USSR- India relations
This is a collection of articles archived for the excellence of their content. |
Contents |
Vetoing in India’s favour
1957- 1971
Suchit Nair and Rajesh Sharma, March 2, 2022: The Times of India
Russia, and the erstwhile USSR, have always looked out for Indian interests in the UN Security Council, vetoing resolutions unfavourable to India starting from 1957. In all, there have been six instances when the Soviet Union blocked resolutions against India.
February 20, 1957
Concerned at the “lack of progress” in settling the Kashmir dispute, Australia, Cuba, the UK and the US moved a resolution requesting the president of the Security Council, the representative of Sweden, “to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the achievement of demilitarisation or to the establishment of other conditions for progress towards the settlement of the dispute... and the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force”.
The USSR vetoed the resolution, while Sweden abstained.
Australia, China, Colombia, Cuba, France, Iraq, the Philippines, the UK and the US voted in favour.
December 18, 1961
France, Turkey, the UK and the US moved a joint resolution in the Security Council, “deploring the use of force by India in Goa, Daman and Diu” and called “upon the Government of India to withdraw its forces immediately to positions prevailing before December 17, 1961”.
The resolution was defeated 7-4, with the Soviet Union, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Liberia and the UAE voting against the move. Those who voted in favour were Chile, China, Ecuador, France, Turkey, the UK and the US. Speaking in the debate, Soviet ambassador to the UN Valerian Zorin had said, “Those who defend Portugal are defending not the United Nations but colonialism, the most shameful phenomenon of the 20th century, although dozens of times they may assert the contrary.”
June 22, 1962
A resolution moved by Ireland, with backing from the US, urged the “Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations on the question (Kashmir) at the earliest convenient time with the view to its ultimate settlement”. It also appealed “to the two governments to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of negotiations”.
The USSR vetoed the resolution. Romania voted against it, while Ghana and the UAE abstained. Chile, China, France, Ireland, the UK, the US and Venezuela voted in favour.
December 4, 1971
A resolution piloted by the US calling for a ceasefire at the India-Pakistan border was vetoed by the USSR. Poland voted against it, while France and the UK abstained. Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria and the US voted in favour.
December 13, 1971
A US-sponsored resolution called upon the “Governments of India and Pakistan to take forth with all measures for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of the India-Pakistan borders”.
The USSR vetoed the resolution with Poland also voting against it. France and the UK abstained. Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, China, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria and the US voted in favour.
YEAR-WISE DEVELOPMENTS
1959: USSR pulls up ally China for killing Indian policemen
AS Bhasin, July 7, 2021: The Times of India
After the Kongka Pass incident where nine Indian policemen on patrol duty were killed in an ambush by the Chinese, which was more serious than the Longju incident, Nikita Khrushchev addressing the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Parliament, on 31 October 1959 deplored the incident and expressed the hope that the disputed border would be resolved by friendly consultations between the two neighbours. He described it “sad” and “stupid” to the correspondent of the CPI mouthpiece, the New Age, and again cited the settlement of the Soviet Union’s border with Iran as an example. Nehru, however, did not take the hint. There were visible signs of deterioration in relations between the two fraternal allies Soviet Union and China.
Nehru, too, remained discreet thereafter in asking Soviet support to resolve the dispute, so as not to embarrass Moscow. China, however, resented Soviet neutrality and continuation of their economic aid to India.
The Soviet leaders did not take a firm stance in public yet in private did not fight shy of deriding the Chinese leadership for creating a chasm in their relations with India, a non-aligned country, which was otherwise friendly towards China. Khrushchev had gone to Beijing on the occasion of the tenth anniversary celebrations of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and had a stormy meeting with the top brass of the Chinese leadership, which included Mao. Khrushchev spoke rather frankly and took the Chinese to task for their failures along the borders and in Tibet.
He said that despite Nehru blaming the Soviet Union regarding the Hungarian revolt, Moscow did not break its relations with India. Khrushchev added: He put the responsibility for loss of life in the Longju incident on China and did not believe the Chinese version of the events which said that India attacked first. To put the Chinese on the defensive, he said, no one was killed on the Chinese side, the casualties were among the Indians. As such the Tass statement was justified.
Finally, Mao said that “the border issue with India will be decided through negotiations”. Zhou justified the Chinese actions. Khrushchev told him, “You have been Minister for Foreign Affairs of [the] PRC for many years and should know better than me, how one can resolve disputed issues without (spilling) blood.” About this particular case, he said, “If the Chinese and the Hindus (Indians) do not know where the border goes between them, it is not for me, a Russian, to meddle. I am only against the methods that have been used.”
When Chen Yi said that he was outraged that he blamed China for aggravation of relations with India, Khrushchev retorted that he, too, was “outraged by your (Chen Yi’s) declaration that we are time servers. We should support Nehru for him to stay in power”. Khrushchev, too, blamed China for its failure to manage things in Tibet. He said: The events in Tibet are your fault. You ruled Tibet, you should have had your intelligence there and should have known about the plans and intentions of the Dalai Lama.
The tension on the border was escalating without any possibility of an amicable solution in sight. To minimise the incidents along the border, Nehru gave instructions to the security forces to reduce the possibility of any conflict with China, which, he said, “would also help us to clear our own minds and guide us in the future”. His instructions were: (i) To avoid actual conflict unless thrust upon us; (ii) On no account our forces to fire unless they were actually fired upon; (iii) Our forces must keep on our side of the border; and (iv) If Chinese armed detachment come to our side, it should be told to go back and only if they fired on our men, they could return fire. He wanted the Aksai Chin to be “left as it is”. He conceded that India had neither any check-post there nor any means of access to the area. For the present, he said, “We have to put up with the Chinese occupation of this North-east (western) sector and their road across it.”
He insisted that any question relating to major changes in the border such as “envisaged in the Chinese maps cannot be considered by us in this way”. Clarifying, he also said that the “status quo that has existed for some time, should be maintained”. India later, in a note to China, explained the absence of any Indian border outpost in the Aksai Chin due to it being sparsely populated. India mentioned that it had “no reason to anticipate any aggressive intention on the part of the Chinese government”.
Border outposts are a sign of sovereignty and announce the ownership of the country concerned. It may be recalled that in 1956 the prime minister had approved instructions for the setting up of check-posts “in all the disputed areas without delay, especially at the suitable points... and with regard to other inaccessible and uninhabited areas like Aksai Chin, we might send reconnaissance and survey parties”.
Aksai Chin by all accounts was a disputed area and the absence of any check-post was a major lapse on the part of India. In other words, India, after drawing the line to convert the ‘undefined’ border into a marked boundary in the western sector in 1954, took no steps to announce its sovereignty in the area by establishing either check-posts or planting even a flag to indicate its sovereignty in any form.
India was content to send patrol parties to these areas occasionally. About the survey parties, it was said: Indian survey and reconnaissance parties which went from Leh to Lanak La in 1954 and 1956 did not come across any evidence of Chinese occupation. For the first time in 1957 signs of intrusion by the outsiders were noticed at Shinglung and some places further north. Obviously such intrusions must have occurred in these places for the first time in 1957.
Later in Parliament, the prime minister said: It is a fact, which we may deplore, that in Aksai Chin area there is no representative of the Indian government; neither is one there now nor has one been there for some time... we can go there only, more or less, at the present moment after some kind of conflict and after exhibiting high mountaineering skills...
Though until 1958 Indian patrols had been going to places like Qaratag Pass, Haji Langar, a place close to Lanak La, and another place across the road on the Aksai Chin-China border, it remained a mystery that they failed to notice the 120-km road which was then under construction across Aksai Chin. If, however, they failed to meet any Chinese individual, it was nothing unusual, as Nehru said: “These territories are so high up that they are hardly inhabited, there is no communication, there are hardly any trees or any blade of grass.”
The writer is a historian
Excerpted with permission from Nehru, Tibet and China (published by Penguin India)
See also
USSR- India relations
