Pakistan History: Between East And West (1971-1988)
Between East And West (1971-1988)
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1971, after the loss of East Pakistan,defeat in war with India
The simultaneous loss of its East Wing and the defeat in its war with India was a devastating blow to Pakistan, leaving many citizens stunned and angry. The presidency of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which replaced the discredited Yahya Khan regime, promised a peaceful, progressive period. But corrup- tion charges and scandal ultimately led to widespread unrest, opening the door to another period of military rule. General Zia ul-Haq seized power in the name of restoring public order, suspended promised elections, and set the country on an Islamic course. It was during this period that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan became a key ally of the United States in a massive covert program to raise and equip an army of Islamic fighters to battle the Soviet forces. The ties forged between Pakistan's intelligence apparatus and the mujahideen would have important consequences as the specter of global terrorism arose at the end of the century. The lives of the leaders during this tur- bulent period came to violent ends. Bhutto's ended with his hanging in 1977 after a show trial. Zia ul-Haq was killed in a plane crash in 1987, an accident whose cause was never determined.
Zulfikar Bhutto's Regime
Zulfikar Bhutto was at the United Nations to speak to the Security Council about the crisis in Bengal when Yahya Khan resigned on December 6, 1971. He returned to Pakistan on December 18 and on December 20 was named president (r. 1971-77) as well as the civilian chief martial law administrator.
With its East Wing gone, the rationale for Pakistan's existence — a homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims — seemed hollow. Pakistan had lost more than half of its population — 70 million people — and more than 54,000 square miles of its territory. While those in Bangladesh rejoiced at their independence, Pakistanis in the West Wing reacted in shock and anger, venting their rage at the armed forces and the govern- ment. In one of his first official acts, Bhutto addressed the nation and vowed to rebuild Pakistan and restore its pride.
War Investigation
The same week he was named president, Bhutto convened a com- mission to determine the causes of the military and political disaster Pakistan had suffered in Bengal, placing the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Hamoodur Rahman (served 1968-85), as head of the fact-finding body. More than 200 officials were interviewed, but the report, issued in July 1972, was classified and not made public. By this time Bhutto had been able to sway the public to accept recent events and welcome Bangladesh. At a mammoth public meeting in Karachi in February 1972 he sought approval for releasing Mujibur Rahman, still in jail for agitating for now-realized Bengali independence, from prison.
In 1974 the investigation was reopened and a supplemental report issued, though this too remained classified for more than 25 years. In 2000 a copy of the initial and supplemental report appeared in the Indian press, and, with its contents unveiled, Pakistan authorized pub- lication. The long-suppressed report included accounts of atrocities against West Pakistanis committed by militants from the Awami League, as well as by Bengali members of Pakistan's armed forces against West Wing officers. When news of these atrocities reached West Pakistani troops during the war, they responded by committing atrocities of their own against Bengali officers and soldiers as well as civilian Bengalis and Hindus. The report also found the army guilty of mass killings of intellectuals and professionals and of the rape of large numbers of East Pakistani women. It recommended that the military officers deemed responsible for dereliction of duty be tried publicly.
The report concluded the military defeat was the result of systemic failures of political as well as military processes. A lack of courage among senior army commanders was identified as a key reason for the Pakistani army's defeat. So too were the effects of martial law, which had corrupted the military by allowing officers to neglect military duties in favor of acquiring wealth and property under its cloak.
The number of casualties of the war is unknown, but it has been estimated at least 300,000 — the majority of them Hindus, whom West Pakistanis believed were principally behind the independence move- ment — died in the conflict.
The Simla Agreement
In the immediate aftermath of the war, India held some 93,000 Pakistani troops and civilians as prisoners of war. To win their release, Bhutto met Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi (r. 1966-77, 1980-84) at Simla, in northern India, in late June 1972 and agreed to recognize Bangladesh. India dropped plans to try some 200 soldiers accused of war crimes. The parties signed the Simla Agreement in early July, pledg- ing to use peaceful means to settle differences between the two nations in the future. Both countries also agreed to pull back their troops in Jammu and Kashmir to their respective sides of the internationally rec- ognized border and withdraw from other occupied territories seized in the war. India relinquished more than 5,000 square miles of Pakistani territory it held, and Pakistan relinquished about 70 square miles of Indian territory under its control. The agreement also stipulated the countries resume economic and diplomatic relations. Almost two years later, on February 22, 1974, Pakistan formally recognized Bangladesh, announced at the Islamic Conference in Lahore with the leaders of Islamic nations in attendance.
Bhutto's Policies
Though he had championed restoration of democracy, Bhutto initially retained martial law. In March 1972 Bhutto gained effective control over the military by putting officers loyal to him in command of the army and air force. He pushed through an interim constitution that gave him expanded powers. He initially allowed formation of non-PPP-led governments in the areas of NWFP and Baluchistan, but within a few months dismissed these local governments, alleging foreign powers held undue influence over them. He also banned the National Awami Party, the primary voice of the political opposition.
Bhutto set the nation on a more economically socialist and politi- cally nonaligned course. In an attempt to break up the concentration of wealth symbolized in the expression "22 families" in early 1972 Bhutto nationalized 10 heavy industries, including steel, chemicals, and cement. In March he unveiled large-scale land reforms. Since 1959 landholdings had been restricted to 500 acres for irrigated land and 1,000 acres for nonirrigated land. To further break up large estates and make more land available to peasants, the Bhutto government limited ownership of agricultural land to a maximum of 150 acres for irrigated and 300 acres for nonirrigated land. Rights of tenant farmers were also strengthened.
On the foreign-policy front Bhutto terminated Pakistan's member- ship in the Commonwealth of Nations and SEATO and recognized the Communist nations of East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Soon after taking office, he commenced a tour of 20 countries. The display of solidarity with international leaders bolstered the spirit of Pakistanis devastated by the civil war.
Bhutto pursued a policy of bilateralism, maintaining good relations with all nations by eschewing alliances with any. The policy's purpose was to facilitate relations with the three competing major powers: China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Early in 1972 he visited China and the Soviet Union; the United States, concerned about his policies of nationalization of private industries, was less welcoming to Bhutto when he visited in September 1973.
Now that Bengal was no longer part of Pakistan, Islamabad's stand- ing as the nation's capital was unquestioned. When Bhutto summoned the members of the National Assembly to session in the spring of 1972, they met in Islamabad in a building borrowed from the State Bank of Pakistan. It was here that the constitution of 1973, the nation's third, was created and voted into law.
Unrest in Baluchistan
Baluchistan, with its tradition of independence and aspirations for autonomy, was inspired by the birth of Bangladesh. The Baluchi tribes, spread across Central Asia, had been separated by international borders in the 19th century when boundaries between Iran, Afghanistan, and British India were established, disrupting their nomadic life and cul- ture. A large portion of Pakistan's mineral and energy resources were located in Baluchistan, but the local population, among the poorest in Pakistan, benefited little from the wealth of natural resources. The Baluchi were unhappy with the growing number of miners, traders, and settlers, mostly from Punjab, migrating to Baluchistan to explore these resources. The frustration and anger erupted in an insurgency in 1973 led by the Baluch People's Liberation Organization. Many of the most committed nationalists had communist leanings and considered seek- ing protection from the Soviet Union to guarantee the security of the independent Baluchistan they envisioned. The core of the insurgency was small, but as the conflict wore on, the appeal of its message grew. Pakistan's government and military were still reeling from the loss of Bangladesh. The officer corps was in disarray and the troops ill-equipped, and the political leadership unsure of its direction.
Afghanistan was a close ally of India, and India was ruled by the reso- lute and implacable Indira Gandhi. Bhutto and others were concerned the Baluchi nationalists might receive support from the Afghan, Indian, or Soviet governments.
The shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (r. 1941-79), eager to keep the insurgency from spreading to Baluchis in Iran, reportedly promised that should India give them assistance, the Iranian army would battle alongside Pakistani troops in Baluchistan. With the pledge of help from Iran, Bhutto used harsh methods to suppress the insurrec- tion. The Pakistan army waged full-scale warfare against the insurgents, deploying Huey-Cobra helicopter gunships supplied and flown by the Iranians.
Bhutto gained public support for the war. Punjabis, who were targets of the insurgents' hostility, backed Bhutto. The threat of loss of another major piece of the nation, so soon after the loss of the East Wing, also helped solidify public backing. Western governments feared an inde- pendent Baluchistan allied with Moscow would give the Soviet Union its long-sought warm-water port, Baluchistan's port of Gwadar. The Soviet Union, which saw Bhutto as a friendly leader, did not want to alienate a potentially important client state. Afghanistan seemed eager to normalize relations with Pakistan and so refrained from supporting the Baluchi cause. And India did not want to see further fragmentation of the subcontinent and the instability that could accompany it. Bhutto's harsh methods ultimately quelled the opposition. Many involved in the movement sought sanctuary in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union as well as in the United Kingdom and France. But the insurrection did not end until 1977, after Bhutto had been removed from office. The regime of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, which deposed Bhutto's, used eco- nomic inducements to win the hearts and minds of the Baluchis and tamp down secessionist aspirations.
The Constitution of 1973
Bhutto oversaw the drafting of the nation's third constitution, accom- plished with the cooperation of opposition parties, and was able to reach consensus on the fractious issues of provincial autonomy, Islam's place in government, and the nature of the federal government. The constitution declared the nation to be a federal republic; it continued to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In place of the One Unit system that had been adopted in part to mollify East Pakistan, the nation was to have four provinces: Punjab, Sind, NWFP, and
Baluchistan. Islam was declared the state religion. The government would be a bicameral parliamentary system consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate. Members of these bodies would choose the president, who would serve a five-year term and be limited to two terms. The president would appoint a governor for each province and also appoint the attorney general, supreme and high court judges, and the chief election commissioner. The prime minister would appoint federal ministers from among members of Parliament. The constitution guaranteed citizens fundamental rights of life, liberty, equality, freedom of speech, and freedom of association. Unlike the previous constitution, which gave the president absolute power, this version made the prime minister the key power. It placed the military under civilian authority in an effort to prevent coups, which had previously brought military rulers to the presidency.
The constitution of 1973 was also more Islamic in nature than the two previous constitutions had been. It created an Islamic advisory council, the Council of Islamic Ideology, to ensure all laws were in keeping with the tenets of Islam, as had the constitution of 1962. However, it also mandated the government take further steps to pro- mote Islam. These included making the teaching of the Qur'an compul- sory in schools; making the government responsible for organizing the collection of zakat, or charitable donations, which Islam requires; and making the state responsible for preventing gambling and prostitution, which the religion forbids.
The constitution took effect on August 14, 1973, Pakistan's 26th anniversary. The passage of the new constitution was followed by elec- tions in the legislative bodies for president, prime minister, and other key leadership posts. Bhutto resigned as president, and members of the National Assembly and the Senate elected him prime minister. He was sworn into office on August 14, 1973. Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry was elected president (r. 1973-78). Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry wielded no real power, as the constitution vested almost all authority in the prime minister.
Growing Repression
Pakistan appeared to be back on a democratic course. But Bhutto con- tinued to use the powers of his office to undermine and battle the oppo- sition on any disagreement. Amendments to the constitution adopted during his rule reflected the changing tenor of the Bhutto regime. The first recognized Bangladesh, following an accord on mutual recognition reached between the countries in early 1974; formal diplomatic relations would not be established until two years later. A second amendment was passed to win favor from religious parties. That amendment was adopted when a battle over the Ahmadiyya movement resurfaced in the fall of 1974. Seeking to bolster his credentials with the religious estab- lishment, Bhutto issued a resolution passed by the National Assembly proclaiming the Ahmadiyya to be a non-Muslim sect. Legislation was later adopted that made it illegal for Ahmadiyya to call themselves Muslims or use Muslim terminology in reference to their faith. They were not, for example, allowed to call their place of worship a mosque. A third amendment adopted limited the rights of detainees, and a fourth, in 1976, curtailed the rights of political opponents of the ruling party as Bhutto's rule became increasingly autocratic.
Reluctant to use the military in his politics of repression, given the armed forces' history of coups, Bhutto created the Federal Security Force (FSF), a paramilitary police corps. Drawing on retired military officers and senior police personnel, the force worked closely with the staff of the prime minister. At first deployed to maintain law and order in situations beyond the capabilities of the police, in time the security force was used for gathering political intelligence and allegedly disrupt- ing the activities of political opposition groups.
A Socialist Economy
For all the efforts of Ayub Khan's economic development plans in the early 1960s, by the end of his regime real wages had declined, poverty increased, and income was concentrated in the hands of a burgeoning industrial elite. At the time Bhutto took office, Pakistan was operating at a deficit, importing far more than it exported. The loss of East Pakistan added to the challenge facing the country's economy. To redress Pakistan's international trade imbalance, Bhutto's government devalued the rupee by more than half — 58 percent — in relation to the U.S. dollar soon after com- ing to power. Pakistani goods became cheaper on the international mar- ket, and imported goods cost more. But devaluation also made paying off debts to international banks more expensive, and it stimulated inflation. Zulfikar Bhutto's economic policies reflected his populist platform, an approach he called "Islamic socialism." More socialist than Islamic, it included land and labor reform initiatives, nationalization of industries and major business sectors, and efforts to alleviate economic inequities and improve social services. But draping the economic policy under the mantle of Islam minimized attacks from rightists who objected to socialism. Moreover, the message was malleable: Islam could be stressed to religious constituencies, socialism to industrial workers, and land reform to Sind's rural lower classes. Bhutto also saw the policy as similar to those practiced in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, which he admired. Bhutto's blend helped win support across a spectrum of classes and interest groups.
Carrying through on his nationalization agenda, in 1972 the govern- ment took control of more than 31 large companies in 10 basic indus- tries: iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, motor vehicle assembly and manufacture, tractor assembly and manufacture, heavy and basic chemicals, petrochemicals, cement and public utilities. The nationalization was undertaken in part to reduce the hold Pakistan's 22 wealthiest families, who controlled these industries, had on the country's economy and political power. Banks were also nationalized, as were 32 life insurance companies. Credit policies for small farmers and small businesses and entrepreneurs were eased.
That same year Bhutto lowered the maximum limit on individual ownership of land from about 500 irrigated to 150 irrigated acres,
and from about 1,000 to 300 unirrigated acres. However, loopholes enabled many landowners, including the Bhutto family, among the largest landowners in Sind, to retain their lands. Laws governing the landlord-tenant relationship were amended to prevent evictions and outlaw free labor. The rights of workers and trade unions were strengthened.
Bhutto also introduced educational reforms, making education through high school free and providing allowances to unemployed college graduates. He also mandated admission quotas to public uni- versities, ensuring that students from rural areas had access to college degrees.
Higher oil prices following OPEC's 1973 oil embargo, along with natural disasters including floods and an earthquake, also impacted the economy during Bhutto's rule. The floods affected crops and boosted prices, and in response the cotton and rice export trade were national- ized. Flour-, rice-, and cotton-processing businesses were nationalized in 1976.
Owing to nationalization, the role of the public sector in the econ- omy increased dramatically. In 1972 the public sector contributed 3 percent to the nation's output. By 1976 the figure rose to 13 percent, and a full 20 percent of nonagricultural output. The costs of nation- alization, which included large investments in acquired industries and businesses, financed with international loans, quickly became a drag on the economy. By 1974 Pakistan was unable to make its debt payments on the loans, commencing ongoing payment rescheduling efforts by Pakistan over the next several years. This basic restructuring also caused widespread economic dislocation. Many left the country to look for work in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. Remittances sent back to Pakistan from these emigres helped bolster the country's economy during the Bhutto years.
The government experienced perennial budget deficits during Bhutto's rule. To finance them, money was printed, adding to infla- tionary pressures. The economic results of nationalization and of the investments made in formerly private enterprises are difficult to deter- mine. In some cases investments made in these industries, for example in fertilizer and cement production, during the Bhutto regime did not begin to pay off until Zia ul-Haq's regime.
Overall the economy under his stewardship was characterized by stagnation. Industrial output increased only 2.1 percent annually, and agricultural output 2.3 percent annually during Bhutto's years in power.
The Elections of 1977
As Bhutto's rule continued, his authoritarian manner and efforts to sup- press political opposition eroded public support. Charges of corruption and mismanagement grew, fueled by the country's imploding economy and rising level of inflation. Bhutto was also held responsible by some for having caused the crisis that led to the loss of East Pakistan. By 1977 the middle class was disillusioned with the Bhutto regime. General elections were scheduled to be held in the latter half of 1977, but in January Bhutto announced the dates for the election would be moved up. A week later, the chief election commissioner announced that all nominations for the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies had to be filed by January 19 and 22, respectively. Bhutto expected the opposition would be unprepared, and, indeed, the accelerated timetable hampered the ability of the opposition to field candidates as well as to register them. Bhutto immediately plunged into campaigning, ally- ing himself not only with the disadvantaged, who had been the core strength of the PPP, but also with feudal lords. To bolster his support among the commoners, Bhutto announced new land reforms.
Rather than battle Bhutto and his party individually, nine opposi- tion parties united under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). They campaigned on an anti-Bhutto platform, charging him with corruption and mismanagement while simultaneously claiming the Qur'an, the Muslim holy book, as their political as well as spiritual inspiration. The PNA generated surprisingly large support during the campaign. The political establishment, which was increasingly unpopu- lar, displayed overt anti-PNA bias, enhancing the party's appeal among large numbers of voters. Public PNA rallies drew immense crowds. But in the elections for the National Assembly, held on March 7, Bhutto's PPP took the majority of seats and the PNA won only 36, a surpris- ingly poor showing given the crowds the PNA had drawn during the campaign. The PNA protested, claiming widespread election fraud and intimidation, and demanded new elections to be held under the supervi- sion of the armed forces. The PNA also boycotted the provincial assem- bly elections. The resounding victory of the PPP in these elections — in some areas winning more votes than there were voters — bolstered the charges of corruption leveled by the PPP's opponents.
Bhutto rejected demands for new elections, and in response the PNA called for nationwide strikes and protests, which had the support of religious and business groups. Bhutto met the opposition with defi- ance. PNA leaders were jailed and martial law was declared in Karachi, Lahore, and Hyderabad, while major cities throughout the country were put under curfew. In May and June battles between PNA sup- porters and government security forces became particularly violent. Bhutto's repressive tactics failed to end the standoff. He shifted to a more conciliatory tone and had some of the PNAs leaders released from jail, initiating negotiations with them in June. Bhutto offered to hold new elections in November and promised the PNA five ministerial positions for their party until then. But the PNA demanded half of all cabinet positions and that elections be held before mid- August. Bhutto finally agreed to meet almost all the PNAs terms, but before formal- izing the agreement he left Pakistan for a tour of Saudi Arabia, Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iran. His opponents viewed the trip as a delaying tactic.
1977, April: Protests in Lahore, Army called in
Naveed Ashraf, How three Brigadiers silenced the rifles, July 21, 2017: The Friday Times
From: Naveed Ashraf, How three Brigadiers silenced the rifles, July 21, 2017: The Friday Times
Brigadier Ishtiaq Ali Khan called Brigadier Muhammad Ashraf on May 5, and asked him if he had received the letter? Brig. Ashraf told him that he had—back in March. Brig. Ishtiaq was upset, as he seems to be in early May every year. CORO or the Central Officers Record Office branch of the army is diligent about sending birthday letters to retired officers. Yet again, Brig. Ishtiaq was reminded of the events in Lahore, forty years ago, which had led to demotions for him, Brig. Ashraf (my father) and Brig. Niaz Ahmed from brigadiers to lieutenant colonels, and lowered pensions commensurate with the diminished rank. The technical term the army used was ‘retirement due to fault’. It’s the lieutenant colonel part that gets Brig. Ishtiaq every year.
In late April 1977, Brig. Ashraf, who was commanding 2AK brigade in Rawalakot, Azad Kashmir, received orders by a signal message from GHQ, to move to Lahore without relief, which meant he was to leave immediately without waiting for his replacement. The morning after receiving the message, he left 2AK brigade. He was to take command of 103 brigade posted in Lahore’s most troubled area. The city was in turmoil and martial law had been imposed by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to quell protests that had broken out against the government in response to what people believed were rigged elections.
As his jeep drove down from the lush hills of Azad Kashmir, the brigadier saw a jeep crossing the bridge over River Jhelum, at Azad Patan, ascending the valley from the opposite direction. His replacement, Brig. Said Muhammad, was on his way up. They stopped at the side of the narrow road and met.
“You are lucky that you are going to command 2AK brigade,” Brig. Ashraf said.
“Well, you are not so lucky, Sir,” Brig. Said replied. “The situation in Lahore is chaotic.”
Later, Brig. Ashraf would learn that Brig. Said had been moved from Lahore because he had developed differences with the corps commander, General Muhammad Iqbal, over the General’s style of micromanaging everything.
Brig. Ashraf spent the night with his family in Mangla. Next morning he caught a train to Lahore from Dina.
In Lahore
Brig. Muhammad Saleem, a close friend, was at the Lahore railway station to receive Brig. Ashraf. On their way to his new headquarters, Brig. Ashraf told Brig. Saleem that 2AK brigade was a great command, and that he had enjoyed his time there.
“You forget about 2AK now; in Lahore there is only one commander and that is the corps commander, and we, as brigade commanders, are like the adjutants of a unit,” Brig. Saleem told him in response.
Brigadiers Niaz and Ishtiaq were already posted in Lahore, in less disturbed locations; Brig. Ishtiaq was commanding an infantry brigade in the cantonment area, and Brig Niaz was the artillery commander with his headquarters also in the cantonment area. Brig. Ashraf took his command on May 2, and days later the three brigadiers met for lunch at Brig. Ishtiaq’s headquarters, at Gaddafi Stadium.
“So, what should we do if the situation gets worse, and the command still doesn’t listen to us?” said Brig. Ishtiaq.
“In that case we should not hesitate to resign,” came Brig. Ashraf’s unequivocal reply.
“When should that be then?” said Brig. Ishtiaq.
“If there is more firing and more people are killed, that should be the time,” one of the brigadiers replied. Firing had been taking place in the area that was now under Brig. Ashraf’s command.
“Then, we should resign together,” remarked Brig. Ishtiaq.
While this was an informal meeting of close friends, and no decisions were taken, they were clearly concerned about the deteriorating situation in Lahore, and the high command ignoring their advice.
In the evenings, along with other brigade commanders, the three brigadiers would attend the conference with the division commander, General Agha Zulfikar Ali, and would vocally express their reservations about how the army was being used; they believed it was not only counter-productive but could also be dangerous.
On the evening of Monday, May 9, Brig. Ashraf, having received orders from the higher command, held a meeting with his battalion commanders, and briefed them on operations for
the next day. After passing on his orders, he told the officers that he may not be with them in the morning, but they should go on and do their duty as best as they can. A protest rally was to be held on May 10 at the Neela Gumbad mosque at one end of Anarkali Bazaar, in the area directly under Brig. Ashraf’s command. The corps commander had ordered Brig. Ashraf to personally supervise the troops at the Neela Gumbad site, and sort out the crowd in case of any disturbance. He had used this phrase previously, and Brig. Ashraf had spoken to him about it.
“Sir, sorting out means that my soldiers have rifles, they are not holding batons, which means the troops will open fire on the crowd.”
“But yes, they have to be sorted out,” came the reply.
At the other end of Anarkali, Brig. Niaz was posted with similar orders, that he would also personally supervise his troops, on site.
“For me it was clear that the command was bent on making the situation worse,” recalled Brig. Ashraf in a recent conversation with me.
Two of Brig. Niaz’s artillery units were also under Brig. Ashraf’s command, which meant he and Brig. Niaz met regularly at Brig Ashraf’s headquarters. After the meeting with his battalion commanders, Brig. Ashraf told Brig. Niaz that he had decided to resign. “The division commander will be coming here shortly, and I will inform him.”
“If you go, I will go too,” Brig. Niaz said.
Brig. Ashraf urged Brig. Niaz not to resign, “The troops are under my command, I bear responsibility, and you are not required to do this,” he had said.
“Ashraf, if you go, I am not Raj Wali’s son if I don’t go also.” Brig Niaz was not about to let his friend leave by himself.
“I did my best to persuade Niaz not to resign; he was an outstanding officer and a great human being. Both of them were,” said Brig. Ashraf as he recalled the events of four decades ago.
The division commander was shocked to hear about his decision: “Ashraf, don’t do this! We all feel the same way, but it’s a question of our service.”
“Sir, you do as you please. I have made my decision. I will write a letter and you can give that to the corps commander.”
Later the same night, Brig. Ashraf was called to the corps headquarters, where the corps commander also urged him to reconsider his decision, and subsequently met Brig. Niaz as well. Both brigadiers declined to take back their decisions.
The next day, on May 10, Brig. Ashraf received a message to report to the division headquarters to meet General Ziaul Haq, who had been sent from Rawalpindi on the Prime Minister’s official aircraft. Details of that meeting have been recorded previously (including in my translation— The Three Brigadiers, September 29, 2011—for this newspaper, of Brig. Ashraf’s interview with Rafiq Dogar, originally published, in 1994, in the Urdu paper Deed-Shuneed.)
Brig. Ashraf and Brig. Niaz were ordered to report to GHQ in Rawalpindi.
By now Brig. Ishtiaq had heard of the resignations. He called Brig. Ashraf at GHQ: “Yaar, you guys didn’t even tell me that you have resigned. Well, don’t worry I am coming.” Within days he joined his friends at GHQ.
The news of the resignations spread like wildfire, and the desired effect was achieved. There was no more firing anywhere in Pakistan. Three senior officers handing in their resignations made the government see the gravity of the situation. Negotiations were started with the opposition, which led to an agreement between both sides to hold new elections; a date for the polls had also been picked. But before the agreement could be implemented, Gen. Ziaul Haq staged a coup, and, on July 5, imposed martial law on the country, with fateful consequences for the future of the nation.
The protest at Neela Gumbad, on May 10, 1977, went by peacefully and the rifles stayed silent.
After the army
Life in the private sector was not easy for the three brigadiers, but eventually, Brigs. Niaz and Ashraf found success in business after trying several ventures. Brig Ishtiaq held several high-level jobs, but remained under financial hardship after finishing his career in the civil sector. He felt the sting of the lowered pension the most. Forty years later his blood still boils when he receives the birthday letter from Coro. The wages of having taken a principled stand and done something right do not always agree with honest, brave people.
Brig Niaz passed away in August 2014, in Islamabad, and Brig Ishtiaq still lives in Lahore. My father lives in Rawalpindi. In 1992, he established Raj Bukhsh Trust, an organization for the education and welfare of the poor. The trust set up two higher secondary schools near his village, catering to the underprivileged. Nearly fifteen hundred students are enrolled in these schools, and their graduates are now in medical colleges, are teachers, and are young captains in the army. Brig Ashraf considers Raj Bukhsh Trust his life’s best achievement, and at eighty-five, is still actively involved in his schools.
Zia ul-Haq's Coup d'Etat
The army was called in to restore order in major cities. With the impasse threatening to incite anarchy across the country, on July 5, 1977, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (1924-88) arrested Bhutto and members of his cabinet and imposed martial law. The constitution was suspended and all legislative bodies dissolved. It was the country's third military coup.
Muhammad Zia ul-Haq was born to a middle-class family in East Punjab in 1924. Schooled in India and a veteran of the British Indian Army, where he attended officer- training school, he chose to join the Pakistani army upon partition. He later trained in the United States and, while working his way up to the rank of lieutenant gen- eral, developed a reputation as a professional soldier with little interest in politics. Furthermore, he had little affinity with most other high-level officers, many of whom came from northern areas of Pakistan, which had been favored recruiting grounds for the British. Given the history of mili- tary interference with civilian rule, Bhutto had been cognizant of the potential threat represented by the armed forces and had chosen Zia ul-Haq as army chief of staff in part because of his background
Zia initially kept an appearance of Civilian rule. The constitution was suspended rather than abrogated. Zia announced that elections, overseen by the military, would be held within 90 days under "Operation Fairplay" but this pledge went unfulfilled. He disbanded the FSF, Bhutto's security force, and established a committee to investigate irregularities in the election.
Bhutto's End
Zulfikar Bhutto was released from detention on July 29, 1977, little less than a month after his arrest. Though removed from office, Bhutto was initially allowed to remain in politics. He embarked on a series of politi- cal rallies across Pakistan and proclaimed that those responsible for the military takeover would face legal consequences once he was restored to power. The constitution of 1973 made a coup d'etat a capital offense punishable by death, and Bhutto left no doubt of his intention to seek such redress. Thus, the military was reluctant to allow him the chance to regain power.
The committee investigating the election irregularities reported find- ing a document in Bhutto's home, prepared in 1976, that it described as a blueprint for election fraud. Entitled "A Model Election Plan," it became known as the "Larkana Plan." The chief election commissioner later blamed the PPP candidates for using the power of their offices to circumvent election laws.
In early September 1977 Bhutto was rearrested and, though briefly released, was eventually brought to trial on charges that included con- spiracy to murder a political opponent. The director-general of the FSF, Masood Mahmood (served ca. 1972-77) was implicated in the murder and pleaded guilty. His deposition formed the bulk of the case against Bhutto. The trial began in October and lasted into the new year. Much of the evidence presented seemed questionable and the witnesses for the prosecution unreliable. Nonetheless, in March 1978 the Lahore high court found Bhutto guilty and sentenced him to death. An appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court in early 1979, and on April 4 Bhutto was hanged in Rawalpindi's central jail.
By the time of his execution Bhutto had ceased to be a factor in Pakistani politics. In February 1978 political leaders had gathered for a conference to discuss restoration of civilian rule and democracy. But Zia had no intention of giving up his rule. In September, as Bhutto faced trial, Zia had taken the title of president (r. 1978-88) and made the martial law administrator of each province its governor. He was the nation's sixth president, and the third to assume the office in the after- math of staging a military coup. In early 1979 Zia disbanded political parties and disenfranchised some politicians.
While Bhutto had been vanquished, his party the PPP, had not. Bhutto's oldest child, Benazir Bhutto (1953-2007), became its leader. Zia and his regime set out to neutralize the party's power and to restructure the political process to ensure the PPP's impotence. From 1979 to 1985 Zia engaged in numerous maneuvers to achieve this objective, from stra- tegic alliances with PPP opponents to cancellation of elections.
Zia's rule was marked by economic growth in the private sec- tor and the growing influence of Islamic parties on the government. Responsibility for the economy was turned over to Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1915-2006). Pakistan had been without a coherent economic strategy since the early 1970s. The five-year plan in place at that time was shelved, made irrelevant after East Pakistan's secession. Zulfikar Bhutto's restructuring of the economy was conducted without a road map. It was not until July 1, 1978, that the next and Fifth Five- Year Plan (1978-83) was instituted, one year into Zia ul-Haq's imposition of martial law. The plan's stated goal was improving the reach and quality of social services. With the budget stretched by investments in the public sector, the new plan curtailed industrial and infrastructure expansion, focusing its spending on works in progress. However, devel- opment funds were also earmarked for agricultural projects, including investments in water resources and loans and subsidies for farmers. Economic planners were counting on a healthy return on investment. During the first five years of the 1970s Pakistan's GDP had increased 4. 1 percent annually. The fifth plan called for a 7.0 percent annual growth in GDP, fueled by a projected 10 percent annual increase in industrial growth and 6 percent increase in agricultural output. The plan also pro- vided a blueprint and timetable for bringing the economic and financial sectors of the country in line with Islamic principles.
Relations with the United States improved during Zia's rule as well. The Iranian Revolution had brought a virulently anti-U.S. Shi'i regime to power in Tehran, and the United States needed friends in the region. Pakistan, dominated by Sunnis, also saw a threat across the border in Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was another catalyst for the suddenly strong relationship.
Pakistan and Islam
Since the republic's inception, the role of Islam in the government had been hotly debated. Pakistan was founded as a parliamentary democracy, with Islam as the state religion, although the constitution allowed free- dom of religion to the members of other faiths. Jinnah, the father of the nation, wanted separation from the subcontinent's Hindu majority not because he thought Pakistan should be a theocracy but because he saw it as a refuge where Muslims could be free to pursue their religion as they wished. Zia, however, tried to bolster the influence of Islamic parties and the ulama on government and society. With the tacit sup- port of the United States, which sought to undermine the Soviet regime in Afghanistan, he encouraged the formation and activities of militant extremist groups.
In his first speech to the nation, Zia pledged the government would work to create a true Islamic society. A federal sharia council, or reli- gious law court, was created to determine cases based on the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunna, the book of traditions of the Prophet's sayings and deeds from which much of Islamic law is derived. A sharia council was appointed to bring the state's legal statutes into alignment with Islamic doctrine. To address the Islamic prohibition against charg- ing or paying interest, or riba, a system of profit-and-loss sharing was instituted on January 1, 1980, whereby account holders would share in their banks' profits and losses. Efforts to enforce the Islamic tenets of praying five times each day were adopted, and public eating and drink- ing during the holy month of Ramadan was outlawed.
The general also introduced the Islamic hadood into Pakistani law, which deals with the drinking and manufacturing of alcohol, theft, adultery, false accusations of adultery, and highway robbery. The Hadood Ordinance passed into law by Zia in February 1979 stipulated that punishments for crimes would be consistent with those called for under traditional Islamic jurisprudence, including floggings, amputations, and death by stoning. Women were particularly vulnerable under the third ordinance, as a woman who became pregnant as the result of rape could be charged with adultery. Furthermore, a woman's testimony was deemed only half as reli- able as that of a man. Thus, the testimony of two women was required to rebut the testimony of one man under the revised legal code.
Islamic scholars were retained to devise laws pertaining to financing and the economy that would incorporate Islamic principles. The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance that resulted was adopted in June 1980. Zakat, or alms for the poor, would be deducted at the rate of 2.5 percent per year from all Muslims' bank accounts holding more than 3,000 rupees. For those who held land or cultivated crops, ushr in cash or crops would be levied at 10 percent of the land's yield. Zakat committees were estab- lished to oversee the distribution of the collected funds.
In 1986 the penalty for blasphemy against the prophet Muhammad was raised from life in prison to death. Islamic studies and Arabic became compulsory courses for many degree programs. The media was directed to present the news in Arabic on both television and radio, and female announcers were required to cover their heads. In the armed forces, reli- gious teachers were elevated to the rank of commissioned officers.
However, the country's citizens began to chafe and protest at the increasing Islamization of their nation, and Zia had to stop short of adopting sharia as the law of the land; with their limited jurisdiction the sharia courts had primarily affected Muslim personal law and religious issues. Yet with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Islam was seen as being threatened by infidel forces just across the border, giving added power to the general's call for governing Pakistan on Islamic ideals.
Nuclear Program
In May 1974 India became a nuclear power when it detonated a nuclear device underground with an estimated yield of 15 kilo tons. Although India claimed that it did not have plans for nuclear weapons, the devel- opment was profoundly disturbing to Pakistan. After India's nuclear test, Pakistan proposed to India that South Asia be declared a nuclear weapons-free zone, but India declined. As the minister of power, fuel, and natural resources, Zulfikar Bhutto instituted a nuclear weapons development program in response.
Pakistan had had a research reactor in operation at Parr, in Rawalpindi, since 1965, and its nuclear ambitions — or at least consideration of its options — preceded Bhutto's tenure. When the United Nation's Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, created to staunch the spread of nuclear weapons, was completed in 1968, Pakistan declined to become a signatory, as did India and China.
Pakistan was the beneficiary of aid from the United States through the United States's Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In an effort to put pressure on Pakistan to stop its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. Congress passed the first of several amendments to the act that prohib- ited assistance to countries for weapons development. The Symington Amendment, passed in 1976, banned assistance to any country traffick- ing in nuclear-enrichment technology outside of international controls. In 1979 Pakistan was found in violation of the Symington Amendment by U.S. president Jimmy Carter (r. 1977-81) for clandestinely building a uranium-enrichment plant. U.S. assistance was cut off. The sanctions had little impact in stopping the program. A 1983 U.S. government assessment concluded there was unambiguous evidence that Pakistan was actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The U.S. Congress passed the Pressler Amendment in 1985, requiring that before Pakistan could receive aid, the president had to certify annually that Pakistan had no nuclear device. However, the president was given the power to waive sanctions when such action was perceived to be in the nation's interest. In fact, soon after assistance to Pakistan was cut off in 1979, regional events would prove to Pakistan that the United States could quickly change its priorities and policies.
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
In late December 1979 Leonid Brezhnev (r. 1964-82), general secre- tary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the country's de facto leader, ordered Soviet forces to invade Afghanistan in support of the Soviet-allied regime of Hafizullah Amin (r. Sept.-Dec. 1979), whose government was under attack from tribal resistance groups. The invasion was supposed to be a quick surgical operation aimed at securing Kabul, the Afghan capital, and primary communication lines linking the country and the Soviet Union. But the Soviets wanted an even more compliant leader and on December 28 had Amin assassi- nated. Babrak Karmal (r. 1979-86), a Soviet protege and puppet, was installed as president.
In response to the invasion President Carter canceled U.S. partici- pation in the 1980 Summer Olympics, held in Moscow; put the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) II missile treaty on hold; and reduced contracted shipments of grain to the Soviet Union. However, caught up in the Iranian hostage crisis, he was unable to take more decisive steps. Six months prior Carter had signed a secret directive authoriz- ing assistance to the rebels fighting the Communist government in Afghanistan. After the Soviet invasion the United States encouraged Muslim countries around the world to help with propaganda and covert aid against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The goal was to harness the religious fervor of Muslims who viewed the battle as a holy war against invading infidels.
Pakistan became a major ally of the United States as money and materiel were routed through Pakistan to support the mujahideen, or holy warriors, who were organized to battle the infidel invaders. Pakistan, for its support of U.S. efforts, received most-favored-nation trading status. At the same time some 4 million Afghan war refugees fled into Baluchistan and the NWFP. Pakistan's primary intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), served as liaison between the Pakistani and U.S. governments and the mujahi- deen. Founded in 1948, the ISI's role was expanded under Ayub Khan's rule in the 1950s, when agents were employed in monitoring opposi- tion politicians and supporting the country's martial-law rule.
In 1988 U.S. president Ronald Reagan (r. 1981-89), elected in November 1980, waived the aid sanctions imposed on Pakistan under the Symington Amendment. The assistance from the United States helped Pakistan's economy, removing the financial problems that had beset earlier regimes. The Pakistani army was also able to modernize with a $3.2 billion military-assistance package and U.S. -supplied weap- ons and training.
Training camps established in Pakistan and Afghanistan trained as many as 100,000 Muslims from dozens of countries. These mujahideen turned Afghanistan into what became known as the Soviet Union's Vietnam, leaving 15,000 Soviets dead and 37,000 wounded by 1989. More than 1 million Afghans died in the war, and 5 million became refugees. After a decade the Soviet Union could no longer afford to con- tinue its losing war in Afghanistan. Negotiations for a withdrawal were conducted under General Zia's auspices, and the agreement ending the conflict, the Geneva Accords, was signed on April 14, 1988. The Soviets withdrew in 1989, leaving behind a shaky Communist regime barely in control of Kabul. When the government in Kabul fell in April 1992, it was regarded by the mujahideen as a grand victory for Islam, and by the West as a major defeat for communism.
But the impact of the war continued to reverberate across Pakistan. Pakistan was beset by the drug trafficking and gunrunning that had helped fund the resistance to the Soviet occupation. Meanwhile, the freedom fighters in Afghanistan turned on each other, transform- ing the country into a lawless land. Ultimately the Taliban, Islamic fundamentalists, gained control of the country, making it a haven for militant Islamists.
Effects of the War in Baluchistan and NWFP
The influx of Afghan refugees across the border into Baluchistan and NWFP added another destabilizing element to an already volatile territory. Both regions had joined Pakistan for the promise of eco- nomic benefit and in the name of Muslim solidarity but had come to feel shortchanged by the arrangement. One source of disaffection in Baluchistan was the inequitable sharing of revenues and benefits from the province's natural resources. Natural gas, for example, discovered in the province in 1953, was fueling cities in Punjab by 1964. But at the time of the Soviet invasion, there was still no pipeline to the Baluchi capital, Quetta, and it would not reach the city until 1986 — brought in to supply a military garrison. Moreover, the federal government had long stressed the need for national unity over ethnic identity, and both Baluchis and Pashtun, with their strong cultural roots and tradition of independence, felt the brunt of this policy.
With more than 40 percent of Pakistan's land but only 5 percent of its population, most of them rural poor, the government saw little need to placate Baluchistan's population. The Baluchis represent a plural- ity but not majority of its inhabitants; Baluchis compose 45 percent, and Pashtun 38 percent, with the rest of the population of mixed or indeterminate ancestry. Though their plurality may be small, Baluchis regard themselves as the dominant power in the province. In NWFP, the Pashtun also agitated for more autonomy, with some calling for an independent Pashtun nation. Ongoing negligence of the provinces by Islamabad fueled the discontent.
The local population supported the war, however, and believed in the jihad against the Soviets. The ISI, Pakistan's intelligence agency, served as the conduit for the support to the mujahideen paid for by the CIA and Saudi Arabia, the two primary underwriters of the war against the Soviets. Though Zia ul-Haq, who endorsed and approved the anti-Soviet jihad, was head of the armed forces, he left direction of the Afghanistan campaign to the ISI. The ISI established camps where mujahideen volunteers trained, and the agency handled all logistical elements of funneling material to the Muslim warlords on the front lines. During this period the ISI, which had been discredited for intel- ligence lapses during Bangladesh's war of independence, regained its stature and power.
But the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan exacerbated conflicts between the Baluchis and Pashtun. Since the 1980s, more than 2 mil- lion Afghan refugees, most of them Pashtun, resettled in Pakistan, one-quarter of them in Baluchistan. The tide of Afghans fleeing over the border into Baluchistan led to charges by Baluchis that they were becoming minorities in their own homeland. Concurrently, with the Pashtun population swelled in the NWFP by the refugees, calls for Pashtun autonomy in the region became louder.
Ethnic tensions continued to build in Baluchistan. In October 1992 clashes between Baluchis and Pashtun erupted, sparked by the creation of 12 new wards in the municipality of Quetta. The Pashtun saw the change as an effort to reduce their representation and aid Baluchis in winning local elections. Baluchi disaffection with the federal government con- tinued as well. In 1998 three Baluchis hijacked a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) aircraft to draw attention to what they claimed was the discrimination of Baluchis by Pakistan and to protest what they believed were planned tests of nuclear weapons in Baluchistan.
Restoration of Civilian Rule
In 1980, with the National Assembly dissolved, Zia created a Majlis- i-Shoora, a council of handpicked advisers, to provide counsel and an appearance of communal rule. The council included intellectu- als, religious scholars, and professionals. Still, calls rose for an end to martial law and elections. In February 1981 the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) was founded. In March the govern- ment established a provisional constitution to replace the constitution of 1973, which had been abrogated by the martial law imposed at the time of Zia's coup.
General Zia sought a way to restore civilian rule while retaining the presidency. Under the Referendum Order of 1984 Zia scheduled a vote on the country's future through which he sought backdoor approval for his continued rule. The referendum asked voters if they approved of the Islamization process Zia had initiated and if they wanted an orderly transfer of power to elected representatives. Zia considered a yes answer to be the equivalent of a vote for his retention as president for five years. The referendum was held on December 19, 1984. Though boycotted by the MRD, General Zia claimed the results validated his continuing rule as president. He then announced that elections for national and provincial assemblies would be held in February 1985, although candidates would run as individuals, not as representatives of any political party.
While the MRD boycotted the elections, the public voted in large numbers. Since many known political opponents were off the ballot because of their boycott, many obscure representatives were elected. This gave the elections a veneer of democracy without Zia having to contend with established opponents in the newly elected national and provincial assemblies.
Following the election Zia nominated Muhammad Khan Junejo (r. 1985-88) as prime minister. Junejo lifted martial law and restored the constitution after extensive amendments were adopted at the behest of Zia that gave the prime minister little maneuvering room. Whereas the constitution of 1973 had vested most of the power in the office of the prime minister, Zia's constitutional changes greatly changed the power equation, elevating the president's position on a par with that of the prime minister. In November 1985 the Senate adopted the Eighth Amendment to the constitution. It gave the president the right to nominate the prime minister, provincial governors, and judges of the supreme and high court. The amendment allowed the president to call referenda on national issues, establish the legislative agenda, and order the prime minister to seek a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. Article 58 2(b), gave the president the right to dissolve the National Assembly at his sole discretion. Thus the government went from a parliamentary to a federal system. SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC)
In 1980 the president of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman (r. 1977-81), proposed creating a regional alliance in South Asia to promote greater cooperation among member states and regional peace, stabil- ity, and economic development. Representatives of regional states met in 1983 to consider the idea more thoroughly and decided to proceed. In December 1985 the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was launched. The seven member states were Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Members pledged that all action would be endorsed unanimously. Since then the summit conferences have provided a venue for lead- ers of these nations to discuss issues on social, economic, cultural, and other policies. A permanent secretariat's office is maintained in Kathmandu, Nepal. Though it has fostered improved regional rela- tions, it has proven less successful as a forum for resolving difficult bilateral regional issues, such as resolution of the Kashmiri conflict. India has consistently declined to endorse calls for using the SAARC for this purpose, as proposed by Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. As unanimity is required for actions, without India's approval the pro- posal cannot advance.
Zia's supporters claimed that previous political deadlocks had made the imposition of martial law imperative. Bestowing the power to dissolve the assembly upon the president would ensure such deadlocks would never end in a military takeover again, because the president could now simply dismiss the assembly in the event of such a crisis.
Junejo, despite his diluted power, fulfilled his promises, returning basic freedoms to Pakistanis. In December 1985 Junejo unveiled an ambitious five-point program to set the government and society on a more progressive and egalitarian course. The objectives included eco- nomic reforms, social justice, ending corruption, and cutting illiteracy in half. Under the initiative, in rural areas roads were built and villages received electricity.
Unafraid to antagonize powerful interests, Junejo pursued a for- eign policy developed with input from leaders across the spectrum of Pakistani politics. After martial law was lifted, generals who had grown accustomed to luxurious perks found their large staff cars replaced by small vehicles. In April 1988, at Ojheri Camp military base near Islamabad, an explosion at a weapons storage facility sent rockets rain- ing down on the city, killing hundreds of civilians. Junejo attempted to investigate the incident, which further inflamed military leaders. He was returning from a visit to South Korea on May 29, 1988, when President Zia dismissed Junejo, his government, and the national and provincial assemblies, using Article 58 2(b) of the constitution to jus- tify his action. Zia claimed a breakdown in law and order had left the government unable to conduct business. General Zia installed a care- taker government and promised elections in 90 days.
Zia's Death
On August 17, 1988, Zia, along with his military secretary, Najib Ahmed; ISI director Akhtar Abdur Rahman; the leadership of the army and other Pakistani officials; as well as the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphel (served 1987-88), went to Bhawalpur in Punjab to view a demonstration of tank maneuvers. On the return flight to Islamabad, the C-130 military transport they were aboard crashed shortly after takeoff, killing all 30 people on the aircraft. The cause of the crash was never identified, but suggestions of sabotage were raised. The report of the official inquiry was never released.
Political leaders gathered in Islamabad to determine how to deal with succession. The constitution stipulated that in the event of death, incapacitation, resignation, or removal of the president, the chairman of the Senate, a position held by Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1915-2006), was to take the position until a new president was elected. Military and civilian leaders agreed to proceed as constitutionally mandated. Thus Ishaq Khan assumed the presidency on August 17, 1988, an office he would hold until July 1993.
See also
Indpaedia has uploaded an extensive series of articles about the Pakistan Movement, published in Dawn over the years, and about the various Pakistani wars with India published in the popular media. By clicking the link Pakistan you will be able to see a list of these articles. The Pakistan Movement articles are presently under 'F' (for freedom movement).
