days just before Musharraf declared emergency rule, then came back to Pakistan to resume her campaign. At the welcoming rally a bomb intended to assassinate her killed 140 people. Bhutto escaped injury and continued her political quest. She decried the emergency rule and the lack of decisive move- ment against Islamic militants, and was placed repeatedly under house arrest. The election was scheduled for January 2008.

On December 27, 2007, Bhutto was assassinated as she left a rally in Rawalpindi. At least three other candidates were murdered during the campaign. After her assassination, Musharraf announced elections would be pushed back until February 18. Bhutto's widower, Asif Ali Zardari, took control of the PPP, claiming he would act as caretaker until their son, Bilawal, finished college and could lead the party.

In a reversal of Musharraf's practice of encouraging military involve- ment in the government and politics, in January 2008 the new army chief of staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, ordered military officers to refrain from involvement in political affairs and the upcoming elections. In February he ordered them to withdraw from civil service positions.

National Elections of 2008

Tensions rose in the weeks leading up to the contest, as fears of election fraud, violence on the campaign trail, and voter intimidation grew. But the elections were relatively calm. The results were a resounding defeat for Musharraf and his party, the PML-Q, which won only 38 seats out of the 272 in the National Assembly. At least 10 of its ministers and senior leaders also lost their seats.

The MMA, the coalition of six religious parties, was also soundly defeated, winning just 5 seats. The PPP, headed by Zardari, won the most seats, and the PML, headed by Nawaz Sharif, came in second. Together the two parties gained 171 seats. Needing a two-thirds majority to change the constitution and weaken Musharraf's powers as president, the two parties began discussions on forming a coalition government.

The major issue dividing the two parties involved the reinstatement of the 60 dismissed judges, whose removal by Musharraf had been one of the lightning rods for opposition to his regime. Sharif and the PML sought the judges' immediate reinstatement. The PPP preferred to avoid a confrontation with Musharraf they felt an immediate reinstate- ment would likely provoke. Moreover, Chaudhry the dismissed chief justice, had previously raised issues about the legality of the pardon Musharraf had granted Benazir Bhutto and Zardari for corruption and other charges, which had allowed them to return to Pakistan without facing arrest. The PPP's concern about Chaudhry's position on the pardon likely affected the party's position on the cashiered judges' reinstatement. The two parties were unable to reach an agreement on the issue and, in May, the PML withdrew from the cabinet, though at the time party officials said it would continue to support the coalition government. Though the PPP-PML partnership was unsuccessful, the brief alliance marked the first time Pakistan's two main parties joined to provide civilian rule.

One of the most immediate results of the election was a new policy toward Pakistani militants in the tribal areas and NWFP. Whereas Musharraf had sent in army troops in an effort to root out home grown and foreign militants (though his level of commitment to this effort was a subject of longstanding debate), the new government sought a truce with them. Opposition to Musharraf's military approach was widespread, in part because it was seen as an affront to Pakistani sover- eignty, a policy set in Washington rather than Islamabad. In April 2008 the government began negotiations with leaders of Pashtun tribes that historically had controlled the areas where militants linked to al-Qaeda operated. That same month the government announced a tentative accord with the militant groups. The agreement would require tribes to expel foreign militants, cease attacks and kidnappings, and allow the Frontier Corps, the government's local security force, freedom of movement in the region. It also called for an exchange of prisoners and the gradual withdrawal of Pakistani military forces from part of the tribal region in South Waziristan. But it held no promise of reining in militant activity. In June Baitullah Mehsud, leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban, a coalition of militant groups, who was himself accused of involvement in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, vowed to continue mounting cross-border raids to fight against NATO forces in Afghanistan in sup- port of the Taliban.

The United States continued trying to blunt the militant activity on its own. In May a house in the border region was destroyed by what was believed to be a missile fired from a drone aircraft operated by the United States. It was at least the third site known to be used by al-Qaeda opera- tives struck by missiles from drones. However, neither Pakistan nor the United States would confirm that such attacks took place. In July, U.S. president George W. Bush authorized military operations by U.S. ground forces in Pakistan without the approval of the Pakistani government. In September, Special Operations forces carried out the first publicly acknowledged ground raid in Pakistan. Attacks on suspected militant targets in Pakistan by U.S. drone aircraft also increased. Charges by Pakistanis and independent monitors that attacks by missiles fired from drone aircraft frequently killed civilians exacerbated anti-U.S. sentiment in the country. Violence wrought by militants in other areas of Pakistan also continued. In June a suicide car bomber attacked the Danish embassy in Islamabad, killing at least six people. The target was thought to be chosen because in February Danish newspapers had reprinted car- toons considered insulting to the prophet Muhammad.

The Pakistan government's degree of control over the ISI, and the ISI's involvement in attacks carried out by militants in Afghanistan also came to the fore at this time. U.S. and Afghan intelligence agencies concluded that ISI operatives were involved in a July bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed 58 people, as well as in a bombing that targeted Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, in April.

When Pakistan's prime minister (from 2008- ), Yousaf Raza Gilani, visited the United States in late July, administration officials pressed him to exert greater control over the ISI. Gilani publicly denied charges that the ISI assisted or colluded with Islamic militants. Yet on the eve of his visit, Pakistan issued a memorandum stating the ISI would henceforth report to the civilian officials in the Interior Ministry, rather than to the military. However, the following day, the government reversed the new policy, reportedly due to objections from the ISI, stating its announce- ment had been misinterpreted and that the government would simply improve its coordination with the ISI.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the bombing of India's embassy in Afghanistan and several cease-fire violations along the Line of Control in Kashmir, relations between India and Pakistan sank to their lowest level since the two countries came to the brink of war in 2003, accord- ing to statements by Indian officials.

Relations with the United States had also grown more strained due to unwavering American support for president Pervez Musharraf; U.S. officials viewed Musharraf as a more reliable foe of terrorism than coalition leaders Nawaz Sharif or Asif Ali Zardari, despite whatever lack of commitment to democracy Musharraf evinced while in office and despite the rejection of his government by Pakistani voters in the 2008 election.

Pakistan's fractious ruling coalition, widely seen as ineffectual in its first months in office, harnessed its fragile unity to move toward impeaching president Musharraf. Lacking support, Musharraf resigned in late August of 2008 rather than face impeachment. Shortly after his resignation the PML(N), which had already withdrawn from the cabinet over a dispute with the PPP about reinstatement of the Supreme Court justices the president had fired, left the coalition. The PML(N) wanted the justices reinstated; the PPP resisted restoring the justices, perhaps fearing they would overturn the amnesty for corruption charges the replacement justices granted Zardari.

Zardari was elected president of Pakistan in September and pledged to improve relations with Afghanistan. His administration also prom- ised to eliminate the constitutional provision that allowed the president to dismiss Parliament. Whatever its intentions, Zardari's government faced significant challenges in bringing Pakistan the stability that has eluded the country for most of its history.

Looking Ahead

One of the most fundamental questions of Pakistan's future is whether it can exist as a democracy. Stable political institutions never had a chance to take root in the nation's first turbulent years. The country's political father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, died only 13 months after the country's founding in 1947. His closest associate and political heir was assassinated four years later, setting a precedent for political upheaval that has afflicted Pakistan ever since.

Pakistan is united by history and religion and rightly wears its independence with pride. But there are strong countervailing trends, groups, and attitudes working against the integration of its myriad parts into a greater whole. Ethnic and sectarian violence and a congenital inability of political institutions to function for the benefit of those they represent are ongoing problems.

The battle between militant and more moderate strains of Islam will be a major factor in future government policy. What constitutes prog- ress and equality to the latter group represents apostasy and damnation to the former. Is there a possibility that these divisions will plunge the country into civil war?

Relations with India have warmed, but Kashmir remains a flashpoint ever ready to push the two countries into war. In the past, progress on forging normal relations between the two countries has been easily undone by violence wrought by small groups opposed to any negoti- ated settlement that stops short of delivering all the concessions they seek. And with their nuclear arsenals, a crisis could quickly spiral out of control. Will both governments be more cautious about their rheto- ric and actions now that they could end in a nuclear confrontation?

And how will Pakistan address the poverty and lack of education that still afflicts so many of its people, or the endemic corruption that has undermined faith in its governmental institutions? Can democracy of the model Pakistan has developed, even if free of military interference, rise to meet these challenges? Or will the repeated bouts of military rule lead to some more permanent form of autocracy?

And what will happen if and when the United States's emphasis on the War on Terror wanes, or the government refuses to take part in it? Can Pakistan meet its internal challenges without the support and assistance of the United States? And what if the tacit approval for authoritarianism the United States has long extended to a succession of regimes around the world ends, and assistance only comes at the price of meaningful democratic reforms?

Yet Pakistan has resources to retain its newfound position of importance, filled as it is with the energy and determination that are increas- ingly the currency of a flattened world.

Pakistan History: A Return To The World Stage (1999-2008)

Contents

See also